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Following on from Theory and the Disappearing Future, Cohen, Colebrook and Miller 
turn their attention to the eco-critical and environmental humanities’ newest and 
most fashionable of concepts, the Anthropocene. The question that has escaped 
focus, as ‘tipping points’ are acknowledged as passed, is how language, mnemo-tech-
nologies and the epistemology of tropes appear to guide the accelerating ecocide, and 
how that implies a mutation within reading itself—from the era of extinction events. 
There’s something uncanny about the very word Anthropocene. Perhaps it is 
in the way it seems to arrive too early and too late. It describes something that 
is still happening as if it had happened. Perhaps it is that it seems to implicate 
something about the ‘human’ but from a vantage point where the human would 
be over and done with, or never really existed in the first place. And so besides 
the crush of data there’s a problem of language to attend to in thinking where 
and when and who we are or could ever be or have been. Cohen, Colebrook and 
Miller do us the courtesy of taking the Anthropocene to be a name that marks 
both the state of the world and the state of language. They bring their consider-
able collective resources to bear on this state of language, that we might better 
weave words that attend to the state of the world.
McKenzie Wark, author of Molecular Red: Theory for the Anthropocene
With breathtaking fearlessness, the authors expose the full extent of the Enlight-
enment shell game: not only have ‘we’ never been modern, we’ve never even been 
human. This is the bedtime story for the advancing night in which all tropes are 
black, and the tropological grid in permanent black-out.
Sigi Jöttkandt, author of First Love: A Phenomenology of the One
Imagine this book as the masterpiece of a new Pascalian wager: the irreversible 
wave of extinction events may turn out to be nothing, a false signal overtaken by 
a surprise holding capacity of the earth; but if not, if it is not, at least this book 
will have been one of the most important that appeared towards the end.
Jonty Tiplady, 2009 Crasaw Prize winner and author of Zam Bonk Dip
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tems beyond 20th century anthropomorphic models and 
has stood, until recently, outside representation or address. 
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concerns material agencies that impact on biomass and 
energy, erased borders and microbial invention, geological 
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ity of extinction has always been a latent figure in textual 
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Preface 
Tom Cohen and Claire Colebrook 
When we originally conceived this volume the original title was Twilight 
of the Anthropocene. We liked the Nietzschean resonance, and the notion 
that by the time the Anthropocene arrived as a marked event, yet still 
to be consecrated by geologists, it was already far too late. By this we do 
not mean “far too late to save the planet.” The planet does not need to be 
saved; it existed before organic life, and will go on to exist for some time 
(probably) well after humans and well after organisms. The “lateness”—
or twilight—is not even a lateness for us. Indeed, one of the features of 
what has come to be known as the Anthropocene is that very few want 
to own up to being the guilty party: as soon as the Anthropocene was 
declared as a way of uniting humans once again, objections started pour-
ing in. Why would “we” want to sully the entirety of humanity by plac-
ing it as the author or agent of this late-modern event? So many declare, 
against the Anthropocene: “Not in my name!”: the Anthropocene is really 
the Capitalocene, the Corporatocene, or is better figured as a critical zone 
rather than one grand evil mess that includes all of humanity. And so the 
first way we would like to intertwine the concept of the Anthropocene 
with the notion of twilight is to argue that the idea was at once highly 
illuminating, suddenly sweeping away all concepts of the post-human, 
erasing the fiction of Cartesian “man,” and allowing humanity to appear 
clearly and distinctly, and yet the blinding nature of this light obscured 
so much. Only now, as the dazzling brilliance of the Anthropocene idea 
begins to wane, and we hear all the claims for different scales and narra-
tives, do we perhaps think to question both the logic of “anthropos” as 
the single agent of geological change and the cry from the other humans 
who accept the narrative of geological destruction but want to exempt 
themselves. It’s capitalism and corporations, not me, not my humanity. If 
8 Tom Cohen and Claire Colebrook 
the Anthropocene seemed to drown out other scales and figures with its 
blinding light, its dimming seems to have opened other narratives, and 
yet perhaps what is not questioned is the light of narrative as such. 
Everything appears both with conditions of visibility, but also of 
obscurity, and one might only become aware of constitutive blindness 
by way of another dimming of lights. (The “light” of reason progressed 
only by co-opting fire, coal, nuclear energy and the labor of many beings 
not blessed with the spoils of enlightenment; but reason can be made 
aware of that debt only when the source of light is waning, in an age of 
depletion.) Insofar as there is a “we” or an “us,” we cannot say, in good 
conscience, that we only found out that we were destructive once it was 
too late. The formation of a “we” is generated from destruction and from 
the recognition of destruction: humanity as global anthropos comes into 
being with the Anthropocene, with the declaration that there is a unity 
to the species, and that this unity lies in its power to mark the planet. To 
speak of twilight of the Anthropocene has a three-fold resonance: the 
concept is already waning precisely because the bet it placed on nam-
ing “Anthropos” once and for all has met with so many objections (usu-
ally objections from those who want to save humanity from the charge 
of global destruction) that seeming counter-narratives are being written 
(with capitalism, colonialism, patriarchy and corporate culture being 
offered as more nuanced ways of naming the component of the earth 
that has become the agent of systemic change). Second, this play of lights 
within the global narrative—of who, and when, and how—obscures 
the light of narrative as such: both the Anthropocene and its competi-
tors assume that the globe as a living system can be marked at certain 
points, and that these points are to scale. To question scale as such by way 
of the concept of twilight is not to reduce these narratives to human con-
struction but rather to place the human and narrative within syntheses (of 
before and after, the earth conceived as a globe and relatively enclosed 
space), and to acknowledge that the forces from which various scales 
and narratives are proposed are multiple and irreducible to any register. 
To illuminate is to (at least in part) occlude. Finally, in a far more paro-
chial manner, if we write of Anthropocene idols and twilight, this is not 
because we set ourselves apart as critical dragon-slayers, tearing down the 
great idols of theory and humanism to arrive at a properly post-human 
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apocalypse. On the contrary, we find ourselves still conversing with the 
critical names and manoeuvres of the past, and yet for all their power 
and for all the illuminating force of their declarations, belief in the world 
is at least as strong as it ever was. If, decades ago, Jacques Lacan posited 
the real as that which resists symbolization absolutely (Lacan 1991), 
and Paul de Man (1996) argued that there could be no theory of narra-
tive (for such a theory would be a narrative), and Luce Irigaray (1985) 
argued that figuration of the scene of truth was always speculative (gener-
ating some material substrate that would be the basis for the subject and 
knowledge), these attempts to hinder the Olympian self-regard of what 
defined itself as man ultimately resulted in reaction formations. Not only 
has the narrative of humans as a destructive species generated the imper-
ative to survive—if “we” discover ourselves to be an agent of destruction, 
then “we” must re-form, re-group and live on; the very critical motifs or 
idols that offered another way of thinking about the future became the 
means for a hyper-humanism. Somehow Lacan has enabled Slavoj Žižek 
to hold onto the motif of genuine revolution; a notion of deconstruction 
as textualism has allowed for various turns back to affect, matter, bodies 
and realism, and Luce Irigaray has found a new future for humanity by 
way of the East: “To go back and meditate starting from practices and 
texts of Eastern cultures, especially pre-Aryan aboriginal ones, can show 
us a way to carry on our History” (Irigaray 2002, 36). 
One of the unifying motifs across this volume, that all three of us 
explore in different registers, is that there is no “we,” no “anthropos” 
until, in a final moment of inscribed and marked destruction, a species 
event appears by way of a specific geological framing. When we began 
writing this volume some years ago, the Anthropocene was a relatively 
fresh notion, and seemed to promise—even if it was the Anthropocene—
some sense of a new modality of theory. This could either occur by way 
of generating viewpoints, framings or intuitions of an inhuman look, or 
of refusing the inscription of “the” human altogether. When, decades 
ago, Thomas Nagel posed the question “What is it Like to be a Bat?” he 
concluded that no matter how much information we might gather about 
bat behavior, experience, navigation and sense input, we could never live 
the bat in his batty world (Nagel 1974). Our slightly different project was 
to ask, “What is it Like to Be a Human?” and ‘What is it Like to think 
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without the Human?” Our various answers were no more generative of 
lived experience than Nagel’s. We can summon all the information we 
like; we can shift scales, read more and write more, but this reading writ-
ing animal, finding itself inscribed in the Anthropocene, cannot exit from 
inscription altogether and simply live: 
Observe the herd as it grazes past you: it cannot distinguish 
yesterday from today, leaps about, eats, sleeps, digests, leaps 
some more, and carries on like this from morning to night 
and from day to day, tethered by the short leash of its plea-
sures and displeasures to the stake of the moment, and thus 
it is neither melancholy nor bored. It is hard on the human 
being to observe this, because he boasts about the superi-
ority of his humanity over animals and yet looks enviously 
upon their happiness—for the one and only thing that he 
desires is to live like an animal, neither bored nor in pain, 
and yet he desires this in vain, because he does not desire it 
in the same way as does the animal. The human being might 
ask the animal: “Why do you just look at me like that instead 
of telling me about your happiness?” The animal wanted to 
answer, “Because I always immediately forget what I wanted 
to say”—but it had already forgotten this answer and hence 
said nothing, so that the human being was left to wonder 
(Nietzsche 1995, 87). 
When Nietzsche wrote about humans looking longingly at animal for-
getfulness he was more prescient even than his declarations of being 
untimely would promise. With all the evidence of human destruction—
or the human as that which finds and inscribes itself after destruction—it 
seems as though only an animal can save us, as though it might be pos-
sible now, finally, to become-animal. When Brian Massumi looks to the 
future by detailing what “we” can learn from animals about politics, he 
suggests a program of replacing the human, back to its animal milieu: 
This project requires replacing the human on the animal con-
tinuum. This must be done in a way that does not erase what is 
different about the human, but respects that difference while 
bringing it to new expression on the continuum: immanent 
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to animality. Expressing the singular belonging of the human 
to the animal continuum has political implications, as do all 
questions of belonging. The ultimate stakes of this project are 
political: to investigate what lessons might be learned by play-
ing animality in this way about our usual, all-too-human ways 
of working the political (Massumi 2014, 14). 
Our volume takes a different path from that of talking to the animals, or 
of repairing what is left of the human. Tom Cohen’s genealogy and geol-
ogy of the anthropos, shifts terrain from the problem of whether we—we 
humans—can legitimately know or feel what it is like to be other than 
human. There is no shortage of talk and lament regarding the human, 
and both its incapacity and capacity to think outside its all too human 
subjectivity. But all that talk about the post-human, the non-human, the 
inhuman and the problem of lumping all humans into the Anthropocene 
provides a way of sustaining the human as a problem. What if the human 
were an effect of its own delusions of self-erasure? What if there were no 
humanity other than that which is effected from the thought of the other-
than-human? We can think of this in many ways. One way would be to 
see the constant proclamations of overcoming humanism, Cartesianism 
and anthropocentrism as producing man as the being who can annihilate 
himself in order to become animal. 
Tom Cohen’s approach in this volume is to reverse the problem of 
anthropomorphism: it is not so much that “we” project “our” humanity 
onto nature, but that there is no “we,” no humanity until we chastise our-
selves for configuring nature in our own image (which does not exist). 
The mourning of humanity, the accusations that “we” have not attended 
sufficiently to our inhuman others, the extension of human rights or per-
sonhood to nonhumans: all these Anthropocene gestures are modes of 
generating a humanity that never was. Following Lacan’s declaration that 
there is no sexual relation, Joan Copjec asked us to “imagine there’s no 
woman” (Copjec 2002). Timothy Morton has also declared that there is 
no nature (Morton 2007). The lost, prohibited, yearned-for object of ful-
fillment does not exist outside structures of mourning. Today, we do not 
want to say “imagine there is no humanity”—no all-encompassing uni-
fied species unity charged with the crime of the Anthropocene—for that 
is the gesture of post-humanism, of thinking beyond the human. Rather, 
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there never is and never was the human, until perhaps some pious the-
orists thought there might be a beyond of the human or a humanity to 
come. Humanity comes into being, late in the day, when it declares itself 
to no longer exist, and when it looks wistfully, in an all too human way, at 
a world without humans. The human is an effect of a declaration of non-
being: “I do not exist; therefore I am.” 
It is in this respect that Hillis Miller will take up the notion that cli-
mate change is a linguistic event: just as one might say that the human is 
an effect of strategies of thinking the other-than-human, to say that cli-
mate change is ideological or linguistic is not to say that it isn’t real. It 
is to challenge the way one thinks about the morality, temporality and 
rhetoric of reality. As Bruno Latour argued, one of the great successes of 
the climate change deniers was the promulgation of a notion of a true 
reality that we might grasp behind all our figurations, twinned with the 
notion that science should ideally be ideology-free. Climate science, like 
all science, is composed and compiled from a series of dispersed institu-
tions and practices (Latour 2014). But there is no reality that we should 
try to grasp if only we could somehow get outside inscription or compo-
sition. Further, and this is where Hillis Miller draws on de Man’s concep-
tion of ideology: rather than see ideology as the constructed, linguistic, 
symbolic or cultural mask that conceals political reality, it is the notion 
of some pristine real prior to inscription that is ideological. At first this 
might seem to play into the hands of climate change deniers; for if this 
is so, then how would we ever know once and for all that climate change 
was anthropogenic? Your guess would appear to be as good or bad as 
mine. But that notion—the notion that science is as much a construc-
tion or rhetorical device as anything else—is a weak, and still ideological 
notion. If inscription goes all the way down, and if there is no nature, no 
climate, no humanity and no truth that would exist outside inscription, 
then what remains is the reading of inscriptions. This remainder operates 
at two levels. First, as Hillis Miller notes, “Language is deeply involved in 
this happening. It has been facilitated in part by climate change deniers, 
who believe the lies told by politicians and the media claiming that the 
evidence for ‘anthropogenic’ climate change is a hoax perpetrated by 
‘mad scientists,’ against the evidence.” To talk about language, inscrip-
tion, rhetoric and tropes is not to introduce textuality into an otherwise 
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scientific or material problem; every fact, every reported event, every 
filmed disaster, every declaration of drought, every discussion of just 
where the Anthropocene starts and stops is already within language. And 
language is material in a radical sense: not the medium through which 
thought communicates, but a multiplicity of relations and traces that 
enables what comes to experience itself as thought. In addition to the 
irreducible materiality of inscription and its resistance to being thought, 
there is a second more profound problem of inscription, which all three 
of us work with in writing this volume.  
To talk of inscription is not just to talk about language or even visual 
composition in its narrow sense; it is not only to concur with Latour that 
any scientific account is composed from technical readings, adjustments, 
concerns, interests and affect. Rather, it is to see the world, the earth, 
the climate—all these unities that we are witnessing as being changed 
utterly—as effects of complex systems of relations that are irreducibly 
multiple. As Stephen Jay Gould noted decades ago, “we” have a parochial 
interest in the survival of our species (Gould 1998). But one might go 
further, and say that there is no we, only a network of parochialisms, com-
posing now this and now that sense of urgency. To talk of saving human-
ity, or saving the planet, or even being past the tipping point is –neces-
sarily—to be perceiving a certain time and space from a certain scale, 
vantage point and network of syntheses. The tipping point was probably 
reached centuries or millennia ago for some living beings whose carnage 
was required in order to generate the “human” civilization that is now 
mourning its own demise.  
Our original intention, then, was to think about the Anthropocene as 
a twilight concept, as a form of half-recognition that can only occur in the 
moment of waning. And we also wanted to signal that what appears as 
a moment of sudden loss or intrusion—“look, we destroyed the planet! 
Who would have thought!”—was there all along. There was always 
destruction, always eco-cide, but “now” (for some) it has become read-
able (even if, for others, such destructive force was all too obvious, and 
human, all too human). 
Colebrook’s angle of entry is entirely through the orders of the aes-
thetic—which is to say, the materialities of inscription that, inacces-
sible to perception or memory regimes, give rise to perceptual grids, 
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“phenomenalities,” the cinematic hallucinations and aesthetic ideologies 
that have, in the case of anthropos, shaped not only the modes of refer-
ence, hermeneutics, and visibility that have accelerated the ecocidal log-
ics of any anthropocene beyond “tipping points,” but the problem of 
reading that subtended this arc. The “aesthetic” is called back to primacy 
of agency around the inverse way that the figure of the sublime had inhab-
ited, recuperated, diverted, or implicitly doomed the Euro-anthropic tra-
ditions of Western writings from which it derived.  
In each of these explorations, the “idols” that we cast about involve 
what has been ignored or largely omitted from the chorus of facts, cor-
porate media white-outs, green or sustainability imaginaries, and diver-
sionary activisms attending the topos of “climate change.” What has been 
suppressed is that language conventions and cognitive habits have abet-
ted or predetermined the accelerated mass extinction processes under 
way—irreversibly so. If the “man” of anthropos was a Greek invention, 
he appears with the very definition of the polis or the political that, for 
mysterious reasons, “we” are still trying to recover or re-inflate. The 
paralysis of the liberal and utopian left before the logics of climate change 
mirrors that of the humanists. This volume, accordingly, extends the 
cipher for reading the neganthropocene, today, back to where these terms 
seem, alone, to have been addressed in the twentieth-century “theory” 
canon: the work of Paul de Man. Our previous collaboration, Theory 
and the Disappearing Future: On de Man, On Benjamin (2012), explored 
this problem by extracting a “de Man” who appeared, from a twenty-first 
century perspective, to be writing of, or to, the “Anthropocene” avant la 
lettre—something quite distinct from the narrative of “deconstruction” 
and its self-mythologizing and branding. In resetting that narrative, it 
would appear that Derrida operated almost as a climate change denier, 
and in trying to cement his own legacy, occluded a materiality that would 
put the premise of “deconstruction” in doubt from within. By contrast, de 
Man went toward this locus.  
In this current volume “de Man” is honed into a cipher for the fol-
lowing question: if the passage today into an ecocidal script delegitimizes 
the forms of archival management, governance, and epistemologies that 
operate today, what do the materialities of inscription, the “epistemo-
logical critique of tropes” or “aesthetic ideology” more broadly have to 
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do with this ecocide? In many different ways, this volume approaches 
the passing of tipping points as a positive achievement for thought, and 
the irreversibility of ecocide as the invitation to a terminological reset 
of “idols.”  
All of our chapters, in different ways, depart from where our previ-
ous volume terminated: each begins where our first explorations left 
off by asking what tools might be available for a post-mortem of the 
Anthropocene as a rhetorical term or claim. 
~
As the writing of this book progressed, it was not so much the 
Anthropocene that was catching our attention as the Anthropocene 
idols: not just the disaster-mongers, emergency opportunists and eco-
cide impresarios who could market survival strategies, but the theorists 
who thought to find a new point of refuge. In its most explicit form one 
might think here of the criticism made by Naomi Klein of the forms of 
capitalism that profit from catastrophe, but one would also need to think 
about Klein’s own redemptive narrative in the same mode (Klein 2014). 
Only now, in this moment of “final” catastrophe, can humanity save itself 
from a capitalism that is now—finally—appearing at its most destructive 
and unsustainable. Turning to the Avatar solution (as typified by James 
Cameron’s 2009 eco-redemptive epic that retrieves holistic indigenous 
wisdom) and the imaginary of a return to 60’s social movements, the 
crashing of planetary life has one great virtue: it confirms the critique of 
twentieth-century socialism (even as the latter fed the same acceleration). 
It is interesting that the author of The Shock Doctrine, expects a “people’s 
shock” to stir the cognitive cavities of the multitude in a non-violent and 
inclusive “revolution” that would have to be so thoroughly cultural, sys-
temic, cognitive, and sudden as to exist only as one of those “people to 
come” that political discourse, if it is that, rallies itself while deferring.  
The complicities that Klein’s maneuver displays operate far more 
widely in a series of objections to the Anthropocene itself. It is as though 
only with the heavy-handed humanity-accusing declaration of the 
Anthropocene, could theory and the humanities revive itself by talking 
of some guilty humans who deprived us of our just and savable world. 
One might suggest that an older gesture of deconstruction—that all our 
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concepts of justice and democracy in their very corruption must promise 
a humanity to come—has now gained much broader purchase, even as 
a covert divestiture of responsibility. If “our” planet, and “our” human-
ity is broken then there is necessarily the promise of another humanity 
and another future, still. We see this at the end of all Hollywood’s Cli-fi 
fare. Here, though, is where one might channel Nietzsche, for whom the 
twilight of the idols is constitutive of a certain philosophical piety. It is not 
that master thinkers (or humanity) have fallen on hard times, but rather 
that the very declaration of hard times—of crisis, emergency, decadence, 
loss of reason, injustice–enables the pious elevation of the master thinker. 
For Nietzsche, a certain demand that the future is promised, and 
promised to us, follows from an experience of decadence. Reason, history 
and a promissory arrow of time are both modes of recuperation, of refus-
ing to experience the world as not necessarily for us, as not necessarily on 
a path of human moral improvement at all. Against this necessary sense 
of promise, a sense of history would entail a consideration of inscription, 
and of the contingent composition of order that allows narratives of cau-
sality, of relation, and of justification to range.1 The history of histories 
is just this war of inscriptions, but with this caveat: this history, and its 
sense of being for us, is always cobbled together after the event: 
Language began at a time when psychology was in its most 
rudimentary form: we enter into a crudely fetishistic mind-
set when we call into consciousness the basic presupposi-
tions of the metaphysics of language—in the vernacular: the 
presuppositions of reason. It sees doers and deeds all over: it 
believes that will has causal efficacy: it believes in the ‘I’, in 
the I as being, in the I as substance, and it projects this belief 
in the I-substance onto all things—this is how it creates the 
concept of ‘thing’ in the first place … Being is imagined into 
everything –pushed under everything—as a cause; the concept 
of ‘being’ is only derived from the concept of ‘I’ … In the 
beginning there was the great disaster of an error, the belief 
that the will is a thing with causal efficacy,—that will is a fac-
ulty … These days we know that it is just a word (Nietzsche 
2005, 169). 
Preface  17
Following Nietzsche, it is in the contemporary experience of reason’s fail-
ure—of the world being at odds with reason, hope and piety (or human-
ity in general)—that reason becomes evermore shrill: there must be 
a future and it must be human (and by human, we mean “mine,” ours, 
and not some other unimaginable life or non-life). The “twilight of the 
anthropocene idols” does not refer to a loss of reason, of critical thinking, 
of our human potentiality. On the contrary, the very figure of a human-
ity oriented towards a history of flourishing, self-realization, universal 
scope and a proper future relies upon an accidental and temporary cor-
ruption. For Nietzsche, a dream of human futurity (always better, always 
more human, more rational) is an eternal idol that relies upon declaring 
its own threatened existence: “I am becoming extinct, therefore I am, and 
ought to be.” 
For thousands of years, philosophers have been using only 
mummified concepts; nothing real makes it through their 
hands alive. They kill and stuff the things they worship, these 
lords of concept idolatry—they become mortal dangers to 
everything they worship. They see death, change, and age, as 
well as procreation and growth, as objections,—refutations 
even. What is, does not become; what becomes, is not…So 
they all believe, desperately even, in being. But since they can-
not get hold of it, they look for reasons why it is kept from 
them. ‘There must be some deception here, some illusory 
level of appearances preventing us from perceiving things 
that have being: where is the deceiver?’—’We’ve got it!’ they 
shout in ecstasy, ‘it is in sensibility! These senses that are so 
immoral anyway, now they are deceiving us about the true 
world.’ Moral: get rid of sense-deception, becoming, history, 
lies,—history is nothing but a belief in the senses, a belief in 
lies (Nietzsche 2005, 167). 
More specifically, as outlined by Hillis Miller, one can observe that an 
entire rhetoric of lies, hoaxes, manufacture, ideology and concealment 
has allowed climate change denial to survive. Whatever is experienced—
whether it be scientific data, an absence of rain, freak storms—it is pos-
sible to posit a deeper truth, behind these lies: that climate change is the 
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grand conspiracy fiction of the left. If we insist here that climate change, 
financial brigandry and eco-cide are real and inscriptive events this is 
because we are committed to reading materialities. 2 
The truth is composed from these inscriptions—with the inscription 
of sea levels, extinction rates, conspiracy theories, dreams of revolution, 
post-apocalyptic reveries, dire warnings, and geo-engineering proposals 
all being material events.3 What we insist upon is that rather than talking 
about what these inscriptions must mean for us, we should read: do not 
see the snow storm as a sign that there’s no global warming, as it does 
not erase or allow us to read as secondary all the other matters at hand 
(droughts, floods, resource depletion, extinction); we do not see a rise in 
employment as a sign that there was a brief recession that must (like pre-
vious recessions) return to normal. Do not read catastrophe as a sign that 
there must be a humanity to come. More importantly still, perhaps if one 
began to read catastrophe—rather than fold it about one’s own person, 
world and temporality—one might have to confront a radical temporal-
ity, in which what comes to pass might not be in the order of history. In 
this respect one might draw upon Michel Serres’s conception of history 
as a strata of inscription, where certain lines, marks, events and orders 
initiate relations among traces that will proceed until one reads and imag-
ines not a time of progress but a sublime becoming (one not amenable 
to the line of time as we know it). In his book on Rome Serres depicts 
the history of a space as a confluence of contingent inscriptions—akin 
to the emergent creation of a termite hill. In the beginning is a random 
collision that acts as an attractor; far from seeing this line of catastro-
phe as promising a justice to come, the task of reading is one of retrac-
ing towards contingency, with each step back giving nothing more than 
marks and reversals: 
Imagine the ground of Rome after a millennium of tram-
pling by the Romans. Imagine the earth of the forum after the 
pounding of the feet of the mob. And now, decipher that ich-
nography. This is the final painting of the Herculean meadow, 
this is the initial painting of Rome; these paintings have pre-
scribed every direction or meaning. There is prescription of 
every direction or meaning before the inscription of a single 
direction or meaning. In the beginning is the ichnography. 
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That is to say, the integral, that is to say, the sum, the summary, 
the totality, the stock, the well, the set of meanings or direc-
tions. The possible, capacity. Each defined direction or mean-
ing is only a scenography, that is to say, a profile seen from a 
certain site (Serres 2015, 30).  
Chapter One 
Trolling “Anthropos”—Or, Requiem for  
a Failed Prosopopeia 
Tom Cohen 
Another form of convalescence, which I sometimes prefer, is 
sounding out idols. The world has more idols than realities: 
this is my “evil eye” on the world, this is my “evil ear” as well. 
Posing questions with a hammer, and perhaps, hearing 
in reply that famous hollow sound that indicates bloated 
intestines—what a pleasure for someone with ears even 
behind his ears…. Even this work—the title gives it away—
is above all a recuperation, a sunspot, a little adventure into a 
psychologist’s idle hours. And perhaps a new war, too? 
Nietzsche – Preface, Twilight of the Idols
1. Daybreak in the Ideovomitorium 
Again…. ? Is there time for another replay, or too much time, in the non-
now of 2015—that is, as the geo-political and geo-rhetorical apparatuses 
compensate for what may take years, still, to enter the normative imagi-
nary: that those tipping points, the ones that the temporal imaginaries of 
ecological protest want to outrun, pre-empt, save from, or mutate with, 
have passed, tripped, entered the phase of vortex-like accelerations and 
back-loops, taken any “decision” away from us, introduced something 
like a politics of managed extinction going forward (already visible)? It 
would be the year, or date hypothetically, to which the geo-morphic and 
bio-morphic scar of a human or Anthropocene age would be, by some 
future archivist, indexed. Since the title of this volume was to pivot on 
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“Twilight of the Anthropocene” or “the Anthropocene Idols,” one enters 
an operatic mise en scene. Even when Nietzsche uses this imprint, it con-
verts (and of course tweaks or mocks) Wagner, draws on that tired use 
of “twilight” to romanticize a passing, or passed, epochality, as it always 
seemed. Here, in what we will call the Ideovomitorium, recovering from 
a sort of Walpurgis Nacht in which an irreversible calculus has slipped 
or passed—let’s just say, or call them broadly, ecocidal tipping points—
there is no twilight really to mourn. Waking into the new day, nonethe-
less, seems disorienting, sunless, encrusted from a long night of cogni-
tive dissipation…. Why, rather than drone on about “twilights” of the 
Anthropocene, or more strictly, its cognitive “idols,” would one not want 
to rush, first, to the daybreak beyond that? 
Nietzsche’s evil ear with “ears even behind his ears” in the above quo-
tation would entertain itself by sounding out tinny and hollow idols—a 
“recreation” and by-play from the task of transvaluating all values. This 
may all sound somewhat different if we update ourselves from the noon 
of Zarathustra—where a hyperbolic logic is turned against the “human” 
as previously constructed, before what is called, sometimes, a responsi-
bility to an “Earth.” That hyperbolism may be inverted in the hypobo-
lisms of today. That is, of that other noon moment, today’s twilight of the 
“Anthropocene” where we witness the passing of tipping points, in which 
a broader ecocidal extinction event is accelerated, and this before a “last 
man” global tele-culture in which this monumental moment is registered 
with a blink (if at all). One might think that this passing would draw hys-
terical philosophic or media attention. The proactive project of the early 
responses to “climate change”—that of the ecological thought, the holis-
tic and organicist reflexes—has given rise (if not fully passed to) what 
we would have to call the ecocidal sublime. What are the idols of “the 
anthropocene,” then, today, if not the proliferating cognitive theatrics of 
what one must call, finally and with some relief, climate comedy? There is 
something comic about today’s other or new noon—that, say, of “peak 
human” (or Human 3.0), passing unnoticed in the tele-epoch of the last 
man. —Ah Nietzsche, naif. So far as twilights go, you had it easy—the pass-
ing of cognitive empires, the noon or shadowless moment of Western self-orga-
nization or regard, the locating of a target.  
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The shadowless noon of Zarathustra is parodically inverted in today’s 
impassivity of last man settings when “climate change” arrives, and the 
ecocidal races are on. They are on now. They are also, in a sense, over 
before arrival. So a very small hammer comes out again, this tool of tools, 
when much seems exposed before the irreducibility of extinction events, 
which delegitimize every political organization and epistemography to 
date. Before this trope of “climate change,” discursive practices appear 
checked, exposed as rhetorical regimes intertwined with cognitive spells, 
feedback loops, short-circuits, end-running, a gaming of cited “laws.” 
One might grow to suspect that climate change had something, after all, 
to do with epistemographic regimes, unstable conventions of reference? 
Clive Hamilton reminds us that an entire trajectory of utopian thought 
on which “we” rely, was not only a parenthesis of post-war Western 
hyper-industrial affluence, now withdrawn, but itself fueled the same 
ecocidal acceleration [2012]. One must develop a taste, here, for apo-
ria—and tune out the flabby chorus of last man reactivism (comedic) for 
whom the thought, today, of extinction events is deferred as something 
cynical, outside the tribe, another excuse. But the reflex of mourning 
was not for “us,” despite its ejaculation and fetishization: one has always 
wanted to restore what was never there entirely, anthropos, who seems 
to return today in ungainly contortions and mimic memory. Perhaps 
mourning was for the biotica wiped out going millions of years forward 
in what seemed a decade of procrastination and discursive con games, 
after all the remarkable accidents that brought about this opening: lucky 
meteor strikes (the dinosaurs), just right positioning near a star (“the 
sun”), diverse lucky catastrophes and inscriptive events that made anthro-
pos appear, among other hominid types and cognitive orders.4 
Language and “climate change”: the first non-term dissolves, today, 
to absorb hyper-technologies of script and data streaming, tele-market-
ing, mnemo-technics in exponential digital mutations. This relationship 
between our language conventions, referential practices, and ecocide 
is set aside generally today for a number of reasons. One gives all the 
attention to scientific reports and their mediacratic dilutions or political 
manipulation. One perhaps ticks off the burgeoning if not cascading and 
interlocked climate trauma sprouting: megadroughts, accelerating melt-
offs, shock flooding, heat wave die-offs, then of course climate wars. It 
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should have been obvious, this lack of attention to cognitive language, 
and represents a certain blind, an unscratchable itch. Even in the most 
pragmatic sense, key terms and tropes of “the climate debate” have been 
disastrous, a retinue of flaccid romanticisms or organic metaphors of 
recovery, sustainability, environmentality, and so on, coupled with sopo-
rific and numbingly descriptive scientisms (“global warming”). It was a 
discourse engineered for failure and exploited as such by corporate media 
(certainly in the Anglo or Murdoch-news nations). One gags on the iro-
nies: the term “Anthropocene” can only arrive in (or after) the twilight of 
what it names, so it can only anticipate or legitimize itself from a future 
recognition of it, after a disappearance it implies is accomplished. It proj-
ects a proleptic anterior “inscription.” It would have inscribed a proper 
name into crashed life-systems, “earth,” mutated materialities, defaced 
surfaces, exploited genetic codes—an inscription that would have to be 
read (that is, given recognition) by another eye entirely. It is driven by 
an aesthetic compulsion. Today’s geographers double back to contain 
the meme they unleashed, as when they seek now to mark “its” start (the 
traces of nuclear fission, say, after Hiroshima?). It operates as a destroyer 
of anthropisms. It is a proleptic memorial of ecocide from a back-glance 
that is not anthropoid at all.5  
But the term is a bluff that mutates: it is readily appropriable by 
corporate rhetorics telegraphing a new ethics of adaptation and geo-
engineering projects; it erects a Eurocentric trope into a universal—the 
Aristotelian anthropos, male and Greek, possessor of logic and reason, 
the artifice of the Greek dawn, and so on. It is not a question of there 
being rather a better name, a Sinocene, or a Gynocene, or a Bacteriacene.6
Or, if the future looks back from the perspective of artificial intelligence, 
robotics and digital “life,” then “Anthropocene” as a term would be in bad 
grace—a destructive time of piggish and ruinous organic life, best sup-
pressed. Does not the U.S. “Hobby Lobby” ruling, after all, give not only 
personhood but personality to the “corporation” entity, this corporeally 
non-existent supra-organism, accepted by the Supreme Court of the U.S. 
as having beliefs and feelings that cannot be overlooked? This supra-
organism without a body made a clever move overleaping and consoli-
dating “Citizens United” mere endorsement of its “personhood.” There 
are nations that give this recognition to porpoises or dogs, after all. So 
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it expands again from being a “person” to supplanting the entire facade 
of subjectivity: this time, the corporation is “more human than human,” 
and will fully take over (and evacuate) its host organism. It is religious, 
against abortion, for human “life”; it is for family values after all. The out-
line of personhood has now been invaded and displaced, downgrading 
the organic or old variety—the messy era of ruinous hyper-industrial 
civilization, anthropoid, best forgotten.  
Of course, this brings another inversion and it explains why we, rather 
than being outraged, seem to shrug at the same time. Perhaps the ascrip-
tion of personhood to corporations might be true, after all. It is not that 
the corporations are like “us,” but that the structure of the “we” sees itself 
vaguely in the non-existent corporation’s disembodied algorithms. The 
“we,” after all, the premise of tribal or caste “personhood,” is an artifice 
independent from any speaker, one that technically “does not exist” 
(Stiegler 2014, 12).7 The corporation is mocking human anthropomor-
phism. The “Anthropocene,” if it exists, is not that of a hominization in 
which “man” mastered technologies to achieve his apex of planetary 
power. Rather, it is the hominid as undefined full spectrum organism 
(fingers, hands, cognition, mnemonically driven) through which host 
technics would incarnate and evolve—to the point at which it might 
re-engineer or shed the host organism, thus enabling the species-split 
recently engineered (in “2015,” say), which implicitly accompanies the 
“breakaway civilization” of a neo-feudal klepto-mediacratic hyper elite. 
Even the meme of “inequality” is circulated and sported as a distraction.  
What are the idols of the Anthropocene? Writing from what we call 
“2015” one has a certain vantage, even a theatrical responsibility, to note 
some recent turns in the road of time. Those are not, necessarily, the rup-
ture of the international “legal” order, the flaring of wars and collapse of 
nominal democracies; those are not the proliferation and acceleration of 
“climate change” debacles (mega-droughts, air-pocalypses, breaking ice 
shelves, resource wars); those are not the flare-ups of Ebola or ISIS, and 
severed heads dangled on videos cut by British-born rappers—and so 
on, a ripe list. Rather, I limit myself to two events that passed unremarked 
largely. The first is the passive recognition by Western states that the eco-
cidal “tipping points” have basically passed. This rewrites the “noon” that 
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Twilight of the Idols invokes in “How the True World became a Fable: the 
History of an Error”: 
How The ‘True World’ Finally Became A Fable
The History Of An Error 
1. The true world attainable for a man who is wise, pious, virtu-
ous,—he lives in it, he is it. (Oldest form of the idea, relatively 
coherent, simple, convincing. Paraphrase of the proposition ‘I, 
Plato, am the truth.’)  
2. The true world, unattainable for now, but promised to the man 
who is wise, pious, virtuous (‘to the sinner who repents’). 
(Progress of the idea: it gets trickier, more subtle, less compre-
hensible,—it becomes female, it becomes Christian ...)  
3. The true world, unattainable, unprovable, unpromisable, 
but the very  thought of it a consolation, an obligation, an 
imperative. (Basically the old sun but through fog and scepti-
cism; the idea become elusive, pale, Nordic, Konigsbergian.’)   
4. The true world—unattainable? At any rate, unattained. And 
as unattained also unknown. Consequently not consoling, 
redeeming, obligating either: how could we have obligations to 
something unknown? … (Gray morning. First yawn of reason. 
Cockcrow of positivism.)   
5. The ‘true world’—an idea that is of no further use, not even as 
an obligation,—now an obsolete, superfluous idea, consequently 
a refuted idea: let’s get rid of it! (Bright day; breakfast; return of 
bon sens and cheerfulness; Plato blushes in shame; pandemo-
nium of all free spirits.)   
6. The true world is gone: which world is left? The illusory one, 
perhaps? ... But no! we got rid ofthe illusory world along with the 
true one! (Noon; moment of shortest shadow; end of longest 
error; high point of humanity; INCIPIT ZARA THUSTRA.’) 
(Nietzsche 2005, 171). 
This is fine as far as it goes, but what if Zarathustra doesn’t fill out the 
script? Benjamin had already posed this question in dissing the Overman, 
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and displacing him, simply, with what he termed the Unmensch—a fig-
ure he describes as that which happily cannibalizes and destroys “men.”8
Today, this “noon” is bio-material: the time of peak human, peak water, 
peak species, and the acceleration of irreversible ecocide. So, one might 
channel Nietzsche’s Twilight to test some idols of the Anthropocene, to 
scan about without the requirement, generally, to return in some sort 
of redemptive reflex to save a twentieth-century cognitive legacy or to 
somehow save “the planet.” “2015” interrupts by exceeding the tragic 
rhetoric warning of global warming, accelerated ecocide, or extinction. I 
would suggest, rather, that something like climate comedy is in order, now 
that tipping points are in the back mirror. 9 
I have changed my positions, so to speak, on several things (not that 
those are particularly relevant and I mention them only in candor). One 
scrambles to keep up with the accelerations themselves, the sheer tempo-
phagy. I no longer find the sobriquet and place-holder “climate change” 
anything more than tinny; yet a temporary replacement, such as ecocidal 
acceleration, is no less so: it merely draws the perspective from an event 
to a process of which the cognitive addressee (“we”) is itself a product 
and accelerant. If I allow myself a sort of hypobole, to the degree that the 
import of the “resistance to theory” (de Man [1986]) is parallel today 
to the manifest resistance to “climate change”—to its re-cognition, to a 
discourse incorporating it, to responsibility—it would be because both 
converge on the “materiality of inscription” that puts into question the 
entire cognitive programs of, well, “anthropos.” And here another bit of 
climate comedy returns. To give this a little piquancy, I’ll propose a rec-
reation, intended with a very straight face, in the following hypothesis: 
that rather than having arrived at a geo-bio-technic impasse that requires 
the total retirement of literary interests from the scientific-philosophical-
economic stage, one can posit something like a literary structure to “cli-
mate change,” one that even guarantees ecocide. When I say “structure” 
I am trying to obey protocols, be timid—but one might almost substi-
tute cause. Exploring this would require, for a moment, detaching oneself 
from the frontier logics encountered today: that the “norm” we want to 
return to never was a norm, but rather an abnormal parenthesis. Ecocidal 
thought compels a new (intellectual) ethics, which would re-read the 
entire archive, in turn, and rewrites geographisms and agency, and so on. 
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What fades today is what mobilized the ecological thought or, for that 
matter, the over-late appropriations from the Left (Naomi Klein [2014]). 
One abandons the premise used so far: that it was ever a matter of sci-
entifically bringing to light an unwelcome truth in order to get a global 
response that would over-ride corporate media denialism and addicto-
genic accelerations. But this was naïve: they would not stop in any case, 
but rather accelerate (say, emissions)—after dividing populations from 
wealth and control of resources, or preparing a technologically enhanced 
survivor caste for the next generations. 
This anticipates a second signal shift or event of “2015,” one which 
future archivalists will wonder over. The current chatter about “inequal-
ity” represents a smokescreen or fop in this regard (Thomas Piketty’s 
meme [Piketty 2014]). That is, this timid word suggests a balance to 
return to, ideally, called “equality,” and insinuates the past equilibrium 
can be recovered. This typically misreads the situation of today—which 
must be read from “climate change,” which is to say, after tipping points, a 
sort of ecocidal sublime and the backglance of future imaginaries. These 
imaginaries or calculations are widely known—one might begin with 
the 2003 Department of Defense report suppressed by Bush at the time, 
which dismisses any “war on terror” and envisages mega-droughts, mass 
climate migrations, population culling and perma-war (starting, well, 
right about now). If one allows that the delay of aid to Ebola-stricken 
Africa (much remarked on, including by the U.N. Secretary-General) 
was not entirely innocent, one might say bifurcations are already well 
in place. One might note the climate comedy of fortress Europe scurry-
ing to save face (and a few boat drownees from North Africa, as if this 
were not a trickle compared to what’s coming), or observe the outright 
doom cast on the stateless Rohinga—enslaved, drowned, sold, or pushed 
back to sea with an occasional water bottle as disposables, a preliminary 
test case in select population disavowal and becoming waste. Of course, 
as with Oedipus, it is fruitless to look for the cause of the wreckage or to 
defer some coming catastrophe; we are in the middle of it already, or in 
fact late, in a twilight of sorts, since from the point of view of any other 
contemporary life form or living system, “we” are the catastrophe. This is 
why it is the term “extractivism,” which is more primordial and, arguably, 
precedes even “Capital” heard or thought as a totalizing evil agency that 
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we resist but are caught in. One also might take into account today that 
any Anthropocene would be a subspecies of what Derrida nails as human-
ualism—which includes the prioritization of the hand and the senses as 
configured by historical regimes, of which the haptic-optic interface is a 
key dominant.10 This gives a hint of what I mean by climate comedy. It 
suffuses, perhaps, a spectrum of recent Hollywood Cli-fi fare seemingly 
designed to mop up the climate change imaginary—since they routinely 
have survivors and new beginnings tacked on (message: “Chill, we win”). 
One must admire the efficiency of what would be the greatest engi-
neered mass wealth transference since Genghis—under the cover of the 
“2008 financial crisis” (in which the “shock doctrine” is turned by Capital 
against itself). It is interesting that Naomi Klein, who codified this anal-
ysis, is left with no other turn than to argue, before the immutables of 
climate change that shred any utopist calculus, for a “people’s shock”—
resulting, optimally, in a new people’s movement like that of the U.S. civil 
rights movement (that is, her memory tapes of heroic victory—ignoring 
the current state of re-tribalization under climate change pressure). One 
cannot do away with the imaginary of the political “we,” yet what if the 
problem, so to speak, lay elsewhere: in the machinal hypotheses of the 
“we,” as practiced (always human on human), tribally posted, exclusion-
ary, inventing the closure that, briefly ameliorative for positing an author-
ity of the imaginary “collective” but structured, already, like and as a cor-
poration—and corporation as “person” specifically. What if there were 
no outside of this impasse, today, none at all, because any discourse of 
resistance is both generated or absorbed? This too would lie with how 
referents were contracted, generated, back-looped: the result would be the 
“prison-house” of short-circuited referentials, memes, hashtags, end-run-
ning with algos, derivatives.  
To open this portal to take a look occurs in a lightless place, which 
is nonetheless not to be considered joyless or scary—since it precedes 
Western tropologies of “light,” heliotropism (Plato), the Enlightenment, 
the memory regimes by which something like the eye or seeing were con-
flated with knowing in Plato’s early card trick of fusing the two in the verb 
eidein.11 And there are two new rules, to surveying these re-organizations 
of “the inorganic.” First, not just that tipping points are past and “we” 
can now pause to absorb the implications of irreversibility—which alter, 
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in essence, how the entire archive of scripts have been read or transmit-
ted—but that everyone knows this. Most aware of all are the hyper-elite 
and so-dubbed “.001 %,” who implicitly fund and tolerate the mass anaes-
thesia of corporate denialism for the supposed public, while vacuuming 
up and locking down the future resources that would define survival in a 
generation and more. Everything “knows”—from bio-organisms in muta-
tion due to global warming, to extincting life forms, to migrating spe-
cies. And yet, we “know” in a way that includes all variations of occlu-
sion, denialism, affirmation, dissimulation, and acceleration. This marks 
vast portions of our pre-occupations and consciousness. Since social and 
ideational exchange tends to be a management of conscious hypocrisies, 
this produces a generalized climate change “unconscious” that can be read 
everywhere, at all points, less stuffed into individual psyches than played 
out in the still public spaces marked by occlusion. One must discard 
the Enlightenment tropology, of course, which assumed that “climate 
change” was a shocking secret that science, bringing to light, would foist 
on societal governance to address—as if “enlightened self interest” were 
the market’s desideratum. Yet this precludes unrealistically the alternate 
scenario: not that a collective humanity would come together against a 
shared threat, as if an asteroid were to strike collectively (though one can 
imagine first checking where and what cities, reflexively, before signing 
up, not to mention the e-casino economy’s response). Rather, one might 
find the opposite—a reassertion of competitive groups and tribalisms, 
virtual combat of non-organic “species” (military-telecommunications 
systems, corporate networks, political constituencies, “human” types and 
a breakaway civilization enhanced, today, by different access to resources, 
financial mafias, proprietized science, bio-technologies). It has become 
easy to point to something like the hyperbolics of “propaganda” within 
media systems (the U.S. very much on spot). Each would be without 
“legitimacy”—since ecocide and accelerating climate change delegitimize 
received governmental structures. One can crystallize propaganda as a 
targeted discourse for mnemonic engineering, the insertion of new rep-
etitions (Potemkin inscriptions). Yet one defers concluding a parallel de-
legitimation of cognitive and hermeneutic settings. Entering a supposed 
“internet of things” brings a double-inflection here. The telepolis absorbs 
and disconnects, totalizes and pretends to seal itself off. It manages the 
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cognitive traffic of tropological nervous systems and memes. But “cli-
mate change” is a stand-in term for a radical materiality that eluded the 
Western epistemological systems and “dialectical materialist” offspring. 
Everything appears caught in the re-iterations and vibratory shaking of 
this tectonic impact, exposing discourse as what it had always been—
varying forms of power rhetoric shaped and instituted in relation to tech-
nologies of memory, knowledge bases, and theft. There is certainly room, 
given the abyssal performance to date of the reigning trance, to question 
and dissolve the rhetorical premises of these sentient locusts expropriat-
ing the last terrestrial life-systems and resources in quest of energy. Is one 
of the blindnesses, today, the grab-bag of twentieth-century tropes and 
critical legacies still regurgitated in order to clothe and manage, name 
or manipulate, disguise and game their disappearance—where some-
thing like “man” has become and performs like the unliving, the “death 
machine” that Chris Hedges accuses corporations of manifesting, theo-
logically considered?12 Moreover, anyone wanting to follow, hail, or claim 
a meme of justice has, it seems, to prioritize “social” justice—human on 
human “ethics,” purportedly—and must ignore that a certain justice can 
be perceived as turning against the entire global Anthropocene “culture” 
and Last Man passivities and corruption, thus putting in question the 
sacred composition of the “social,” the “we,” the utopist together with the 
cognitive and financial (“fascist”) cartels at the other end of an awkward 
and shared spectrum. 
To borrow from Bill Maher, there are now “new rules”: regardless of 
the supposed opinions, spin, strategies of interest, white-outs, capture 
of affect and attention, and so on. First, everyone knows—and, moreover, 
all so-called ideologies, religious investments, academic consignments, 
and prognoses register as the literary agents caught in rhetorics of power, 
reference, stupefaction (overload), and perceptual trance read back, 
as it were, from the logics of climate change. This might even call for a 
return to certain surgical insights into the epistemology of tropes and 
their relation to ecocide—that is, if we view the “Anthropocene” as the 
latest attempt to name a human trajectory beginning with its initiation, 
the theft of fire, the technogenesis of archival regimes and we’s. Second, 
having passed tipping points a “new” or perhaps prehistorial template 
emerges in which differential questions arise, no longer subjugated to 
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projects of recuperation. Third, “we” have entered into a zone that must 
be explored, but does not return to the mother ship this time, nor add 
to the imaginary toolbox of amelioratives or the drug-hits of Hollywood 
imaginaries. Fourth, this other noon, or anti-noon, produces an inverse 
“twilight of the idols” in which climate comedy emerges, and in which a 
Thor-hammer is of less use than a quiet tuning fork or perhaps speculum. 
Does one write, today, whether one wishes to or not, before and for a 
somewhat different receptor organ than what we called, once, an evil ear 
or eye? It may be a bit corporeally provincial to speak of such isolated 
organs in the era of info-bytes and data harvesting, Facebook “subjectivi-
ties,” and the “breakaway civilization” (Catherine Austin Fitts13) of the 
hyper-elite. That is, at the current stage, which is quite premature, in the 
spirit to be cultivated today, not of ethical outrage or advancing technoc-
racies, not of environmental pragmatisms or sustainability rhetoric, but 
from the spirit of climate comedy—“as a recreation and spot of sunshine,” 
and perhaps a new war? 
In this imaginary, the term “twilight” is a bit jejune—holding on to a diur-
nal, natural, organic trope for what is not really an occurrence in such terms. 
Dawns, twilights, noons, midnights. The proper name “Anthropocene,” of 
course, enters in its twilight, as a term with a very short half-life, engineered for 
distraction. And engineered for perpetuation of anthropos’ universalist claims 
(now, in parting , to the entire human “era”). There remains a rather prag-
matic question here, which can be posed with barely a straight face, assuming 
you cling to your inner anthropos still, gears whirring , recuperations pre-pro-
grammed, in the mode of resilience if no longer “sustainability” (or so the rheto-
ric). Why—again, straight face—in a decade in which societies were informed 
that a threat emerged to their collective existence and longevity, were they 
unable to come together in any fashion or form as one (let’s not mention Paris, 
where now lobbyists will do the negotiations and where the numbers undercut 
the pretext). As we see today, in the summer of 2015, the “they” fragments into 
competing tribes of all sorts, vagrant nationalisms, closing off media and inter-
net enclosures or, say, ecographies. China, for instance, would curtail “Western 
values” in its textbooks and devises a self-sufficient internet—all harassed by 
the background music of collapsing ecosystems, mega-drought, disappearing 
resources (water), and so on, with a list that is boring to tick off since it is end-
less in details and combinatoire? Why instead of a “universalist humanity” is 
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one delivered to its competitive fragmentation, with independent memory sys-
tems and “facts” arising , the so-called West in the pack? The best one might 
say to those who, belatedly, want out of the imaginary Western contract, who 
smell how ill it has become or is, is to remind them how zombie bitten they 
are—did somebody say, Karl Marx?—and to recall the cynical decree, that 
what you hate most you will become. If there is or was an “Anthropocene” era, 
then there must have been this figure, anthropos, a Western concoction, hang-
ing around and infiltrating or claiming the whole. But then, might cynicism 
here mean something entirely new, or disclose one of the many lapses applied 
to the term, a guard against that which does not accept the “we”? 
2. Miss Lonelyhearts and the Deadpan—or, a Plague of Face 
We must bear in mind that, fundamentally, there’s no such 
thing as color; in fact, there’s no such thing as face, because 
until the light hits it, it is nonexistent. After all, one of the 
first things I learned in the School of Art was that there is no 
such thing as a line; there’s only the light and the shade. On 
my first day in school I did a drawing; it was quite a good 
drawing, but because I was drawing with lines, it was totally 
incorrect and the error was immediately pointed out to me.  
Hitchcock to Truffaut [Truffaut 1963, 183] 
In a recent essay in the New York Times Stephen Marche analyzes a new 
“epidemic of facelessness” in what we will call our today—in this case, 
it enters through a quirk on the periphery of our tele-sphere with a vir-
ulent logic [Marche 2015]. He is analyzing the effects of trolling on the 
internet, targeting web prey anonymously and with the unrestrained 
vengeful or defacing drive to violate. The link is not made to roiling para-
movements on the seeming geo-political peripheries, like ISIS, with its 
Ebola-like spread and complete defacement of any residual aura or cred-
ibility of “the West” or hyper-modernities. This faceless attack mode pen-
etrates the real despite its ambiguous status—including law courts and 
jailings for discovered miscreants. “Trolling” operates in the structural 
logics of terrorism. It can always be dissociated from by a legal individual 
who adapted a voice or persona and be called all “in play,” as if in citation 
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marks, a form of gaming virtually solicited by the social media networks. 
The dependency of such networks on photographs, or “Selfies,” only con-
flates the dissociation, as persons become obsessed with representations 
of the face and movements (as if to reassure or leave evidence).  
To situate today’s “epidemic of facelessness”—the trope of illness 
pleads, at first, for a treatment—Marche presents a narrative in which face
had been the foundation of an epoch of law, identity, and above all ethics 
(in the West). It was, or promised, a currency and economy of readabil-
ities and debt, like, one might say, the Greek autos or, codified, anthro-
pos. He indexes both Roman law’s requirement to face the accuser and 
Emmanuel Levinas’s claim of face as the premise of Western ethics and 
identification as foundational. Marche’s claim is that face as such is dis-
solved, in the shadow-zones of trolling, into forms of faceless transaction 
that channel blind aggressions, including rape threats and take-downs of 
all sort, as baits for the trap of any response or engagement. (The target 
is advised not to respond, since it could unleash a swarm.) The trolling 
assaults are thus deemed “faceless” themselves, operating from invisibili-
ties (or so thought). Such a plague of facelessness appears viral and predis-
posed within the unfolding of digital and other technologies.  
It spreads, stain-like, from the obverse of a totalized frame. What is 
peculiar in Marche’s account is that face is mourned as if a certain “we” 
were collectively leaving an entire techno-cognitive (and of course 
“social”) epoch. “Face” of course returns us to the core of anthropomor-
phism, as we think of it, as if “face” were detached and sought in the 
world of things and forces (like Greek gods): it is bound to the so-called 
Anthropocene era inescapably and, as such, makes the latter dependent 
for its definition and ecocidal drive on, among other things, dominant 
cultural tropes or a more thorough critique of an epistemology of tropes 
(the purported focus, say, of de Man).14 The first import of facelessness 
is dissonance, since the resuming of one’s corporeal face or identity sees 
itself as disconnected from view, or that of surveillance: 
When the police come to the doors of the young men and 
women who send notes telling strangers that they want to 
rape them, they and their parents are almost always shocked, 
genuinely surprised that anyone would take what they said 
seriously, that anyone would take anything said online 
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seriously. There is a vast dissonance between virtual commu-
nication and an actual police officer at the door. It is a disso-
nance we are all running up against more and more, the dis-
sonance between the world of faces and the world without 
faces. And the world without faces is coming to dominate 
(Marche 2015, 2). 
This may seem, at first, counter-intuitive, since in a world of screens, talk-
ing heads have become the norm, “identification” and “trust” manipu-
lated (among else, corporate media ratings)—as have emoticons, and 
emojis, in which face is reduced to its bare markers or caricatures, distilled 
as an imagined (rather than expressed) affect. And yet, in itself, what “is” 
face, which we presume bespeaks presence, the mirror-stage, the moth-
er’s emotive bonding, but the organization (or individual subordination) 
of features, which now form an expressive or communicative, dissem-
bling or hypothetical imaginary? A dog, cat, or horse, may or may not 
be given face; a machine, without facial musculature, cannot quite; and 
yet figural language—with which, together with emotion and ethics, face 
(or figure, in French) is confused—is defined as chains of substitutive 
logics. To “lose face” is confirmed as the nadir of social valorization and 
currency, becoming a non-citizen, a non-person, losing ontological pur-
chase. “Face” in that sense becomes a commodity to trade. None of this 
has been lost on the televisual and digital sciences of face manipulation 
and technologies of binding, honed across all modern modes of “propa-
ganda,” screen manipulation, telemarketing, corporate mediacratics, and 
the “psychological” tooling of affects. In this sense, a culture of distrac-
tion dependent on screens feeds a steady diet of talking heads to perpetu-
ate (and control) an economy of face that is now entirely simulated: 
the faceless communication social media creates, the linked 
distances between people, both provokes and mitigates the 
inherent capacity for monstrosity…. The challenge of our 
moment is that the face has been at the root of justice and eth-
ics for 2,000 years….  
This epidemic of facelessness has a moral component, or rather the ill or 
symptom betrays the latter’s dissolution, and by inference argues for its 
restoration or at least transition to another iteration of that as a form of 
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credit. This is followed by an account of Emmanuel Levinas’s account of 
face as the originary bond of otherness: 
The face is the substance, not just the reflection, of the infin-
ity of another person [according to Emmanuel Levinas]. 
And from the infinity of the face comes the sense of inevi-
table obligation, the possibility of discourse, the origin of 
the ethical impulse…. The connection between the face and 
ethical behavior is one of the exceedingly rare instances in 
which French phenomenology and contemporary neurosci-
ence coincide in their conclusions. A 2009 study by Marco 
Iacoboni, a neuroscientist at the Ahmanson-Lovelace Brain 
Mapping Center at the University of California, Los Angeles, 
explained the connection: “Through imitation and mimicry, 
we are able to feel what other people feel. By being able to feel 
what other people feel, we are also able to respond compas-
sionately to other people’s emotional states.” The face is the 
key to the sense of intersubjectivity, linking mimicry and 
empathy through mirror neurons — the brain mechanism 
that creates imitation even in nonhuman primates (Marche 
2015, 2-3). 
But before we affirm the narrative that face was originary and the key to 
ethics, discourse, self, and intersubjectivity—assuming these had ever 
arrived—it passes an odd loop, confirmed by neuroscience and exceed-
ing (or preceding) “humanity,” as “the brain mechanism” of “even nonhu-
man primates.” This slippage of an irreducible humanness of the human 
to the primates might be winked at, did it not ascribe the entirety to a 
“mechanism” that exceeds human definition: mimicry or mimesis, or imi-
tation. It would seem, here, that “mimesis” precedes face as such (were 
that to exist): some physical-affective-neural trope precedes the artefac-
tion of face. That claim, too, is the product of a “brain mechanism” which 
spawns imitation, inscription, the bondage and bonding of a “we” (vari-
ously enforced). It precedes and is itself not particularly “human” at all.15  
What is peculiar from the perspective of climate change is that, tech-
nically, the hegemony of face—of prosopopeia and diverse figural sys-
tems—represented the trajectory of an “Anthropocene” era that discloses 
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itself as ecocidal and autos-cidal. From such an impasse, one might expect 
strategies of defacement to emerge. Yet rather than arriving as a critical 
agenda in a war, today, over inscriptions themselves, we find an “epi-
demic of facelessness” arrived in advance, in the province of digital net-
works—as if trolling secretly wanted not to disfigure but to penetrate and 
re-occupy face itself from the swarm of pixels and the time-space of the 
web. That is, the digital orders have simulated facelessness too preemp-
tively, immunized it. And if that generates facelessness, in effect it always 
had, and what we call face concealed all along that it was a construct, a 
project, a technic. Of course, “face” is an artifice, selective, a composi-
tion of parts (sense organs, apertures, “lighting”), of shadow, of what is 
before-the-eye(s), pros-opopeia. What is disclosed, inversely, is not that 
there was face and that now we are entering a faceless era, unchartered, 
outside of “ethics,” which Marche proposes, but that an epoch of “face” 
had been an artificial parenthesis—a technic, anthropomorphizing, itself 
“anthropomorphized” in citing its voice (or face)—within a normative 
state of facelessness, in which face was unreadable.  
Perhaps, though, what emerges is not a snapshot of the new faceless-
ness in a digital telepolis—for instance, the breakdown of contempo-
rary ethics, even when replayed endlessly as about and “of the ‘other’.”16
Rather, what is complicated is not that an “epidemic of facelessness” 
should appear, but that it appears in advance, as if pre-emptively, of any 
act of critical defacement (allow me to adapt this term from de Man), that 
one might want to exercise, say, before an experience of totalization which 
the telepolis assumes?17  
The impasse arrives in advance. Facelessness thus is ascribed first to 
the digital or technic platform itself, from which the trolling projectile 
is launched against the domain of “face” in the latter’s parodic, celeb-
rity-culture, selfie-traversed, emoji-expressed “social network” imagi-
nary—itself tracked and perpetually channeled. Marche describes an 
epidemic of facelessness that precedes any critical strategy to deface, yet 
finds itself preceding the cultural contracts of face and mimesis jointly. 
Amidst the gargled idiocy of the individual moved to troll anonymously 
are elements launched against a totalizing culture of face (in the latter’s 
own name), unreflectively linked across a chain of displacements to an 
event like ISIS—or, for that matter, to a Wall St. culture that has been 
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“short-circuited” and is end-running itself in shocking manipulations 
aimed to extend and pretend. The troll is both a criminal before the com-
munity of face, to be cut out or arrested if tracked (as has occurred), and 
a hero in defying the artifice of a totalized and now artificed and neutral-
ized “ethics” of face. Technically speaking, the troll’s position is like that 
of the cynic, as one who does not subscribe to the “we” as a premise. The 
troll, exposing the artifice of “face” and striking at it, sustains the latter’s 
economy by providing it with a negative gadfly anticipated as the circuit-
ry’s excess.  
Marche’s narrative has to do with the assumption that “face” is and had 
been a given, a historical core of the Western psycho-social and political 
trajectory—and specifically, ethics. To say the arc of the Anthropocene 
would be distinguished as an epoch of face would, nonetheless, call the 
latter into question. The non-trope or putative proper name of the 
“Anthropocene,” as a speech act of the present, seems at once the last 
totalizing attempt to maintain a cognitive regime beyond its due date 
and an ideologeme without ideology. The non-trope of the Anthropocene, 
after all, arrives in and as its own posthumous “twilight,” a cinematic 
flickering that may just be the terminus of a techno-archival regime (the 
cin-anthropocene, say), an Ozymandian inscription of mastery, which sees 
itself as the unfolding of a specific human type, legatee of alphabeticism and 
the era of the Book—the Greek anthropos (for the codifying Aristotle: 
Greek, male, and a possessor of reason, or logos).  
Marche is aware that this recollected institution of face persists in and 
as figurative language, or figure as such: this giving of human face to the 
world of things is what, typically, is associated with anthropomorphism. 
It is the latter that we assume we recognize and curtail in ourselves, at 
least, as sophisticates. It is what has led through attempts to pivot outside 
of a tired “anthropocentrism” by identifying with allo-human others or 
othernesses—as if no one wants to be tagged as human all too human. 
It is the supposed function or constitutive apparatus of what was called 
“language” (or consciousness, or both) that welds and harnesses a mobile 
figure of humanity. It has led through ventriloquizing dogs and animals, 
stones, plants, “objects” and things—the inanimate, in short, even while 
the spraying of otherness as a way of cracking the spell is swathed in liter-
ary assertions of affect, bathing again in the claim of restored instinct and a 
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rather pathetic assertion of emoting (if not pathos). It is what we assume 
to be naive: a technology of perception in predatory anthropo-narcis-
sism. It gives voice and seeming animation to things (and animemes). 
No one, however, seems to have stopped to define, articulate, or analyze 
anthropomorphism as a reflex or artifice, trope or technic. That is, no one 
stops to ask, it seems, why a figure that founds the “Anthropocene” itself 
does so by naming the role of cognitive rhetoric in the acceleration of 
“climate change”—that is, among the mass spells, perceptual disconnects, 
and digital pacifications of a populace in virtual climate denialism despite 
“debates,” accords, corporate plans for geo-engineering, and a rhetoric of 
adaptability and resilience, inevitable as “tipping points” pass. A politics of 
managed extinction, a segregating out of disposable territories, geogra-
phies, populations, adheres to this event. Today, the implied criminality 
of facelessness rises at the same time that facial recognition technologies 
consolidate data-bases. 
Marche bemoans a loss or disappearance of face, and with it a model 
of ethical “man,” for the replacement of which there are no psycho-politi-
cal models. This would rhyme with Timothy Morton’s overt indexing of 
cognitive and moral weakness attending an era of hyperobjects—distin-
guished by being inaccessible to perception and programmed senses, as 
if that disconnect echoed in Wall St.’s mafiatization, the corporate cap-
ture of “democracy,” and the hollow disconnects of “Enlightenment” (or 
utopist) rhetoric.18 Yet one may toggle between the macro and the micro 
here, between the hyper-object and what, too, begs attention and con-
ferred agency, the errant and unreadable hypo-scripts that subtend and 
traverse the telepolis’ screens. Marche thus overlooks that the artifice 
of a defacing avatar or web-persona mimes “face” to gain the discourse 
community’s entry—and calls out the artificed milieu of the similarly 
web-presented success of the prey target: the troller would participate 
in and conveniently dissimulate that the narrative arc of a community of 
face was always artificed, and was always one organizing technic or con 
among others.  
But if a neural-mnemonic-tele-political regime resulted and brought 
about an ecocidal hyper-consumption, one that appears totalized at the 
very moment its sheer artifice and techno-dependence is disclosed—
there had always been an invisible Facebook. Moreover, would this not 
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confirm less an epidemic of facelessness, than the unwinding of an era, 
perhaps something like the “Anthropocene,” which itself had culmi-
nated in a plague of face? Might one not think of “face” along the lines of 
facial recognition software, in which points align and assemble in unique 
relational mappings to trigger “identification,” something that may be 
learned and counter-feited. Might one think then of an era of “face” as 
one in which that software had been programmed in, and no doubt tor-
tured into the mnemonic commons which could revoke it in turn, and 
the co-ordinates assemble like a second skin over the musculature, like 
a scaly encasement? Hence the compensatory proliferation of selfies—
each a doubling-down defiance of the extinction advanced by it. (The 
promiscuous “selfie” today moves the game-board forward one or two 
innocuous notches, knowing that every photograph poses before the 
eye that might receive it after the catastrophe or erasure—and every selfie 
squeals with that discrete logic.)  
The logic of the promise that sustained the credit cycle of Western dis-
course and its monotheist technic is in effect vaporized, or exposed as 
hypothetical, by twenty-first century climate change. The latter implies 
that collective futures may be structurally revoked by extinction events 
already set in motion irreversibly. And if the promise of the promise were 
post facto disclosed as void, together with any claim to futures, it would 
necessarily be voided retroactively too—altering every text in the archive 
that depended on it to be “properly” interpreted. While trolling from a 
position of facelessness constitutes an anonymous aggression seeking to 
enter the picture, in order to be felt and to assume “face,” face is exposed 
as a commodity to inflate or trade and an artefaction preceded by a phase 
of mimetic imprinting. An installed accord, entropic, it maintains refer-
ents or generates them—as if cinematically: 
The connection goes the other way, too. Inability to see a face 
is, in the most direct way, inability to recognize shared human-
ity with another. In a metastudy of antisocial populations, the 
inability to sense the emotions on other people’s faces was a 
key correlation. There is “a consistent, robust link between 
antisocial behavior and impaired recognition of fearful facial 
affect. Relative to comparison groups, antisocial populations 
showed significant impairments in recognizing fearful, sad 
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and surprised expressions.” A recent study in the Journal of 
Vision showed that babies between the ages of 4 months and 
6 months recognized human faces at the same level as grown 
adults, an ability which they did not possess for other objects. 
Without a face, the self can form only with the rejection of all 
otherness, with a generalized, all-purpose contempt — a con-
tempt that is so vacuous because it is so vague, and so fero-
cious because it is so vacuous. A world stripped of faces is a 
world stripped, not merely of ethics, but of the biological and 
cultural foundations of ethics…. The spirit of facelessness is 
coming to define the 21st century. Facelessness is not a trend; 
it is a social phase we are entering that we have not yet figured 
out how to navigate (Marche 2015, 3). 
But what if the posited and enduring “we” were itself an effect of this 
regime, including how “we” think or iconicize “the” social or “the” politi-
cal or have all along—the “anthropocene” signature and default ill in 
advance, willing to read everything but its Ponzi-stretched and captured 
indexal “economy”? The “we,” after all, is non-existent technically, arte-
facted within an anthropomorphic assertion and a by definition fero-
ciously exclusionary regime—the we of a privileged circle, specialist lan-
guage, gentlemen’s accord, shared bet, criminality, or usurpation. This 
renders any figural hypothesis of humanity, of a single or shared human-
ity of hominids, as impossible as it is to locate the authority of the “we,” 
which is a rhetorical technic promising to dissolve (and re-stamp) indi-
viduation. Such a “we” is a mutation of the same “I,” or Autos, the it or 
inimical “they” that opened the Greek grammatical adventure. So while 
this same “we” supposedly figures out “how to navigate” the “new” orders 
of facelessness, how to avoid its aporia and steer around its black holes, 
at least in order to perpetuate this “we” (we, purported humans), or sus-
tain the assumption that the social polis—like the “Anthropocene”—is a 
premise immune to any suspicion itself, it is unsurprising that corpora-
tions have moved in to appropriate not only the legal role of “person,” 
though incorporeal, but then, pushing on, claim the domains of “human” 
affect, spiritual prerogatives, anti-abortion stances, religious freedom, 
care of the unborn human (with, as it were, a straight face). Yet is this 
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non-existent and somewhat corporatized “we,” in fact, or ever strictly, as 
is asked of Lord Jim, “one of us”?  
One would think this new zone of pre-emptive auto-defacement were 
a threat—but it catalogs a mutation that is “not yet figured out,” even if it 
conjures an outside or precession of figuration itself. The promise’s ghost 
lingers in a robo-stutter pointing to the next one to come along, who will 
figure it out, an open deferral. Needless to say, this mimic zone mimics 
itself in the digital short-circuiting that produces nothing but faces: 
Google recently reported that on Android alone, which has 
more than a billion active users, people take 93 million selfies 
a day. The selfie has become not a single act but a continuous 
process of self-portraiture. On the phones that are so much of 
our lives, no individual self-image is adequate; instead a rapid 
progression of self-images mimics the changeability and the 
variety of real human presence. 
Marche cannot yield to a nostalgia of “face,” which is irrecoverably dis-
solved across digital accelerations (and homogenizations). One is now 
in the imitation of faces, or tags like emoticons. Yet he cannot allow that 
this welding of face-granting “intersubjectivity” to what might be termed 
Anthropocene 101 “ethics,” as viewed in the rearview mirror, may itself 
have been but one random organization among others, a time window 
like the post-war Western “middle class,” or the little ice age whose pass-
ing sprouted Enlightenment memes. Since if face were always an arti-
fact produced by machinal and mimetic triggers, it was always also one 
technic among others. In this case, it is one welded to a certain regime 
by which identification, referentiality, and totemic recognition can be 
provided an economy. It, of course, is de facto a front for con games and 
manipulations, one that makes Melville’s Confidence-Man appear shy.  
Would the so-called “Anthropocene” or its simultaneous twilight, 
today, coming out of the model of the Greek anthropos and Roman law 
in the West, not appear in a sense as the time of faces, as Marche implies? 
This would seem to resonate with the ritual manner in which something 
like “anthropomorphism” is casually referenced as a lamentable naiveté 
as if gone beyond—without one ever stopping to define or analyze the 
term (anthropomorphism) or what it may do if it all rested on a single 
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trope or metaphoric regime, assuming that is what anthropomorphism
connotes? A technical problem with “face” is that in reality it depends 
alone on light hitting it, and it depends on an eye seeing that and as if 
being seen by it—as Hitchcock tells Truffaut: “There is no such thing as 
face.” On the screen and in the world in fact there is “no face,” just the 
way the shadows and light coalesce. That is how prosopopeia can be trans-
posed: defined as the poeisis or making of what is before the eyes, as face, 
the giving or emergence of voice in the inanimate, the coalescence of the 
sense organs of the head (ears, nose, eyes, mouth) in one cognitive place 
or center, and finally their capture, today, by facial and retinal recognition 
security systems.  
Thus any fetishization of “a facelessness epidemic” must be ques-
tioned for its inverse or hypo-defacing logic—quite aside from the 
nostalgia for “face” that is tracked in a sort of double-chase, the hunter 
stalked. It is a mimetological war that is witnessed, since the mimetic 
accord both engendered face (mimicry) and is sustained by it (identi-
fication, posters, Leaders, selfies, televisual screens, talking heads). Are 
we sure “face” has not been a problem—at least, if taken as a mimetic 
regime, which is to say, one that is technically replicable and subject to 
capture (tele-marketing of all kinds, now “pre-crime”)? Is it not, at least, 
indissociable from a certain, obvious, “anthropomorphism” or even the 
Anthropocene as a hashtag for ecocidal disappearance? Is or was “it,” one 
organization of visibilities among others, itself politically consolidated 
or used—as when arche-cinema, in Stiegler’s insight, both enables archi-
val communities and perceptual grids yet allows stereotypical grammars 
to institute themselves, such as appear totalized today, at the apparent 
“death” of cinema and its migration from screens to interactive interfaces 
and neural management?19  
Facelessness, a turning against the regime of face, is pre-emptively 
claimed and programmed by and within digital streams in advance of 
any cognitive or aesthetico-political turn. Let us posit, for a moment, a 
system, call it a corporate system today, from which decisions are dis-
seminated and to which all hyper-technologies appear back-looped if 
not subordinate. It pre-empts and takes the strategy of defacement away 
from any position of resistance, and in fact perpetuates, for now, the 
ghost ideology, which is to say the aesthetic ideation-ography of “face,” 
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in a streamed, managed, and anaesthetized mode. Every selfie is a zom-
bie lunge for the blood of a self-penetration—which is why I suggest we 
look, on occasion, to how a “selfie” of the Anthropocene itself might be 
posited, marking the lens’ and cinema’s technical agency in what unfolds 
today (what one might name, if at all, the twilight of the cin-anthropocene). 
Thus the “epidemic” Marche ascribes the position of facelessness to: as 
to the technologies that irradiate or rage through the trolling troll, say, 
from its shadows, unseen and wielding the “Ring of Gyges” effects, invis-
ible itself (it thinks), dissociated into some irretrievable dark side of gam-
ing itself (from whose ranks drone pilots are drawn). The magical “troll” 
is neutralized as anything more, contained as what presents a symptom 
of a wider “present” (hence Marche’s generalization from a peripheral 
harassment we are advised to ignore if it occurs to you). Of course, the 
import of such a staged logic of defacement in a broader sense links up 
with the always black-faced ISIS horde of video beheadings or the reso-
lute refusal of any metaphor by Ebola (or the tendency to link both as 
media memes).20 That is, say, to the virulent and inhuman agent, border-
less and hybrid, capturing the technologies of cell formation and dissolv-
ing these as a mobile, Borg-like imaginary shorn of face, trope, metaphor, 
recognition. Outside mimetic orders, the videos of ISIS beheadings crys-
tallize the rebuke and ridicule of mimesis in the West (which Islam also 
rejects): only the head of a Western face will do, held up on video to the 
West, cut off by a British voiced rapper, an auto-beheading that lures, say, 
Obama into the mediatric necessity of another losing war he wanted at 
all costs to avoid (no war or response, of course, for hundreds of thou-
sands of murdered, raped, crucified or beheaded North Africans, Arabs, 
Christians).  
Is there reason, then, to ask if a destroying era of anthropos, such as it 
is or was, ran on more or less tropological regimes—heliotropic, human-
ualist, organicist—in which an economy of face and the installation of 
a mimetic “contract” of reference production would be directly wired to 
the unfolding logics of planetary ecocide?  
The problem in Marche’s account is the obverse of what one might 
expect. It suggests that a disappearance of face crashes a pre-digital 
regime that separates and lingers on, artificially streamed, in pointless 
selfies or televisual screens (where talking heads abound, re-enforcing 
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identification). And it is not clear what accord will come next, particu-
larly if it is shorn of the means of harnessing care, empathy, “ethics,” cre-
dence. Here, though, is the problem: such an entire regime trading on 
face and identification, subjectals and “inter-subjective” contracts, was 
itself the symptom of an ecocidal, hyper-industrial trajectory—passing 
into the autonomous telepolis whose dark economy the supposed ill of an 
“epidemic of facelessness” confers. It is a dark economy in the same way, 
today, as we find the international cartels moving drugs and trafficking 
humans globally intertwined with international banking, which would 
collapse without its illicit liquidity (HSBC). It is the production, market-
ing, and assertion of face, together with a legacy of cognitive and figural 
conventions, that is interwoven with ecocidal trajectories—and would 
need, like “anthropomorphism,” to be interrupted, undone, disfigured, 
defaced, to get outside of the spell or trance. Potentially. 
But here is the evil twist that is implied. When there occurs a societal 
totalization of a system of tropes (a “culture”), which is also to say of per-
ceptual regimes, so that nothing appears outside of it to those caught up 
in it, the violence of defacement converts into a second-tier strategy. (I 
will take up in a moment what that entails using de Man as a foil or cata-
lyst—and, perhaps, Nietzsche’s claim to an “evil ear” in hammering the 
idols of what he presents as a noon moment, which would appear deflated 
and inverted, perhaps, before the horizons of “climate change” today.)  
Marche does not make the connection to the era of “climate change,” 
to the internet of things, to the wars of last man culture waged on the 
peripheries or dark sites (societal, economic, geographic, digital), nor 
move outside of a contemporary dilemma redoubled by digital media’s 
totalization. He does not, for instance, probe where this now disappear-
ing era of face may be regarded as itself artificial, deceived, cinematized, 
narcissistically destructively, not specular but a sort of installed or 
inserted technic. So-called primitive “tribes” that practiced animist 
modes of trans-spiriting make a point of marking the face and projecting 
masks of dream and power: these avoid the problem of “face.” One can 
always “put on one’s face,” as projected. “Face” would be the devising of 
two stabilizing traits: like today’s facial recognition technologies, it would 
enforce security, define the group, be the guarantor of identification in 
the theatrics of leadership and violence. It would serve a purpose, and be 
Trolling “Anthropos”—Or, Requiem for a Failed Prosopopeia   45
commodifiable, as body modification is aware today. It would appear at 
least coincident with, as Marche notes, the idea of facing one’s accuser, 
and the face-to-face encounter as a facade. “Facelessness” coincides with 
a loss of what Benjamin’s calls aura and the personification of the inani-
mate. The “trolls” Marche cites are, accordingly, monsters: caught within 
a leftover economy of face they cannot escape, as it is streamed and regu-
lated, they mime the position of the prehistorial and premimetic, rehears-
ing predatory raids on the screen icons and reserves of this currency 
(Facebook, say). Yet they do so from a digital position that determines 
in advance a techno-facelessness over which it has no traction or deci-
sion. The pathetic raids on the spectral kingdom of face (celebrity cul-
ture, twitter feeds) practiced on stray individuals as a sort of digital rape 
or kill (suicide epidemics for teens), is itself a trap, a toxic economy of 
maintenance in which a simulant and streamed economy of face is main-
tained as sport and distraction, with the effect not of a loss of ethics and 
address but of the regurgitation of modes of identification, mimetic cod-
ing, the pursuit of “aura,” and ethicist rhetorics bent to shore up a closed 
system or epoch. 
3. Mourning becomes electric—or, Greek words bearing gifts… 
For all of the collective decision to occlude the question of language 
and climate change, the last thing negotiators, scientists, and contend-
ing activists need give attention to, the least real or relevant to extinction 
processes and the undoing of a tentative terrestrial balance or calm, one 
still hears routine finger pointing at anthropomorphism. It is a term sup-
posed to spray human projections onto all things of the world, a trope 
of tropes so banal as to garner no suspicion itself. Those who take it for 
granted never stop to ask what “anthropomorphism” is, names, or proj-
ects—nor, even, why it is deemed bad. The same happens to the human 
speaker: that the grammatical “I” too is anthropomorphized in and by 
social language, given face, aura, person(hood)ification on credit, so that 
one’s voice or persona or self is credited. Given the current stakes on the 
table, which involve the course of species life going forward aeons, one 
might think this would be flagged somewhere? So far, however, that is 
quite timid. Thus a certain we finds itself passing ecocidal tipping points, 
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without fluster, and having suppressed the question of language’s relation 
to climate change, biomutation, and extinction events.  
This question is uniquely if not solely raised where one might least 
look for any input whatsoever, in Paul de Man’s apparently very last and 
posthumously published essay, “Anthropomorphism and the Lyric” (De 
Man 1984). It is a murky piece, since it leads not from the random zones 
of rhetorical blinds out toward the worlding of worlds, nor to “things.” 
Climate change throttles wholly in reverse, here, back into the vortices 
and black holes of what generates perceptual regimes and tropological 
displacements. One can easily overlook the connection to today, as the 
address seems minor, returning to a line of Nietzsche’s “On Truth and 
Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense” (Nietzsche 2009), a touchstone text for de 
Man’s approach to rhetoric, tropes, cognition, reference, and so on. Of 
course—if one needs reminding—the template of Nietzsche, like that of 
Machiavelli or, read well, Plato, understands language as ordering itself 
out of random fictions, organizing lies, strategic dissemblance, that is to 
say, tropes. If there would be an ecocidal trajectory emerging from “mod-
ernist” and hyper-industrial legacies, as now is clear, it would emanate 
from the cognitive settings and tropological regimes that informed that.  
Nietzsche’s essay fragment invokes (and disposes of) something like 
an “Anthropocene” moment in its first two lines: that is its premise or 
“thought experiment,” in today’s captions. It drifts into the question of a 
cognitive ordering of the perceptual world from tropes, but begins with 
two other, more decisive questions: the first is the situated role of “intel-
lect” in his crafting of the world, which is regarded as a tool or function, 
separated out from anthropos as such, whose primary tool of self-preser-
vation is deception; and the second, the epistemology of tropes, which 
can themselves only be viewed as in perpetual excess of “moral or ethical 
sense” (human on human calculi). I cite a medley, which reads like a toss-
away pin-prick on any “Anthropocene” avant la lettre: 
In some remote corner of the universe poured out into count-
less flickering solar systems there was once a star on which 
some clever animals invented knowledge. It was the most 
arrogant and most untruthful minute of ‘world history’; but 
still only a minute. When nature had drawn a few breaths 
the star solidified and the clever animals died.—One could 
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invent such a fable, but one would still not have sufficiently 
illustrated how pathetic, how shadowy and volatile, how use-
less and arbitrary the human intellect seems within nature. 
There were eternities in which it did not exist; and when it 
is gone nothing will have happened. For this intellect has no 
further mission leading beyond human life. It is human and 
only its owner and creator treats it as solemnly as if the hinges 
of the world turned on it. But if we could communicate with 
a gnat we would hear that it swims through the air with the 
same solemnity and also feels as if the flying centre of this 
world were within it. There is nothing so reprehensible or low 
in nature that it would not immediately be inflated like a bal-
loon by a small breath of that power of knowledge; and just 
as every porter wants to have his admirer, so the proudest of 
men, the philosopher, believes that the eyes of the universe 
are trained on his actions and thoughts like telescopes from 
all sides.  
It is remarkable that this is accomplished by the intellect, 
which is at best assigned as an aid to the most unfortunate, 
most delicate and most transitory beings in order to detain 
them for a minute in life, from which they would otherwise, 
without this extra gift, have every reason to escape as fast as 
Lessing’s son. Thus the arrogance connected with knowledge 
and sensation, covering the eyes and senses of men with blind-
ing mists, deceives them about the value of life by carrying 
within it the most flat tering evaluation of knowledge itself. Its 
most universal effect is decep tion, but even its most particu-
lar effects carry something of the same character about them.  
The intellect, as a means of preserving the individual, 
unfolds its main powers in dissimulation; for dissimulation is 
the means by which the weaker, less robust individuals sur-
vive, having been denied the ability to fight for their existence 
with horns or sharp predator teeth. In man this art of dissimu-
lation reaches its peak: among men deception, flattery, lying 
and cheating, backbiting, posturing, living in borrowed splen-
dour, wearing a mask, hiding behind convention, play-acting 
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in front of others and oneself, in short, constantly fluttering 
around the single flame of vanity, is so much the rule and law 
that there is hardly anything more incomprehensible than 
how an honest and pure drive for truth could have arisen 
among them (Nietzsche 2009, 253-54).  
What has this to do with the cataclysms of melting ice sheets, mega-
droughts, or the inevitable unfolding of mass extinction events, sup-
posed to be so much an issue of science, carbon counts, feedback loops, 
a hyper-financialized economics of extinction, and so on, as to make 
any such thought de trop? Or: precisely the opposite. In any case, de 
Man’s last essay draft examines “anthropomorphism” as it appears in a 
single part of a sentence in Nietzsche’s text, and it then moves through 
a relational reading of two Baudelaire poems—“Correspondances” and 
“Obsession.” Who would expect a logic to emerge that would be of rel-
evance to twenty-first century aporia of biomorphic mutation, acceler-
ated ecocide, or “climate change”? Have any logical aporia in this short 
archival history (a couple of millennia or so) ever not included this as an 
implication? I want first to conjure a very different context for approach-
ing, here, why any discourse that puts into question the techno-genesis of 
today’s “we” requires a more complex alertness to the hazards of reading 
after tipping points are past. 
Nonetheless, as we know, anthropos likes to hedge his bets. No one 
wants to give “anthropomorphism” up altogether, perhaps, nor can—
unless there were a more primary narcissism still that precedes that, 
before “face” is posited or seemingly contracted, self-archived and tagged 
as a debt, a promise, an assurance. And even then, no one wants to give up 
certain things: their energy expenditure, their smartphones, their invest-
ments, their credit with diverse mafias, or the perks of “personhood” held 
hostage to a system of privileged exchange (credit cards)—yet exclusion 
from which triggers new zones of disposability.  
One has slipped far from the Nietzschean question that disbands “the 
human” as a cognitive or epistemographic primitive to be hyperboli-
cally recast to survive itself. As if in caricature, literalized and stripped of 
import, this prospect is moved to the “post-human” column conveniently. 
The latter has been reduced to mean merely how to outwit his mortality, 
replace his mortal body, download individual memory, in short, make 
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the present of Last Man culture frozen and perpetual against time-space, 
the organic, corruption. “Anthropomorphism” is cast about as something 
we can counter or suspend, or point to occurring elsewhere, a tautology 
seldom analyzed or defined so much as just blankly assumed. And what 
it assumes is a projection of human qualities onto things and entities that 
subject them to our extractivism and economies: they assume that this 
given, “we anthropoi,” is a given and can be exported into the inorganic 
and merely animate, since it is “we” doing so. It is, or seems at least to 
be, a trope. As such one might imagine, if nothing else were working (it 
isn’t), that the mechanics of tropes would be one of many zones explored 
by sophisticated interrogators—yet, on the contrary, this key premise is 
avoided, as if some unpleasant secret lay within its premise.  
In advance of the moment when everyone had had enough with the 
“nothing outside the text” conundrum, including a Derrida frustrated by 
its polemical capture, de Man doubled down. It remains interesting that a 
Quentin Meillassoux (2010a; 2010b; 2012) would pivot on a break with 
“correlationism” (in-bred cousin of mimeticism) to supposedly occlude 
(again) deconstruction and language in order to access the contingent, 
whereas de Man—who is not to be taken as deconstruction—dissolves 
back into a “materiality of inscription” that departs from the non-relation 
of what was only nominally called “language” any longer (since that 
could not be dissociated from cognition, mnemo-technics, perceptual 
regimes, events), the dissociation of rhetoric and grammar, of trope and 
violation.21 Timothy Morton one-ups the relapse back from Meillassoux 
into “objects,” OOO, by invoking a hyperobject which is not present to 
the senses, and lays bare a weakness and cowardice that adhere to its 
time among men. The prison-house of generated “reference” and refer-
ents coalesces into more general trances of hyper-industrial post-global 
tele-mediacracies: infobytes condense, memes iterate, puffs of affect go 
viral, mnemonic entertainments barrel-bomb media. The heir to such 
totalization echoes the capture of mnemonics by telemarketing tech-
niques—and by its occlusion of “climate change,” its inability to respond 
to or see what is before its eyes, technically. Does an epistemological cri-
tique of tropes hum in a particularly fatal way in the era of climate change 
when, as de Man discerns, figuration in its entiretly can appear caught 
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in a short-circuited vortex of substitutive chains, capturable or subject to 
(now digital) totalizations?  
And yet: “anthropomorphism” is the topos of de Man’s post-
humous and perhaps “last” essay—a curious exit, or opening. 
“Anthropomorphism and the Lyric” is a demure title, until one finds 
the two are not the same, or even what they appear to name: that is, that 
“lyric” is a by-name for a tropological condition of human positing and 
that “anthropomorphism” is unlike any trope and is technically not one at 
all. It is up to something. Might one engender an entire critique and over-
pass of the “anthropocene” by playing out remarks on this one topic? No 
doubt, today is marked by a totalization of the screen, tropological bots 
that guide, harvest, and would direct perceptual and mnemonic circuits. 
Were this the rise of a corporatocracene, it might explain why the term 
“anthropocene” was allowed to circulate as a tempting but self-referential 
break to ponder, before submitting the term to corporate aims, bolstering 
geo-engineering and “adaptation” rhetorics to come. It would be vanity 
candy, laced with toxins. 
I’ll re-iterate the “de Man” that interests me here—a twentieth-cen-
tury post-anthropocene thought that may or may not point to what has 
been occluded from the elephant walk of “climate” discourse and poli-
tics for the past decade largely. One of the ironies of the “present” is the 
degree to which the very impulses that drove the restoration of new 
historicisms and progressive “social justice” imperatives lapsed back 
to mimetic protocols and utopist rhetorics wired to the same ecocidal 
engines as the protocols of the right. Was mimeticism itself a program that 
once installed, say, by an arche-cinematic accident, guaranteed not only 
extractivism in advance of any formation of Capital—including today’s 
mafia or corporate “capitalism” of gaming systems and financial weap-
onization—but also ecocide as its premise, and was it further captured, 
hacked, and subjugated by the equivalent of tele-advertising bots? Thus 
when de Man addresses “anthropomorphism” by returning to Nietzsche’s 
“On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense” one might take note at the 
manner in a which a place-holder term with no definition, anthropomor-
phism, is lazily cast about and even castigated as a given, often by its most 
cunning agents: 
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But ‘anthropomorphism’ is not just a trope but an identifica-
tion on the level of substance. It takes one entity for another 
and thus implies the constitution of specific entities prior to 
their confusion, the taking of something for something else 
that can then be assumed to be given. It is no longer a proposi-
tion but a proper name…. (De Man 1984, 241). 
Just when we might have hoped the figure of personification or giv-
ing face were the navel of utterance, out of which a posited self or “I” is 
shaped—we are interrupted, cut off. Even personification or prosopo-
peia is, already in effect, a defacement: “The lyric is not a genre, but one 
name among several to designate the defensive motion of understanding, 
the possibility of a future hermeneutics.” That is, when we try to identify 
in a specular fashion the moment of projection, by which the anthropo-
morphism of the earth will be read and the reserve of the human face 
or voice registered, we find that itself is already “defensive,” a secondary 
reaction, and this to preserve the “possibility of a future hermeneutics.” 
So, we learn that even face is a citational artifice in the service of keeping 
a bourse or exchange open; it is secondary, socialized, monetized, (in)
corporate as a derivative bet on a “future hermeneutics” (one which it 
would practice, as if, in the meantime: less as promise than as promis-
sory note). Defacement does not have anything to do with the hacking 
away of a monument or statue in place already. It hovers as an antonym, 
a phantom or echo-positionality for what remains before the contract of 
“face” at all (let’s call it a positionality, for the moment, since this can be 
cultivated I assure you). One cannot routinely speak of a blackness in the 
absence of light altogether, or before the latter’s techno-genesis. So, one 
cannot speak of face before a “defacement” that can only be named as a 
negation by the trope that had not yet been confirmed as in place to say 
nothing of formalized, assumed, or socialized.  
Any supposed problem with anthropomorphism might stem from 
the fact that, while passing as one of the gang, it is not a trope or rhe-
torical figure (unlike metaphor and metonymy). It is not even a word, 
but rather a “proper name” for an effect that reverse-narrates its import. 
Rather than project onto the entities of the world “anthropo-narcissism,” 
infusing things and beings with its own traits or affects or sometimes 
voice—speaking animals, cartoons, faces on mountains, diagrams—we 
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witness a three-card monte that is not very surprising. It is anthropomor-
phism that, inversely, retro-projects that there was an entity or anthropos
to begin with: it “thus implies the constitution of specific entities prior 
to their confusion, the taking of something for something else that can 
then be assumed to be given.” Anthropomorphism is a “proper name” 
for an entity that was not there definitionally, and may never be the ref-
erent of the language it projects to anthropomorphize the world (as it 
then assumes). De Man turns this difference into one not only between 
tropes—which at one point can appear as being all in essence the same—
and something impossible to personify or anthropomorphize in any 
way, inscriptions unreadable and without access to sense, to perception, 
to phenomenality, or to memory (since they generate each as software 
code). When de Man pairs Baudelaire’s “Correspondances” with the lat-
ter’s very different “Obsession,” he sets the two poems against one another, 
exposing the non-relation between them and the mode by which inscrip-
tions appear to spawn the rhetorical figures that counter-generate and dis-
figure them. Of “Correspondances” he says finally: “there is no term avail-
able to tell us what ‘Correspondances’ might be. All we know is that it is, 
emphatically, not a lyric. Yet it, and it alone, contains, implies, produces, 
generates, permits (or whatever aberrant verbal metaphor one wishes to 
choose) the entire possibility of the lyric.” A writing that precedes figu-
ration yet “implies, produces, generates, permits” and so on the latter’s 
arrival is possible to narrate as preceding the latter, temporally, but that is 
irrelevant (“’Obsession’ might have been written before ‘Correspondances,’ 
it would alter nothing.”) There is a non-site which antecedes trope and 
its totalizations in situations, ideologies, epochal and geographical com-
munities—what might be called in The Birth of Tragedy a “primal disso-
nance,” or in Benjamin the contemporaneity of the “prehistorical,” or in 
Derrida khora, or in Stiegler arche-cinema, or on Serres’s work on Rome 
the black origin or ‘black box’, a zone of cow paths before mimetic con-
tracts have gelled or been enforced. De Man sometimes used a boringly 
dislocated term, literariness, to invoke what antecedes the participatory 
systems of exchange.  
The import of identifying the stupid or fiat nature of “anthropomor-
phism” is not that it takes the projection of man as a default condition. 
It is not even a pre-originary theft—that is, one that is outside of the 
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artefaction of “origin.” The “I” or so-called subject (this twentieth-century 
bane-term) is only conjured by whatever violation has already occurred. 
In giving the proper name “anthropomorphism,” it assumes and pre-
tends to conjure the anthropos as a retro-hologram to confirm itself. This 
account is opened as a Ponzi scheme sustained by an imaginary of fiat 
credit given (by itself) to the promissory. The same error haunts usages 
like “anthropogenic climate change,” where a distinction is harbored 
between its public sense, that man’s actions cause this and that destruc-
tion on all sides, and a reflective one, in which whatever “man” was and 
effects, “he” does not have control of the processes that produce him, too, 
as homo climactus or homo ecocidus—something quite distinct from criti-
cal fantasies of ecological man who, we will now be scolded, was all along 
a front for a corporate drive. The problem here may be that anthropomor-
phism is disfigured by its own proper name, removed from trope, word, or 
defined event. Hence its collusion with a pop term like “Anthropocene” 
today. While the latter is circulated by geographers as descriptive, even 
literalized to the degree they bicker over timing (the latest: nuclear fis-
sion, Hiroshima, which will surely be in the strata as a marker!), the 
conundrum adheres to the speech act that asserts the name at all. That 
involves “naming” oneself as and with an entire geo-destructive epoch 
(with a certain pride), and ostensibly in a manner that implies and can 
only be confirmed (or in fact read) after the fact, with a back-glance, with 
other eyes altogether—a “possible future hermeneutic” which one must 
go extinct to test. 
“Face” was never about presence, but rather seduction.22 Even the 
seduction performed by making facial expressions is transacted through 
learned responses, manipulations, “acting as,” from the start—the 
infant calibrating the mother’s response to what is mimed and brought. 
Mourning itself becomes a structural device, much as it is triggered in 
advance by the absence or loss of whatever is named or photographed—
activities that are not “descriptive” but appropriative, archiving and 
negating in advance. It is precisely in the moments that we feel ourselves 
as most humanly human, most confabulated by affect, such as mourning, 
that we are most deluded—as our robo-programming by tele-marketing 
and anaesthetizing or self-cancelling Orwellian memes make too clear. It 
is the “anthropos” and its affects that are neither authentic nor originary. 
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It would in this narrative cease its fiction of an exponentially consum-
ing oikos or polis or, detached from organic life or beings, head or body, a 
“corporation,” if it unhooked this circuit or “short-circuiting” (Stiegler). 
It appears glued together, so to speak, by some master trope, as it seems, 
tied to prosopopeia. That appears to be mourning—what itself seems trig-
gered by writing, photographs, and cinema as a quest for a recollected 
loss which was not any more specific than the trauma it associates with 
that. Here it is “mourning” that, in effect, dissembles the import of there 
not even being loss to begin with. What is taken away, and what only is 
experienced as a lost capital, is the dependency on a phantom mediation, 
a relapse or recuperation, a mimetic or historicist attestation that is sub-
stituted en masse for inscriptions. Thus, its other: 
True mourning is less deluded. The most it can do is allow 
for non-comprehension and enumerate non-anthropomor-
phic, non-elegiac, non-celebratory, non-lyrical, non-poetic, 
that is to say, prosaic, or, better, historical modes of language 
power (262). 
Now, for a “final” essay, it is a sort of inchoate but precise last stab (incho-
ate, if one finds in Baudelaire, if not Homer, the zombie army of total-
ized tropes already, but again, it might as well be Homer). It involves a 
peculiar casting off of mourning, which remains a prevalent rhetoric of 
castigation, now, for the future: can one mourn “futures” despoiled and 
cutting off generations? One may argue that this refusal of mourning, too, 
was implied by Benjamin, and steered away from, not convincingly, by 
Derrida, who would run up the ladder to “absolute mourning,” for oper-
atic prestidigitation, as he would with “absolute hospitality” (a blind total-
ization). What here is “true mourning” if it does not mourn, any more 
than one must mourn as such a human extinction logic, “anthropogenic,” 
or in the name of what disappearance or “life”? This “true mourning” 
is defined against a representative roll call of trances, affects, poeticiza-
tions, affirmations, restorings of loss (mourning), integration. Here 
all tropes gather on one side, whereas the other side appears not to be 
without trope exactly—but as something among them but not of them, 
and lethal, making of them an “army (Heer) of tropes.”23 This draws any 
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putative logics of defacement, today, into focus. It is a logic that, famously 
and early, deconstructs “deconstruction” as such. 
De Man halts. He halts before an array of terms that are not figures 
finally, but more like opaque things implying cracks and intrusions in a 
nominal order based, in the end, on substitutive logics (all tropes essen-
tially). These are intrusions, nonetheless, of a language of power that 
deform networks of sense and refuse metaphor, face, or prosopopeia—
that is, the assumed correlation of figurative and affective mechanics. It 
is, essentially, in advance but also to no great surprise, a defacement of 
the Anthropocene as the by-product of a running anthropomorphic hum 
and machinal premise that we do not stop to inspect—and, specifically, 
the homunculus of the “anthropos” as Aristotelian devised it (not as sub-
ject). Since the “anthropos” is posited and then perpetuated as a mne-
monic hologram retro-projected from the acts of linguistic appropriation 
and expropriation that are called, inversely, anthropomorphisms, one 
is positioned differently. There is no “human” to overcome or be more 
sophisticated than (be post-human in relation to), since arche-biose-
miosis, and hence “consciousness,” is not specific to hominids nor, as 
Benjamin strictly observes of language, “human”; there never was any-
thing like a metaphysics of presence understood as an epochal effect or 
historical decision once taken—but only the perpetual simulation of that 
brought about by a hermeneutic reflex and “relapse” in the perpetual if 
artificed present. Yet one can add, here, as an aside (and in agreement 
with Claire Colebrook), that de Man did not go far enough, focusing on 
destroying the routes of retreat, sabotaging the recuperative reflexes one 
can now see as ecocidal in import and extractivist in “origin.”24 
Inscription as a non-word traverses stone, strikes, engravings, prolifer-
ating inked archives, robo-marketing, yet it belongs to non-living orders. 
There is nothing particularly uncanny about the prosopopeia of a stone, 
which speaks from the non-living or, for human consciousness, the dead, 
since living death is the condition of linguistic consciousness, as of “bio”-
semiosis (semio-animation, bio-mimetologies). Similarly, today’s tele-
citizens cannot apprehend climate change or extinction events as other 
than another movie, an “as if,” entirely disconnected from the mutations 
it experiences and receives data-streams on now daily, as part of the 
occlusion. De Man’s use of unreadability is not to be heard as (or applied 
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to) the undecidability of mutually exclusive interpretations. Rather, this 
unreadability becomes inflected from the perspective of “climate change” 
and the post-Anthropocene, much as one regards the Nazca lines as 
unreadable. It accords with the unreadability of a writing effect that, 
looked back upon, delivered its bearer (“anthropos,” if he existed) to a 
vortex of extinction events, ecocidal accelerations, and the erasure of “life 
as we knew it.” Here is where I begin to have my second thoughts on de 
Man’s “use” for thinking critical climate change, at least at this juncture—
but first, allow me to expand this rift or division. I will give a hint, none-
theless, as to one place this leads, I have found, which seems to be too 
embarrassing to contemplate usefully (embarrassing, that is, for a plan-
etary civilization that, in a few thousand years of technological advance 
and a few decades of hyper-industrial and digital advances, seems to have 
triggered a now accelerating auto-extinction event). I will call this later, 
as if in an arche-cynecist mood and with de Man wryly in mind, the literary 
structure of “climate change.”25 
Now, to return to the opening dilemma: the problem arises not 
with “tropes” such as metaphor or metonymy but with something that 
is not a trope but nonetheless is “structured like a trope.” De Man is in 
fact drawn not to figurative language but to what pre-emptively disfig-
ures, perforates, deflates, compels evasion, or seems “structured like” but 
is not that at all. This thing-like status cannot be tagged since it is not a 
substitution of something else. It operates as anti-matter or a black hole 
might within tropes. One encounters this in those sentences in which a 
negative enumeration dismisses all of the substitute interpretive reflexes 
that the psyche or convention, philosophic ordinance or hermeneutic 
demands cast up: 
Anthropomorphism freezes the infinite chain of tropological 
transformations and propositions into one single assertion 
or essence which, as such, excludes all others. It is no longer 
a proposition but a proper name… Far from being the same, 
tropes such as metaphor (or metonymy) and anthropomor-
phisms are mutually exclusive. The apparent enumeration is 
in fact a foreclosure…. Truth is now defined by two incompat-
ible assertions: either truth is a set of propositions or truth 
is a proper name…. [A]lthough a trope is in no way the same 
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as an anthropomorphism, it is nevertheless the case that an 
anthropomorphism is structured like a trope (De Man 1984, 
241; my italics). 
Strange non-figure, that encircles the others, which is to say figuration 
itself (the entire software of face)—substitutive chains of all form of rhe-
torical elaborations we are familiar with, or leave unobserved, or are as 
if produced by: what, at their point of initiation as anthropos, or at least 
their being claimed (heliotropisms, metaphoric identification, mimetic 
passivities, the eidos, “light,” the imaginary teloi of, well, eating more), 
freeze these in place, as in a vacuum, excluding “all others.” Keep in mind, 
for Aristotle this means no women, no slaves, no children, and above all 
no “barbarians,” those with other tongues—one must be in, and of, the 
polis. Moreover, it is, at its initiation, a foreclosure, no trope at all, since it 
has no anterior definition to cite or vary, though nonetheless “structured 
like a trope,” a wolf in sheepskin, in no way possible to define as, in any 
way, “human.” De Man continues: 
it is easy enough to cross the barrier that leads from trope 
to name but impossible, once this barrier has been crossed, to 
return from it to the starting point in ‘truth.’ Truth is a trope; 
a trope generates a norm or value; this value (or ideology) is 
no longer true. It is true that tropes are the producers of ide-
ologies that are no longer true. Hence the ‘army’ metaphor. 
Truth, says Nietzsche, is a mobile army of tropes…. to call 
them an army is however to imply that their effect and their 
effectiveness is not a matter of judgment but of power. What 
characterizes a good army… is that its success has little to do 
with immanent justice…. (my italics). 
It is an odd term, trope—particularly when at the point of its arrival it 
sediments, say, into representing what de Man calls “ideology.” At the 
point at which linguistic consciousness (in this model a redundancy) 
emerges, it models hallucination’s inability to tell itself apart from wake-
ful consciousness: in fact, the latter relies the more on iterative memes, 
citational salutes, tropological hashtags and place-holders. At this point 
the chain-gang of tropes morphs into an army, enforcers of what is un-
true regardless. Yet this other of trope, “anthropomorphism,” at once 
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assumes the structure of and passes for a trope at first glance in the “enu-
meration” that is, instead, a foreclosure; “it” simulates the common form 
yet freezes it out, like an anti-body, refusing its life-blood, transport by 
substitution and identification. Again: the “proper name” simulates a 
trope without being one (in fact, having the power to freeze that)—like 
an alien egg snuck into another bird type’s nest, it is sheer theft. It cannot 
be a metaphor for anything, since nothing precedes it as an iteration. This 
technogenesis and self-differing violence of language conventions (tropes 
troping) remarks the perpetually effaced installation, maintenance, and 
mutation of the “material” traces—Benjamin’s “pure language,” say—
through which an artefaction of values, hierarchy, and co-optation is 
imposed (when, say, Constantine strategically adopts “Christianity” as 
a war god at the Milvian Bridge in order to deliteralize and delocalize a 
fragmenting yet still proliferating “Rome”). Inscriptions, accordingly, 
are like an impossible itch in the back of one’s skull, where the projec-
tor projects, before which there is no artifacted memory or perceptual 
program—and if one were stuck in a “bad” movie, totalized or foreclosed 
within tropological systems? 26  
The irreversibility of a “proper name” that is blindly stamped as an 
exclusionary act and does not have to define itself—to whom, with that 
army?—echoes too strictly de Man’s projection of a reading that does 
not or cannot return or relapse in the reflex of “recuperative” hermeneu-
tics, of all varieties in which identification is recongealed, and which 
here serves both the imposition of this proper name (in this case, like 
the “Anthropocene”) and its refusal to identify itself otherwise. This is 
peculiar, since the anything but a trope status of an “anthropomorphism” 
both appears as the antidote to tropological trances and, at the same 
time, something beyond their worst forms of totalization. The latter can 
be taken to accompany not just totalitarian memory controls (nation-
alisms, tribalisms, and so on) but the saturation by figural systems that 
have become false consciousness or false substitutes for what was not 
there to begin with (“ideology”). Elsewhere this appears as the divorce 
between descriptive language and the pre-phenomenality of any inscrip-
tion—wherein “descriptive” language is not direct, mimetic, or indexing 
but comes into being, itself, as a defense, deferral, and concealment.27  
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If an “Anthropocene era” depended throughout its reign on some-
thing called anthropomorphism, the latter would be key to study or at 
least define. One wonders, again, why volumes were not devoted to this, 
the scene of a crime of sorts? De Man portrays it in a thing-like mode, at 
first hiding out among a herd of tropes, just one among others, yet con-
taminating and freezing them, in effect totalizing them into an army of 
power for what is, by then, a self-feeding vortex. It is very definitely not 
the same as personification or prosopopeia, and it has nothing to do with 
face (the anthropo-technic capture of trope). It is in one sense pre-emp-
tive and lethal, a power that excludes and appropriates, arriving as a fore-
closure. It is not a trope, nor a word, but sneaks into the parade of figures 
in Nietzsche’s enumeration: it assumes an anonymous disguise as one 
among other tropes while remaining in a predatory mode. What is odd 
is that it seems reversibly doubled: there is as if a “good” mode (what is 
before or outside mere trope) and a “bad” mode (what freezes and fore-
closes). It simulates trope, which anthropomorphism is “structured like,” 
but inversely has the qualities of an inscription—that is, what descrip-
tive language and tropes are designed to conceal or efface. Its assertion is 
exclusionary and totalizing, to cover the fact that the proper name has no 
referent, no original to cite or copy. How could it be otherwise, when the 
effects of “consciousness” when asked to account for themselves do not 
depend on or derive from the animal or body that is or conceives itself 
as living? It cannot be a trope because it derives from nothing and cites 
nothing: it steals its place in line by simulation.  
The claim is that anthropomorphism is non-existent, despite unnaming 
a mode of comportment that allies “the eye” with exponential extractiv-
ism. It does not project or express or metaphorize the world as narcissist 
reflections of itself and its own familiar qualities. It doesn’t have any. It 
conceals itself among tropes, shares their “structure,” but then freezes and 
forecloses a system in place, which, technically, cannot escape substitu-
tive chains that appear simultaneously totalized and disconnected. The 
“anthropocene” is similarly a Trojan Horse figure, one that betrays the 
promise of an ex-anthropic perspective, the “promise” on which Western 
discourse has hermeneutically gambled with the equivalent of exotic 
financial instruments. The era of face in this sense was an artefaction and 
parenthesis, like that of a little ice age or a Holocene. It is an act of theft 
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as a structure, hence the doubling between a “proper name” that conceals 
its lack of referent by violence and an inscription that puts the trance of 
figural language in hiatus.  
The term “Anthropocene” projects itself as a future inscription that 
can only properly be recognized or read from a position after its collec-
tive disappearance—a logic that inserts a poison which freezes, totalizes, 
excludes. The anthropos or “human” (the Greek or Western installation) 
is never generalizable or universal or even applicable to something like 
a species or animal type of evolutionary phantom. It is a bandwidth, 
encoded. It is a group construct or “we”: it never named all the hominid 
variants or even a living organism. Thus: “it is easy enough to cross the 
barrier that leads from trope to name but impossible, once this barrier 
has been crossed, to return from it to the starting point in ‘truth.’” It is 
interesting to overlay this with the parallel movement that preoccupied 
de Man’s last published lectures—an irreversible passage that, despite its 
grammar, would parry the “relapse” by which face, recuperative histori-
cisms, and the management of anteriority (inscriptions) would be main-
tained. The “relapse” is the technic by which the dominion of anthropo-
morphism would be maintained, and ecocide acceleration guaranteed.  
This is where defacement seems less to erupt than pre-emptively 
hum—but then it would not “deface” an extant object or face—as the 
totalizing turn against a “totalization.” Not as some violence applied to 
face as one might troll on the web today to do a take-down from the 
shadows, nor as a resentful attempt to usurp it, but as a norm from which 
specific histories of face would be one commodifiable trajectory or story 
arc, one confused and consolidated by anthropomorphism—where that 
occurs or is produced and managed (television screens, talking heads).  
One can transpose all this into an era of climate change—which is the 
time when there remains (as if officially) no climate change and climate 
change at the same time—when its invisibility is (in measure) struc-
tural and decreed. It would imply, as de Man had figured out, but also as 
telemarketing algorithms have long since simulated and contrived to capture 
(and install), that resistance take the form of an equally totalizing deface-
ment: the entirety of this foreclosure is delegitimized. The poison pill of the 
proper name that has no relation to any originary truth and in turn trans-
forms tropes into its subjugated and subjugating army, has effectively 
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incorporated a dead-end technic, a “proper name.” For an army of tropes 
to enter the field of battle as frozen or foreclosed, in advance, is to ini-
tiate this history with a zombie army that would nonetheless be taken, 
across this epoch, as the structure of time and experience. It is one rea-
son today that, when today’s “corporation” assumes its legal role as not 
only a person, but also a suffering subjectivity (the “Hobby Lobby” rul-
ing), it goes unresisted aside from grumblings. It is when faced with the 
ecocide, which said army of tropes advances, that it is fully delegitimized 
and seemingly empowered. This is what is implied if an “epistemological 
critique of tropes” is inescapable. It is the difference between the posi-
tion of the torch at the back of the cave influencing the movement of ani-
mal forms on the wall for the spellbound “audience” sitting before it—
who identify with faces or animation, perpetuating a mimetic template 
or accord.  
As it turns out, the cancer smuggled into figurative systems at play 
in grotesque substitutive traffic, then freezing and totalizing them, and 
then subordinating them, frozen tropes, to its blank militarization—is 
anthropomorphism. It does not, moreover, represent in itself some spe-
cies entity at all, the fact that it is welded to the hominid speaker or claim-
ant is as secondary as the “personhood” now legally and magniloquently 
bestowed on some animals and corporations. Whatever is projected by 
this proper name it could not be called a hominid, or humanity (a trope), 
or the essence of human being, and so forth. There is nothing in advance 
specifically “human” about it, again, were that identifiable. This is con-
firmed by all the warring tribalisms today, the regressions to mythologi-
cal histories as cover—one or another “we’” channels medieval Russia 
or, inversely, Mao lite, or for the U.S., some “age of affluence” is evoked 
(since it cannot recognize itself in any past neo-feudalism and medieval 
kleptocracies). Moreover, one reaches back for twentieth-century memes 
and slogans as cover (if not thirteenth-century ones), an acid reflex or 
robo-relapse shimmeringly anaesthetized before twenty-first century 
horizons under the new pressures of visible and invisible climate wars—
since “resource wars” doesn’t take account of collapsed agriculture, mega-
drought, mass climate refugees, and so on. When Nietzsche launches his 
strikes against being “human, all too human,” and proceeds to write a rhe-
torical machine thinking itself outside of that, he does not mean some 
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biological being or hominid—he does not want to erase the organism. It 
is about altering the proper name, and definition, of what mobilizes and 
inhabits that product of the first (perhaps last) several millennia of writ-
ing and hyper-technics.28 
The import, of course, is that the proper name (“anthropos”) has no 
definitional relation to any idea or model of “the human”—even though 
the latter could not be posited outside of something like it. There is, here, 
no first or previous term to cite, repeat, verify, or express a “human” 
essence since the assertion of the proper name freezes tropes, negates 
and militarizes them (there is no thing to be a metaphor “of ” here). That 
means that not only does anthropomorphism, if it occurs or exists, not 
mean one thing but that it asserts by way of exclusion, guaranteeing there 
is no such thing as the “human” as universal humanity, as other than com-
petition or conflict—as we see geopolitics reverting to the norm of today, 
returning to a pre-Enlightenment and neo-feudal template of hybrid and 
multi-planed “borders,” contractor armies corporate and stateless. That 
is, what is called “anthropos” as proper name, now projected as a future 
anterior inscription, is anything but a natural or even species reference. 
The word “human” is not descriptive nor a word itself, then, but is always 
a verbal construct created as an exclusionary foreclosure. One can see, in 
the era of climate war, that this term will break into innumerable micro-
tribal, territorial and corporate enclaves—including towns or counties 
competing, again, for water. 29  
Thus the proper name “human” never referenced hominids or even a 
living “species.” It is a weaponized construct predicated on exclusion, one 
whose import is linguistic, inscriptive, artefactual, much as the proposed 
moniker anthropocene itself. It speculates on a non-existent “we,” banked 
on, bound by credit and hierarchies. Worse, the era of climate comedy 
coincides with the withdrawal of the post cold-war geopolitical accord. 
The very thing that would universalize the prospect of a joint species 
perspective, “humanity” as the “humanualist” hominid that anthropo-
morphizes, guarantees the opposite: its fratricidal fragmentation—since 
anthropomorphism can only operate as an exclusionary usurpation. 
And it may reference what we take consciousness to be, without entirely 
reflecting whether “consciousness,” if definable, were necessarily homi-
nid or might be generated and exceeded by A.I. networks (to supposedly 
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assure against anthropocide, future robot marketers speak of guaranteed 
blocks against “consciousness”). What if this future A.I., rather than the 
hyperbolic manager of data streams and exponential calculations, took 
an interest in reading?30 It would immediately be very close reading and 
indeed unflummoxed by robo-hermeneutic narcissisms. It would not 
anthropomorphize, obviously. It would not be perplexed by metaphors 
only we “humans” know, usages that cannot be replicated, voice and 
affect inflection, cultural citations—and so on. It might get all that and 
move straight to the “material” play of forms, insignia, interpretive can-
ons and epochal appropriations and their constellatory relations to the 
hacking of the real. 
4. Brunch in the Ideovomitorium—or, WTF: 
Was “Anthropos” ever in fact, er… Greek? 
Here is the painful part. Of course, there is one other possibility. How 
to say this—it’s almost embarrassing. Well, let’s appeal to anthropos’ van-
ity. Since proposing the proper name Anthropocene for an epoch that 
above all signals its forgetting, the geologists unreflectively signed on to 
this land-claim and proprietization of the West’s arc and nomenclature, 
capitalizing on its Greek splendor. It rests on the genealogy, embellishes 
itself, stakes a claim. The one thing anthropos swells at with a bit of pride 
is, nonetheless, his techno-genesis. His DNA for the British Geological 
Society is—you are, hyper-modernity is—after all, Greek, no? It is (in) 
his name. But what if… there are Trojan Horses within and for “Trojan 
Horses.” What if what we call “the Greeks” were, so to speak, trojaned 
in advance? 
A confession. I am not one for twilights—too romantic, murky, too 
nineteenth century, a time of whale-oil-lamps when they still referenced 
diurnal cycles. “Nature.” What about daybreak? Who is to say it is not just 
a sheathing black “light” now indefinite fore and back—like the normal 
day in Shanghai. That is, before anthropos was installed, set in motion. 
(Check with your inner anthropos still on this—the one that changes 
the subject, murmuring no, calling X cynical perhaps, gathering its mafia 
about it, pointing again to its preformatted “we” to come, and mistaking 
all that for esprit.) 
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Just a little note, returning to the very serious mode of climate com-
edy whose operatics and acrobatics could busy one for decades, and will, 
since the new normals that unfold daily allow the carpet to curl up after 
each step—occluding the rupture or disconnect. Is it now normal to 
expect mega-drought, mass extinctions, video beheadings, hybrid wars, 
fixed “markets,” guaranteed ecocide—yes, sure, perhaps, whatever. It will 
not be long before a next generation enters taking all this for granted, 
as the norm given, with no recall of an imaginary before. The resistance 
to climate change, like that to “theory,” which is to say that to the hypo-
script that traverses hyper-industrial algorithms, old textual accretions, 
and the encoding of cells and life-forms, is hard wired to robo-propri-
etizations. The ecocidal accelerations would have less to do with CO2 
and emissions, global warming and biomutation, than with the relatively 
lame cognitive settings, installed, exploitable for honing techno-power, 
fossilized and lingered overlong in a sort of accelerated stall. But to say 
“anthropos” never existed as an organism is also to say, or by way of say-
ing, that he never was installed as such either. This calls for a back glance, 
a bit of detective work, a good joke on us. Back to the Greeks bearing 
the gift of “anthropos”—scene of an obscure inscriptive crime or “swin-
dle,” which indicates the corporatocracene was active in the forging of an 
archival template. 
There is a famous painting by Raphael, “The School of Athens,” where 
the event of this gift is economized—all the boys are gathered in some 
signature gesture, perfect for appropriation as a cartoon inscription. (Of 
course, one would have to say, cartoon characters and pop cultural seizure 
begins, and to some extent ends, with Plato’s “Socrates.”) Raphael gathers 
the philosophic mafia that launched the flowering of Western thought, 
mathematics, and descriptive science and would be refolded, reclaimed, 
redistributed, expropriated by its declared re-birth (Re-naissance) and re-
initiation. It is comprehensive: there is Parmenides, there is Euclid, and 
so on. And there are Plato and Aristotle at the center in full stride, with 
finger and hand pointing—finger up (Plato), palm down (Aristotle). (We 
will omit focus on Plato’s digitating and deictic finger, already pointing, 
invading, protruding, staining the mighty strides, up, down.) But then, 
there is another figure included, lying on the steps, the only one horizon-
tal and pointedly ignoring all of the rest, and he is just reading a book: 
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Diogenes. Raphael seems to mark this counter-point, leaving him central 
yet altogether apart. No marching, no attention granted to the milita-
rized group. The roaming icon of “Diogenes” is unaccounted for, well-
smudged in late modernities with the curiously foreclosed metaphor of 
“cynic.” He is elsewhere pictured with his dog and his lamp, carried in 
the daylight, looking for a real or honest anthropos, that is: looking still 
amidst this troop of titans for “anthropos” at all. It gives pause and opens 
an alternative history within those layered about this painting’s über-
canonization. It would take someone more cynical than myself, if that is 
the term, to really suggest, say, that “we” have just undergone a financially 
engineered species split by the same folk that streamed climate denial-
ism to the masses while knowing the opposite, say, or that even discus-
sion of “inequality” today is a distraction from this. I could never say such 
things myself, or rather, my inner anthropos might thrash about at first 
and need, at least, his meds. But I return to the question posed, this holi-
est of premises: is the Western anthropos in fact even Greek, does that 
anoint his legitimacy, give him a proper imprimatur with which to leave, 
even, the name Anthropocene stamped into (or after) an ecocidal Earth 
that he claims disappearing mastery of compulsively?  
It is in Nietzsche’s divertissement or “recreation,” Twilight of the Idols, 
that we get, again, the gesture that puts the Greeks as received (as 
always) into question, and it is not the sort of attack on Plato’s crafting 
of “idealism” (finger up) that would be overturned or whose overturn-
ing Heidegger would artifice and seize on to keep metaphysics in play in 
order to slay it again and again. It was never in place: 
And please do not bring up Plato as a counter-example. I am 
a total sceptic when it comes to Plato and I have never been 
able to join in the conventional scholarly admiration of the 
artist Plato. In the end, I have the most refined ancient arbiters 
oftaste on my side. It seems to me that Plato mixes up all the 
forms of style, which makes him a first-rate decadent of style 
… The fact that the Platonic dialogue, this horribly smug, 
childlike type of dialectic, could strike anyone as charming—
this could only happen to people who have never read any 
good French writers,—like Fontenelle, for instance. Plato is 
boring. In the end, I have a deep distrust of Plato: I find him 
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so much at odds with the basic Hellenic instincts, so moral-
istic, so proleptically Christian—he already has ‘good’ as the 
highest concept—, that I would just as soon refer to the whole 
Plato phenomenon in harsh terms like ‘higher hoax’ or, if you 
would prefer, ‘idealism’, than in any other way (Nietzsche 
2005, 225).  
Plato was already a “decadent” literateur, “boring” stylistically, crimped 
by Socratic play-school ethicism—at least, from a certain perspective 
among many. It simulates Diogenes’ view at the time, his life spanning 
the generations in Raphael’s set piece. Living out of his broken jar, carry-
ing his oil lamp in the mid-day sun, Diogenes wasn’t buying the installa-
tion of the Western “anthropos.” He harassed Plato as a soft romanticist 
whose version of Socrates was a joke, disregarded Aristotle as a codifier, 
and famously dissed the latter’s conquering student Alexander the Great 
as he literalized the pop program (implemented it) as world transform-
ing empire—allegedly telling him, when he is offered any gift from the 
new transformer of worlds, to move aside as he was blocking the sun. 
Eclipse, dis-eclipse. When Plato offered a working definition of anthropos 
as a “featherless biped,” Diogenes rushed in with a plucked chicken (ecce 
homo). And yet, the familiar of these men, and others of the “school of 
Athens,” Diogenes went looking for anthropos famously, a real or honest 
anthropos, without any luck. Moreover, he did it with an oil lamp held to 
the daylight sun, cancelled by the latter as “light,” but also indicating the 
latter to be a technic producing “light” itself (not, as in Plato’s candy for 
plebeian readers, “the Good,” the “idea of ideas,” the Father, the whole 
heliotropic armature). Of course, there is the oil in the lamp itself, even 
if from olives, anticipating the petrol-cene catastrophe of exhumed and 
hyperbolically consumed “stored sunlight” (fossil fuels, oil—remember 
weaponized “Greek fire” that was a trade secret!). And that lamp cancels 
in advance the Platonic “cave’s” management and casting of a cinematic 
model of “consciousness”—flickering against the wall, for which the true 
light would be, we project or double, outside. Diogenes (the residue of 
the term “cynic” does not get us there) practiced a defacement of the 
entire project of installing “anthropos” at its inception, as if he could fast 
forward in a cinematic forecast of the coming several thousand years arc 
of this installation and its ecocidal program. If, today, a certain we can 
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only give a back-glance at an “anthropocene” era by virtue of its having 
been given a proper name, it would seem Diogenes did the same at its 
purported confabulation—called a “Socrates gone mad.” But more to 
the point than Diogenes’ practice of epochal defacement in advance, his 
complete pulling away from the artificed “we” then being consolidated is 
mimed in the inaugural act of counterfeiting, of rendering the currency 
fraudulent, that earned him exile status and inaugurated a different cos-
mopolitanism (of which he is said to be the first). At issue in his arche-
cynematic trolling, or his dismissal of the “we,” is that he still could not 
find “anthropos” across these generations that were installing its premise 
and promise. Raphael’s propaganda pop art brings the Greek gang under 
Christographic policing, thereby inventing it. 
Thus, the last possibility mentioned above: that “anthropos” was never 
installed at all, apart from his mimic adaptability; that he not only never 
existed (and obviously didn’t name hominid variants in general), but that 
“he” is or was not specifically and irreducibly “Greek.” Beware, indeed, 
gifts bearing “Greeks.” He would arrive not with cities but something else, 
a telepolis composed of his ilk—linking the definition of politics to his 
arc, detour, incessant eating, devastations. This last prospect would imply 
not that the material events of these works, lives, writings, archival coups, 
and imperium (the whole known world, for Alexander) were the tech-
nogenesis of what we find, today, devolved to Last Man ecocidal hyper-
industrialization “culture” stemming from the Western adventure and its 
American cowboy distillations. It would suggest that we, that this “we,” 
is perpetually invented and consolidated through its own production, at 
every epistemo-aesthetic juncture, in every redaction through this fam-
ily line or algorithmic setting of a perceptual “present.” It would be droll 
to suggest, in crit-speak, that this is done by a sort of hermeneutic reflex 
and normatized “relapse” all but pre-programmed in, added in to freeze 
and totalize all but on its own, Autos-matically, automated as a sort of 
acid reflex of cognitive mechanics and referential encasement. It would 
process “the Greeks” as canonical misreadings (“Platonism” for Plato?) 
that confirm and induce the trance-like hashtags for reference and neu-
ral response, a perpetual smoothing out today policed by bots and algo-
rithms, “ideas,” tele-adverts and pre-emptive data-harvesting, mimetic 
management of the screen, and the hollowed out digital theologies. It
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would be independent of its host organism. If so, then we cannot even 
point to “anthropos” as our legacy and pride, our twilight and our narra-
tive base. It would be something else, for which the Greek legacy served 
as a front rather than index. What would that be? 
The proper name “Anthropocene” arrives after and as its own twi-
light, which negates or occludes the fact. We donate the natural image 
of a cyclical twilight—the pathos of going under and the promise of 
midnight passing—to what is a flickering screen, where an epoch of the 
cin-anthropocene terminates and the trope of an “eye” passes into direct 
neural implants, captured mimetologies replayed for purposes of guiding 
consumption and anaesthetizing the nostalgia for an imaginary polis at 
all. “We” are left, so to speak, with the residual prospect or active remain-
der. That is, that not only did anthropos never exist as a specific organ-
ism rather than a linguistic-mnemonic regime, but that something else 
had been at work which we don’t have a proper name for, or any direct 
or phenomenal evidence of. Rather, it would not simply repeat the three-
card monte of anthropomorphism’s claim as de Man accords it for being 
outside the tropologies it passes for and pretends to number among—a 
claim of imposition, abrupt force, exclusion, of freezing and foreclosure, 
enforced by an “army of tropes” or, we might add today, bot surveillance. 
Rather, “it” operates like a reverse anthropomorphism. It goes into reverse. 
It is, then, misleading to call anthropos a “failed prosopopeia,” as I feign 
to above. Per definition, at least in de Man’s account, anthropomorphism 
precedes and forecloses figural systems including prosopopeia; freezes 
and then manages figuration itself as if from without. It would be impos-
sible to personify, animate, give voice or face to what precedes the latter’s 
possibility.  
Perhaps we chose the wrong drugs from Plato’s pharmacy—the ones 
we gulped (the verb eidein, for instance, which fused knowing with see-
ing) were meant as trial packets to discard. We mistook cartel street 
brands for Platonic Big Pharma. It’s one thing for Nietzsche to trope an 
overturning of a Plato who never was, and another for Heidegger to com-
modify the gesture passive aggressively, to divest Nietzsche and own it, 
in turn, when it was never there to begin with. Metaphysics would have 
been something “we” create, re-iterate, consolidate, generalize, and paste 
into place ceaselessly and addictogenically, that feeds the “we” in concert 
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with accelerating ecocide. The latter is called, say, anthropo-narcissism, 
but it is presumptuous if, as in de Man’s account, the first and key term 
looking at the mirror had no presence or face (as is said of the amnesiac 
cipher, Gregory Peck, in Hitchcock’s Spellbound).31 This might return us 
to something like a literary structure or, perhaps, cognitive program of 
ecocide that would have no necessary genetic link to an anthropos which 
or who never arrived quite to begin with. Something without a name, 
neither “human” nor of anthropos, without a model, itself the inversion of 
any anthropomorphism. It might seem that “we” got stuck in an aesthetic 
regime (did somebody say, “aesthetic ideography”?) that at some random 
juncture proved more economical to consolidate and weaponize as a gen-
eralized regime of reference, perceptual calibration, visibility, invisibility, 
animation—and stuck.  
Let’s trace the fallout of this. If anthropos were not installed with the 
Athenian archive, that is not to say it is or was, then, Egyptian, or even 
Hebrew—sorry, Joyce, no GreekJew neither, though whiffs of a psy-
chotic theology remain. It is also not to say, as Nietzsche does, that we get 
“it” really from Rome, a missing “birth” consolidated by its re-iteration 
or, as with Raphael, a naissance posited only by its renaissance.32 This pros-
pect could not even be called a defacement of anthropos the non-existent, 
though it does strip a few epaulets away and retires the genealogical pre-
tense with all its baubles. Ostensibly, this would parallel the urban myth 
that “life” was not terrestrial but carried in by some contaminated aster-
oid or debris from, say, Mars, that “we” are the aliens—or that the gram-
matical “we” is itself. 
De Man’s last intervention is very difficult to “relapse” from. It is 
unfair to call Anthropos, as I pretend in the title, a failed prosopopeia—an 
uncalled for slight, no doubt, particularly if all figuration would techni-
cally follow, be frozen and foreclosed, or contained by something like 
anthropomorphism. (It could be called a failed anthropomorphism, but 
that seems a tautology.) The sentient apparatus, referential codifier, and 
mnemo-technic regime that was sometimes called language in the twen-
tieth century lens is what we associate with his claim to utter distinction 
(let’s still give “him” his gender imprint for all the obvious reasons, mind-
ful, nonetheless, that the apparatus itself is not obviously gendered). 
This sentient being may immerse or wrap itself in figurative language, 
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let itself be creatively shaped by local “cultural” imprints, but only to the 
degree “he” forgets that this latter occurs always in effaced quote marks. 
Figuration is sustained in full play and substitutive dolphin flips, inaugu-
rated as it is frozen, first, by the faceless coup of anthropomorphism with-
out anthropos much as it is, today, by the digital and techno-controls of 
mediacratic and dark-net streaming and data pillaging patrolled by bots. 
Thus today the errant revenants of Hollywood: zombie inundations, 
unfriendly machines, para-humans of all varieties, pathetic “superheroes” 
in knickers, demon teens. Whenever what we call consciousness disso-
ciates—I am actually here? this is really occurring to me?—or whenever 
one reflects that the world before one can be derealized, as if another’s 
or a cinematic screen, the rivets pop and the forged contract flashes up. 
Every time a financial commentator remarks the impossibility of a pre-
tend and extend game in the megadebt economy of extinction, then 
returns to the casino; every time irony gets named as the perspective of 
the non-“human” itself; every time climate change is derealized as a bur-
densome invisibility nonetheless before our eyes, this disjuncture flashes 
up.33 But if anthropos had, all along, a certain affinity with the headless 
and bodiless corporate personhood, one can see why “Asia” or “the East” 
pulls away from him, loudly and geo-politically, as a sort of contamina-
tion: he no longer even seems like anthropos of old, which the “others” 
were coerced to recognize, love, want for a while to be. The “2008 finan-
cial crisis”—wherein he was shown to have no connection at all to his own 
protocols, not to mention the Bush wars, or the ecocidal acceleration of 
earth—delegitimized these fictions. But if this never quite was anthropos, 
what exactly defines last man culture as it presents itself?
One can compare this, parochially, to the difference de Man asserted 
in contrast to Derridean “deconstruction”: there never was any “meta-
physics” to begin with to deconstruct. Anything akin to a text decon-
structs itself in advance. What we retro-project or narrate as a “metaphys-
ics” as if to overcome would be ceaselessly produced in and by a perpetual 
non-present of narrative redaction, of editing the “rushes” of the day—
which would return a certain responsibility and choice to a present in 
which human civilization technically could have arrested a cascade of 
mass extinction events, except, for the same reason, not. Ecocide would 
have been inscribed in the technic phantom of the home (Oikos), the 
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interior or reserve, proprietization, the perpetual exclusion of “all oth-
ers,” the grammatical “we.” There would have been no metaphyics to 
deconstruct, outside of the perpetual relapse by which a “present” were 
secured, artificed, foreclosed in its redaction; text does all that in advance, 
and it still ended up, for us, masking its status as event, accruing, defer-
ring its readability, totalizing its tropological bourses, “capitalizing” things, 
creatures, resources, bio-data, until it crystallizes—at the end of the era 
of cinema—in last man ecocidal totalization. In the pan-metaphysics of 
the digital foreclosure itself, past tipping points, of the “last” anthropos. 
De Man is quite explicit from the beginning of his thought experiment: 
it has been thus since there was not this or that author or oeuvre, but 
since “text” of any sort. Before the Greeks, before and including what we 
pretend to name as “Capitalism,” as if that were out there, and the clever 
antagonist were purer than that (such is the immersive trope), against it, 
if perhaps unwilling to trade in one’s iPhone and retirement benefits to 
make the point or prevent any particular genocide. Before “Capitalism” 
would be an extractivist drive linked to the settings for sight, “the eye,” the 
hunt, the purity of a techno-theft associated with fire, echoed on Wall St. 
today, as if the end of “the cycle,” returned to its nominal site of initiation, 
technics as unrelenting and mimicking Promethean theft. The first mega-
fauna to appear on the cave walls would be the first to become extinct, 
at the scene or advent (already highly advanced in the cave walls that 
remain, for us, to read—likely late, decadent or modernist ensembles 
themselves).
At a time when the so-called “humanities” is being globally defunded 
as irrelevant, and reading closed by data-streams (or foreclosed), the 
question resonates of what it had been doing—and of course, why its 
stalwarts missed its opportunities, predictably, relapsing into a trapped 
vortex of historicist, “political,” humanist and more or less recuperative 
tropes. Of course, that even the Pope can muscle up today, while the farm-
yard of disappearing tenured professors in the humanities, the nominal 
“intelligentsia,” cognitively resist taking it in, still partition off, occlude it, 
nor publish a joint manifesto on the subject, is endemic—which would 
have included, indirectly or by design, the late Derrida.
This returns to what I named at the opening, deadpan, a literary 
structure of climate change—that is, the playing out of ecocide by way 
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of cognitive settings and memory regimes which surround and advance 
extractivist ecocide into the hyper- and post-capitalism, klepto-anarchic 
gaming and global corruption of “we’s” and mafias today. How did a her-
meneutic regime that preceded and mimed both the capture of aesthetic 
production (aesthetic ideography) install itself in the acquisitive and taxi-
dermic “relapse,” reflexively and mechanically ensuring this trajectory. 
To some degree, the elan of trends today like Object Oriented Ontology 
reach for an animism impossible to locate, after all projected or accom-
modated or ventriloquized “others” have been run through. From the 
perspective of this taxonomic and romanticizing reflex, an addictogenic 
“we” is projected and weaponized, visibility honed to target, the artifice 
of the “senses” streamed or calibrated, “life” re-engineered. The house 
of anthropos’ self-inventions along the way—say, Freud’s giving them 
an “unconscious”—serve more as outlets than modes of self-awareness, 
naming and containing spillages. The mergence of the protocols of the 
“Enlightenment” with assured ecocide mime Freud’s tracing of a “death 
drive” that is no drive at all but the logical exteriorization of a paren-
thesis whose cover and propaganda was the home, the enclosure, the 
Oikos, the Self, the interior reserve, the genealogical fable, the recupera-
tive interpretation which traverses both hermeneutics and the everyday 
technogenesis of what we call, figuratively speaking, “consciousness” and 
“perception.”
So, then: Anthropos—master of “life,” destroyer of worlds—is not 
even Greek (then again, was that not implied by The Birth of Tragedy?). 
Let that settle in: you will not have the residual dignity of having been 
auto-erased by and within the noble trajectory of intellectual and techno-
progress that the West’s imaginary presents. Even Žižek, as Derrida did, 
rushes back to the “Enlightenment” parapets before the spectacle of bar-
barian approach, the trolling of ISIS, as the two nihilisms face off. Then 
what? Was it set in motion, as Timothy Morton opines, in the opening 
grid-work of agrilogistics (Morton, 2015), or the initiation and percept 
coalescence of cave “paintings,” or rather, arche-cinematics before any let-
teral or pictographic script—yet where a regime (among others) of light 
and shadow, of movement, of the “eye,” of mimetic animemes, would 
coalesce (someone, some priest, would seize the torch), the collective 
then repeating these arche-hunts as identificatory models in the quest for 
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food, energy, protein, trinkets, megafauna.34 Somewhere in these early 
processes, or many times over, in a “prehistoriality” that is, nonetheless, 
hyper-industrial still, a certain inertia of interpretive organs and percep-
tual bandwidths found itself useful to political forces to lock in place 
or hone: reference would mean their communal repetition, mimetic 
tags would substitute for abyssal processes, gods would shift from ani-
mate projections of unknown forces barely personifiable into narratives 
or statues, fixed, or rituals of hashtags and emojis. This, you can say, is 
where the “still” is invented—not before cinema but after and to fix, as 
temporal marker, an arche-cinematic flux that precedes all script or even 
“image.” This, you can say, is where the apparatus that works like a sugar 
hit on the consciousness-effect it rewards (in projecting), parasites the 
group, the organs and organisms of the cave, the referential stabilities pre-
dictably useful and data-fied. It is here, one could say, and hence where 
“text” occurs, that the relapse is installed, the backfold, in deference to 
a “we” frothed up by the priest with the torch, and the mnemo-technic 
transposition of inscriptions into the info-bytes of assumed presents 
and the claimed immediacy of “my perception” cited, formalized. And 
it is the inertia of the technic acceleration that takes over and protects 
this artificed enclave—the “magic tent” of stacked branches that Justine 
(Kirsten Dunst) and the futureless boy of Lars Von Trier’s Melancholia
retreat into. In short, the very template out of which anthropos would take 
and presume the real that he knew how to handle and name, dissect and 
shadow-graph, and which rewarded “him” ceaselessly with the sugar-hit 
of yet more proprietization to come, and the phantom of “conscious-
ness,” would take off on its own, advance by turning upon its own traces 
and cannibalizing them, and present itself, in the knowledge base and in 
the daily, hourly, momentary redactions of memory—allowing a self to 
be posited as a still, then projected, then quoted, all as if instantaneously 
since the gaps, intervals, whirring gears, and additives would be erased 
and occluded as part of the bargain, this apparatus could and would be 
applicable to any textual formation or event, whether called canonical 
interpretation, history, or hyper-industrial victimage. The last man would 
have been with us from the “first,” balanced by the ardors of war, hunt, 
pillaging, erasure, and weird gods (nowhere as weird, though, as the 
monotheist anti-God of alphabeticist grammar, the precursor CEO of 
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the bodiless corporation). Here is where the “apparatus” of Hollywood 
is first installed or effaced, and it operates as inertia, as a feeding mecha-
nism that counterfeits a present, a “still,” for its organic host, defrays the 
inscriptions that precede projection and the “public space” of the cave 
wall or screen, gifts the hallucinations of empiricism, historicism, prag-
matism, nationalism, literalist tropological systems, frozen vortices with-
out exit from substitutive relays, the “real” hacked in advance of itself and 
subject, in the digital transcription, to calculation and capture. What “the 
Greeks” imbibed and quaffed, exempting Heraclitus, and what would be 
pop-cited already in John 1:1 as, simply, the “beginning” (bureaucratiz-
ing any fiat “lux”), logos, was already a Trojan Horse—the corporate theo-
morphism enabling pre-industrial framing devices. By what necessity, 
after all, would there be only a “Four-Fold”? Grand theft Autos—by itself. 
These coalescences of an autonomous seeming apparatus (forgive the 
improvisatory term), a machine in the ghost that pretends it is the ghost 
in the machine, kept even (even?) Marx from thinking “materiality,” and 
compelled him into a Christological narrative. And it is this which says, 
or ventriloquizes, not only the “I” of “I, Anthropos,” having rendered the 
host being compliant, but the “I” that cites itself into Hollywood cre-
dence on a sentence by sentence basis as the (Western) House of the 
Anthropoid—in exchange, it gifts the latter denizens with the imaginary 
of an Oikos. It is entirely detached from the fortuitous archival catacombs 
and structures, cities and architectures it devises, including their hyper-
industrial accelerations into full service digital streams and mnemonic 
implants to come—that is, the era disclosed after the exteriorization of 
cinema has run its course, and left consumers with superhero franchises.  
Thus, anthropos would never have been Greek at all. And whatever 
says “I, Anthropos” is speaking not from the wealth of a human histo-
rial experience, and not from the citation of a legacy of civilized advance 
and mastery of “earth” (er—megadroughts, mass extinctions, exponen-
tial ecocide—mastery, really?), but is, in mute compact, allowing this 
obscure reflex and device, hidden within the intervals of mnemonic edit-
ing (and confirming the product alone). It might be called all but auto-
matic—and, moreover, the exteriorization of that Greek word, Autos, out 
of which the panoply of grammatical positions, of seeming “subjects” and 
“we’s” to initially proliferate, defend themselves, exclude all others, freeze 
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the very tropological play they depended on for credit and a definition 
of “life,” even to confirm (falsely) that that speaking “I” was, technically, 
alive itself.  
It is hardly accidental that, today, after “cinema studies” had made 
such progressive use of the term cut, assuming that it taught and reframed 
our continuous consciousnesses with the lessons of interruption, that our 
specialists have decided that the brain works with this “cut” incessantly 
and initially—that the continuities are what the redaction papers over, 
that no cinematic product can mime the nano-mnemonic gum and drug 
that yield the product called “consciousness,” that even the latter was not 
a “human” trait (alone or otherwise), but the implant of a semio-biologi-
cal exfloriation and paleo-corporatism that would saturate and anaesthe-
tize that organism or “brain,” until the host was used up, the Oikos fully 
exteriorized as a back-projection, a fully policed Nachkonstruction, the 
disconnect with things and creatures and terrestrial perceptibility com-
plete in the circuitry of a telepolis that cannibalizes all the dead organic 
life previously on earth (fossil-fuels, oil). Plato’s cave indeed—at least, 
in so far as a proper name like “Plato” replicates the containment ges-
ture. It would seem, then, or the notion need now be entertained, that 
Anthropos bears the Greek cloak to backstop and name an initialization, 
an HFT software given to end-running itself, in the name of power, that 
it had all along been an “it,” and that the gift of the illusion of prosopo-
epeia to the hominid type was an agreed upon drug, poison, pharmakon, 
or Gift indeed, for which the addictogenic creature, so richly rewarded 
for the arrangement (smartphones, Nikes, treats of all kinds and girths of 
unprecedented proportions), could not possibly stop. It was an amusing 
error by our Enlightenment rhetoricians and liberal utopists, or for that 
matter scientists, to assume that the prospect of extinction events, con-
vincing mathematics (the import of crashed foodchains, mega-drought, 
“population culling,” resource depletion, and so on), would evoke a 
response of unified “enlightened self interest”—when the “self interest” 
in question would be that of this apparatus, for which “Capital” seems 
but a tool and tropological red herring. When, today, speculators identify 
the sociopathic or psychopathic traits required by the CEOs of predatory 
trans-nationals and megabanks, who were to keep the system running by 
creative destruction—and who, at the right moment, gamed even that in 
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turn by channeling the “secret sauce” of hyperbolic mega-debt—they are 
perhaps missing where just these lords of the fabled “.001 %” are less mas-
ters than tools of an acceleration for which their hoarding would, neces-
sarily, be temporary comfort, buy a few more decades or generations for 
the genetically engineered survivor caste imaginary. 
It turns out, then, not that we need mourn the disappearance of 
anthropos or the extinction of life forms he, it, regards as tools and energy 
sources, since “he” never existed as a creature himself. He was neither spe-
cifically Greek, nor Hebrew, nor Byzantine, even if “he” were honed as 
a type within the geographematic enclave of the Mediterranean and the 
bio-semiotic competition of numerous tribal variants in a happily tem-
perate earth-bowl during a lull in the climactic action of a spittle worth of 
millennia. Well done. But somewhere along the line, this apparatus gifted 
to “him” a certain longevity and imaginary and selectively real hegemony 
that came with a full tilt ecocidism baked into its technic inception—
what appears around us fully today with prattle of singularities, the use of 
the body as a prosthetic to redesign or leave, the imaginary adequation of 
the computer to the “brain.” (It is out of this blurred imaginary that one 
wonders, say, if the Neanderthals were the good guys and progressives—
assigned the propaganda label of sub-humans?) One is only allowed 
to troll this “history” for the moment, with a twinkle in one’s so-called 
eye, now that it is, in a sense, encircuited. That is, now that the artificed 
“Oikos” has fully exteriorized itself and reconsolidated as a tele-politic 
circuit, in which the remaining acceleration will now take care of itself 
regardless. One cannot ignore what tipping points passed means. Among 
other things, that all geopolitical and “breakaway civilization” acquisi-
tions, all Hollywood trends, and all mafia decisions regarding resources 
and wars, indeed, all inducements of “the public” to remain in the same 
aesthetic ideographical trances that have been digitally mastered and rep-
licated, occur, “willy nilly,” under a twenty-first century politics of man-
aged extinction going forward. Disposable nations and peoples, climate 
refugees without nation or earth to land on (the Rohinga are one of the 
first of this new breed), corporate mediacratic streams, the requirement 
to be as close up the pyramid as survival status allows, decade for decade. 
A few centuries is nothing in this calculus.  
And this is “daybreak.”  
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Perhaps these new horizons, irreversible, present another gift. Not 
in the politics of managed extinction that hums in the background, per 
definition. Rather, the time now opening promises without promising to 
be one in which the most interesting narratives in the human chronicles 
remain to be played out or written, without promise. It is entirely bogus for 
our robo-leftists to squeal that this, acceded ecocide, means nothing can 
or should be done or matters, and so on. In the twilight phase of anthro-
poid earth, the true hyperbolic adventures and aesthetic creations, the 
relinquishment of the proper name altogether, and the greatest pleasures 
on a crowded and burnt out “planet” (in our schemata and chemical or 
molecular compositions) proceed to play out for a sufficiently represent-
able group for now. Daybreak—of sorts. And it cannot be incidental 
that something like an arche-cynecism or cynematicism attends this feast, 
again, circling back, and not only in the simulacra of the digital swarm. 
Moreover, in this polar vortex of imaginaries, it is that latter’s disavowal of 
“the political” as an anthropoid contract that marks its identification with 
the disavowed of the world, those outside the anthropoid economy that 
is heir to the colonial epistemologies or perceptual regimes. All of this, 
one should stress, might seem “natural” enough, as there were no guar-
antees that techno-civilization did not have a sell-by date, that it had not 
been luxuriating on borrowed time since, say, the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
that a window or parenthesis would not close—without tragedy, without 
exceptionalism, without telos, without (Hollywood) escape. Contrary to 
the gurgle of discomfort from ethicist and political imaginaries and their 
“beliefs,” neither the new ecocidal sublime nor its arche-cynematic lens 
conforms to the dismissive epithets of pessimism, apoliticism, and so on, 
the reflex of the cartel “we.” It does not result in some exotic “nihilism” 
activists must ostracize to proceed, utopists write, political prognostica-
tors churn on. It just removes the illusion that there is a telos or open 
time-span or comprehensive future, or that the “promise” represents any 
more the temporal premise of speech acts. Moreover, since numerically 
the abundance of human lives of the present swamps and will swamp 
the marquee populations of the so-called past, and the supported popu-
lations of industrial economies and black economies have never experi-
enced such consumables, transport, pleasures, energy consumption—
one might consider this period or time bubble, our own, as using up this 
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reserve and that of future populations numerically, exponentially, and 
leaving the tab. Point: in fact, one might hold the greatest expectations 
for human types and experience, adventures and narratives, wars and 
erasures going forward. It should be extraordinary. It just won’t last that 
long by previous metrics, like the cosmic mayfly opening the Nietzsche 
text taken up by de Man above. One of the street jokes of climate com-
edy, surely, and thus too embarrassing to trot out usually, is that all the 
forecasts and global rhetoric focused on evading “tipping points,” all the 
calculations of what minimal success might even be once the numbers 
are pared, gamed or doctored, the definition of making it ends abruptly 
at the end of this century at best—then the screen goes entirely dark. 
Beyond that is not even imagined. Hilarious.  
~
Here at the Ideovomitoreum there is time to pass waiting for brunch. 
It is a strange form of time. The morning haze tends not to part, rather 
like a Shanghai day—nor the odors. I will let you in on an amusement I 
occasionally pursue as we wait. It sharpens one’s pre-Cog skills. We must 
learn, after all, to live without “anthropos,” difficult as that is to imagine, 
and that includes the robo-we that worked so well in tribal survival and 
contexts of pillage or proprietization (theft), but now appears, well, let’s 
just say its levers got stuck, or gummed into place, and the anachronistic 
settings and memory regimes—not technically “believed in” by their car-
riers—appear to rattle. 
I’ll share my own way of passing time. In a manner of speaking, I keep 
a pet “anthropos” tied beneath the sink for this ritual—a more or less pure 
breed (less fuss than, say, Collies). And I toss it treats, nuggets, conceptual 
softballs, horrors, aporias, from time to time to watch them get snapped 
up, turned into a sort of rationalized candy drip, lips smeared with an 
infantine or eerie satisfaction each time (it reminds me, for some reason, 
of a monitor lizard). Most of all, I like to see not the predictable ratio-
nalizations, the invariable proprietization back into some inaccessible me
or we, the hermeneutic three-card monte, followed necessarily by some 
weaponized belch of promise, hope, selfie-ness, victimage, revenge, and 
so on—usually good for a cognitive smile for the student of failed proso-
popeia (that is, “prosopopeia”). Call me decadent, but I find the faux aura 
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of satiation that attends the sugar-hit of artificed cognitive relapse touch-
ing. I keep it chained not for fear of its natural aggression (one would 
rather say, passive aggression), nor of contaminating bacteria from his 
odd digestive processes. He takes it as empowerment. You can think of 
him, if you like, as Odradek’s loquacious cousin, the family embarrass-
ment—yet he has a secret. In between feeding and treats, you can listen 
to his murmurs and mnemonic reflexes: the we to come… the “singular-
ity” to come… the deus ex machina of “technology” to come… the “ethi-
cal”… “absolute hospitality”… (How the Left got pulled into this, unwill-
ing to sacrifice any one or anything, obverse to their twentieth-century 
forebears, is anyone’s guess—my own is Marx’s cynical inversion not of 
“Hegel,” but Christian teleology, a rhetorical seduction for “the masses.”) 
But of course, he is not the “anthropos” of old. He ceased thinking death, 
nor does its tissue matter, chemical make-up, body, energy hook-ups, 
attention span, or robo-defenses have much in common with anthropoi 
of even a half century ago and much less. Moreover, if you shine a light on 
it, if it goes silent for too long or starts humming to itself, you see some-
thing startling: its ribs still show—in fact, the body cavity is pretty much 
hollowed through, all those items of ingestion fallen to the side, often 
smeared but intact. Even so, he belches. 
I sometimes forget about him. He’s always the same when you 
return—emanating confidence with attention. I can imagine our friend 
de Man encountering a twentieth-century predecessor (less cellular dis-
ruption, not enthroned under the sink), having absorbed a similar set of 
murmurs, then coming up with those sentences streaming negations to 
parry every iconic turn with which it responds, weaponizes, conserves, 
relapses—relying on tropes of victimage, mourning, exclusion (until, as 
with the corporate person, that includes himself). Sentences such as the 
one cited above: “The most [true mourning] can do is allow for non-com-
prehension and enumerate non-anthropomorphic, non-elegiac, non-
celebratory, non-lyrical, non-poetic, that is to say, prosaic, or, better, his-
torical modes of language power.” Feeding time in the Ideovomitorium. 
De Man’s error was to pretend he could starve it into submission, block 
retreat, compel abandonment of an entire form of tectonic inertia.  
Sometimes bored, I taunt it. Something like: “So this is the whizz-kid 
that reshaped earth.” Or: “And all your universals boiled down to trolling 
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raids on other enclaves and hominid types, nerves, representational sys-
tems, bodies, ecographies, collectives—all with a little cinema in your 
head playing reruns.” On occasion we lock eyes in silence, the moments 
I wait for. Rather than turn aside, he grins, then just starts mumbling 
again to my face, surrounded by wrappers and undigested treats: … 
“mmm…. Others—the animal, mmm”… “the singularity”… “human 
rights” (belch).  
Ah, life without Anthropos… things just won’t be the same.  
Bangkok, July 1, 2015 
Chapter Two
What is the Anthropo-Political? 
Claire Colebrook 
1. Things “We” Have Been Told About the Anthropocene 
If one heard the narrative from elsewhere one might imagine it would 
proceed quite differently. There is a species, and part of that species 
decides initially that it is exceptional at a moral and rational level, but 
then declares—late in the day—that the species is better described nei-
ther as moral nor as rational, but as constituted by destruction. One 
might think the next chapter would see this species go through a phase 
of humility, and yet that is not how the story seems to be unfolding. “The 
Human” seems to have been given a new lease of life, with knowledge of 
its destructive power (for all its bleak and dire predictions) nevertheless 
seeming to offer knowledge (once again) a certain privilege. If things are 
this serious then we need to throw away relativism and humility and start 
thinking for real. It seems as though, then, that the Anthropocene is not 
just one more claim about nature but that it erases all sublimity: “nature” 
is not some idea that we must assume but never know; nature is so real 
and so present as to have the force to erase decades of social construc-
tion, relativism, contestation, anti-humanism and theory (if theory is, as 
de Man claimed, that which is constitutively resisted precisely because 
to think theoretically would be to remain suspended before parsing mat-
ters into narrative form). Nature, now, offers its own narrative and frames 
the human species, placing it within the scale and register of earth sys-
tem science. 
Things “We” Have Been Told About the Anthropocene: first, we have 
passed a tipping point; second, this geological event is a game-changer 
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and spells death both for social constructivism and post-humanism; and, 
finally, we are faced with a stark choice, either we radically transform the 
world or we are doomed. The Anthropocene is not only a geological dec-
laration, but a series of diagnoses that generate imperatives. If we have 
damaged the planet to this degree, then we all need to act as one, and for 
the sake of saving us all. If we have passed a tipping point, then we are 
faced with necessary and immediate measures that cannot indulge in the 
luxuries of democracy or doubt. If there is a way that we might survive 
then that is the path we must follow. And who is the “we” that is being 
saved? It is the “we” that is constituted precisely by way of a death sen-
tence: I mourn my future non-being and therefore I am. Further, I mourn 
my future non-being and therefore I must do all I can to survive. There is 
no longer time for post-humanism, anti-humanism, and—most of all—
no time at all for questioning the prima facie value and existence of the 
human. The Anthropocene requires that we think of humans as a species, 
and (even though that unifying thought has been generated by evidence 
of destruction), once the species comes into being as a geological force 
its survival is constituted as an imperative.  
It is in this respect that the Anthropocene is not one twilight concept 
among others, arriving late in the day to alert “us” to our destructiveness, 
and thereby demanding that we become the properly earth-nurturing 
humans that we ought to have been all along. If the Anthropocene—
today—is possible, this is because its potentiality haunted the very 
constitution of the human as a political animal. How is it that “man” is 
thought of as necessarily political (as properly oriented towards others, as 
having his essential being defined by having no essence other than social-
ity)? To be political is not just to be, but to be in-relation. It is this fetish of 
unity, connectedness, attunement, mindfulness and humanity as an inter-
twined ecology that pervades post-Anthropocene pop culture (ranging 
from the utopian dreams of James Cameron’s Avatar, to more recent sci-
fi fantasies of collective consciousness, such as the recent Netflix series 
Sense8, or the earlier Fox series Touch). The notion of the world as a living 
system is not confined to earth science but seems to operate as a default 
mode of pan-psychism that—in turn—enables any number of narra-
tives that overcome human and Cartesian atomism to find ourselves, our 
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proper humanity, in a world that has found itself as what it ought to have 
been all along, truly earthbound.  
This shrill insistence on the political—that there is, beneath it all a 
“we” that must emerge once we erase the pernicious “man” of capitalist 
individualism—allows for a humanity to come. (I would distinguish this 
from the Deleuze and Guattari conception of a “people to come,” pre-
cisely because their use of the term follows from an erasure of a humanity 
that never was; for them, “man” was always a limited effect of certain and 
localized knowledge and desire formations.) Both in social theory and in 
post-apocalyptic culture capitalist “man”—the isolated individual of self-
interest, consumption and myopia—is displaced by the new humanity 
brought into being by the Anthropocene: humanity is (finally) revealed 
as an aspect of the earth as a living inter-connected system. Perhaps this 
is what post-apocalyptic means: after the realization that what called itself 
“man” was destructive at a geological level it became time for a new eco-
friendly humanity to inherit the earth.  
One of the constant objections to the overly inclusive conception of 
the Anthropocene, has been that it is insufficiently political.35 To refer to 
“anthropos” is to forgo asking just who within humanity was the agent of 
destruction. To politicize the Anthropocene is to place a broad geologi-
cal narrative within a different scale or frame, and then to differentiate 
among humans. If it is capitalism, patriarchy, corporatism or colonial-
ism that is responsible for geological inscription, then an observation 
regarding the species becomes nuanced by reference to a timeframe of 
a smaller scale. And this shift of scale becomes possible if one maintains 
a conception of politics that allows for significant groupings: rather than 
blame “humanity” we might think (as Klein does) of “capitalism versus 
the climate.”  
One might say, then, that the problem with the concept of the 
Anthropocene is not that it assumes that there is such a thing as human-
ity in general, but rather that it is insufficiently humanized, and that one 
would want to locate the “anthropos” within human historical narra-
tives that make sense of what “we” do by some broader reference to rela-
tions among individuals (Moore 2014). To politicize is to offer a narra-
tive, with narrative always generating a moral decision regarding scale. 
Debates about the “Golden spike,” or debates regarding the temporality of 
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anthropogenic destruction, like the Anthropocene in general, are claims 
made for narrative frames and trajectories, and presuppose not only that 
humans are political—defined by their relations to each other—but that 
those relations can be morally differentiated (Lewis and Maslin 2015). 
For all their complexity, the majority of these human-human relations 
of politics are relations of good and evil, and allow for the thought of a 
proper humanity that would not be guilty of the Anthropocene scar.36
One might say that it is only when a crime has been committed, such as 
planetary destruction, that there becomes both the need to attribute that 
crime to a perpetrator, and then have those to whom the crime is com-
mitted emerge as the proper inheritors of the earth.  
If one objects to the notion of the Anthropocene that it generates a far 
too general and all-encompassing “Anthropos” it does not follow that one 
needs to find another culprit or proper name, such as the Capitalocene or 
the Corporatocene. Other geological markers, including the Holocene, 
do not have a cause but mark a shift in multiple factors and forces; and 
perhaps one could think of all history this way, as ongoing reconfigura-
tion with multiple acts of violence and opportunism. It is not as though 
there are masters who win and who inflict violence; there is violence and 
cruelty, from which something like a distribution between master and 
slave emerges. Only by way of narrative metalepsis could one think of 
a certain type of humanity (capitalist man) causing the Anthropocene; 
rather, it is from the observation of changes to the earth as a living system 
that one can then, from a series of observed patterns of violence, posit 
a relatively stable force or “anthropos.” And only then, once that “man” 
as agent of destruction is posited, might one then find another agent, a 
force for good.  
The briefest of glimpses at contemporary cultural production testifies 
to this ressentiment: if humanity has been the victim of those who have 
intensified its improper capacities (over-consumption, over-production, 
exploitation) then another humanity will emerge after the game-change 
of the Anthropocene. The flourishing industry of cli-fi and post-apocalyp-
tic drama– in addition to all the usual laments regarding capitalism, colo-
nialism and patriarchy—have generated an excess of monstrous humans, 
including aliens, zombies, viruses, pseudo-humans and corporations 
who enslave the planet, thereby prompting the proper future-oriented 
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humanity to gather forces and triumph over an external and inhuman 
force. (One can think here of everything from Avatar of 2009, to World 
War Z (2013), Oblivion (2013), Interstellar (2014), Elysium (2013), Into 
the Storm (2014) and Mad Max 4: Fury Road (2015).) In both fiction 
explicitly concerned with climate change to more allegorical presenta-
tions of species bifurcation, humanity is at war with the improper and 
inhuman fragment of itself: a destructive humanity becomes the cata-
lyst for human triumph, with a proper humanity emerging with sublim-
ity from near death. (In Interstellar, Elysium and Avatar a myopic, profit-
driven, corporate, militaristic, merely surviving State power is vanquished 
by an ecological, future-oriented and empathetic humanity.” If there is an 
improper destructive humanity (and this is evidenced by the geological 
inscription of the “anthropos”) then there must be a humanity who would 
emerge when such an evil humanity has been vanquished. If we are fallen, 
now in a world of loss and mourning, then there must have been (and 
will be) a better humanity to come. This is not to say that there has not 
been violence and injustice, but it is to suggest that just because there has 
been violence one might attribute such force to a single guilty agent (bad 
Anthropocene man) thereby promising another humanity. One might 
contrast a Kantian conception of justice, where the very idea of a good 
will (defined against the contamination of the present) necessarily opens 
and promises the idea of justice to come, with a Nietzchean notion of 
justice as dike: as the play of forces that generates disequilibrium. The for-
mer conception of justice allows the promise of a proper future to follow 
necessarily from the violence of the present: if there is no paradise, then 
paradise must have been lost, and therefore will be regarined. This logic 
is not confined to post-apocalytpic cinema, but is announced in Jacques 
Derrida’s deconstruction, where despite all the violence undertaken in 
the name of justice and democracy, these ideas cannot be contained by 
the present and necessarily promise a future, justice and democracy to 
come. Against this, one might think of forces in strife as operating less by 
way of good and evil, or light and dark, and more by way of twilight—
of discernible distinctions but always amid a potentially overwhelming 
indifference. 
It does not follow, then, that all the evidence of violence and injus-
tice, and especially the positing of an agent of destruction that operates 
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at species-level, generates the promise of a good human future. If human-
ity has somehow managed to bring itself to the brink of non-existence, 
it does not follow that it must rally to save itself, nor that it must do so 
against a certain evil tendency that will be vanquished in the humanity 
to come, nor that “we” will be all the greater for having contemplated the 
potential end of humanity as such. From Naomi Klein’s claim that cli-
mate change is the opportunity finally to triumph over capitalism, to the 
environmental humanities movement that spurns decades of “textualist” 
theory in order to regain nature and life, to wise geo-engineers who oper-
ate from the imperative that if we are to survive we must act immediately 
and unilaterally, the end of man has generated a thousand tiny industries 
of new dawns. 
All of these vivid calls to arms rely on expertise and generate the 
very “we” that is being addressed. Let us take the first claim about 
Anthopocene tipping points, or the “golden spike” (Lewis and Maslin 
2015). Let us accept the premise of the dispute, and say that we might 
quibble about just when to mark the Anthropocene (industrialized agri-
culture, colonialism, the steam engine, nuclear energy); accepting that 
there is a point where man became definitively destructive implicitly 
generates another pre-Anthropocene humanity, or a counter-Anthro-
pocene. An implicitly moral line of time is effected: if there is a point at 
which humanity becomes catastrophic at a planetary level, then there 
is the possibility both of attributing blame, and of retrieving and saving 
another humanity.  
A new humanity is constituted by the threat of its disappearance; or, 
to follow Nietzsche: it is the voice of a moral law (“Thou Shalt Not…”) 
that produces “man” as a guilty animal, bred and groomed through the 
attribution of guilt. If there is a being called man who has destroyed the 
planet, then not only is a bad humanity produced as the new agent of his-
tory, an entire industry of those who would self-diagnose and redeem 
humanity becomes possible. It is as though only with the impending 
end of humanity does something like “the human” become visible in all 
its anti-human glory. Now that geologists have discerned evidence of 
damage at species level, the human becomes at once victim, agent and 
redeemer. The “anthropos” is produced through an event of guilt and 
diagnosis; if there is damage and inscription at a geological level, then 
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there must be a response at global level, an end to all talk of there being 
no such thing as “man,” and some account as to who, when and how 
this tragedy occurred. The “anthropos” brings himself into being by way 
of a blinding discovery: it turns out, after all these years, that there is a 
“we” and that “we” have not been good to the planet (well, at least not 
the planet as we would like it to be). States of emergency seem to call 
for a suspension of the free reign of opinion along with the resurgence of 
authority. If the bankers and economists benefited from the 2008 finan-
cial crisis by declaring that time was running out and “we” have to act 
now, and then think about justice, then one might ask why climate sci-
ence with its dire predictions has not been blessed with the same unques-
tioning obedience. Perhaps it’s because of a failure of rhetorical flair: “we” 
can only hear those who offer a future to come, a promise of a blessed 
humanity that will rightly inherit the earth. Indeed, there is no “we” out-
side this rhetorical call to arms. So while all the declarations of authority 
would call for one kind of action worthy of the dire predictions of the 
present—a questioning of whether what has called itself humanity has a 
right to survive —the only “action” has been an insistence on a future for 
us. Just as the 2008 financial crisis somehow—how?—seemed to prompt 
a desperate effort to save the banks, a climate crisis seems to justify saving 
humanity, and yet without all the emergency measures that were taken to 
“save” the global economy. 
And yet, as Nietzsche argued, these idols emerge in moments of wan-
ing and decline, or disappointment, even if they are—for all their late 
appearance—eternal: 
…as far as sounding out idols is concerned, this time they 
are not just idols of our age but eternal idols, and they will be 
touched here with a hammer as with a tuning fork,—these are 
the oldest, most convinced, puffed-up, and fat-headed idols 
you will ever find (155). 
The disappointed one speaks.—I looked for great men, 
and all I could find were the apes of their ideals (Nietzsche 
2005, 161). 
It may well be that it is only when the species is at an end that it recog-
nizes itself as a species, and becomes fully and self-righteously human 
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only in the moment it is required to face its loss, a loss that—in turn—
seems to grant it the imperative to survive at all costs. Man exists, and 
must be saved. He can only be recognized and saved in these last hours, 
when destruction has reached such a degree as to become evident. Some 
have presented this moment as a felix culpa: without the evident, readable 
and diagnosable destruction of the Anthropocene, we would not have 
realized who we are, and might have proceeded with capitalism, indus-
trialism and ecological destruction without this wonderful wake-up call. 
Now man knows who he is, and that he can only be saved by himself. He 
must first accept that there is indeed this unified global/geological being 
called the human. From there, in this moment of being too big to fail, 
all forms of emergency measures must be unfurled, if we are to survive. 
In short, it is by way of destruction that the human emerges, finally, as 
destroyer and preserver, enlivened by a whole series of moral laments 
that produce man as he might have been—the man prior to whatever 
we determined the golden spike to be—and then further enlivened by 
a new managerialism that accepts that if the human exists as destroyer 
then there is some urgent imperative to generate a fully human future. 
It is by way of a whole series of self-accusations that Anthropocene man 
becomes capitalist man, patriarchal man, corporate man, colonizing man, 
or the man of the nuclear age; this industry of self-accusation allows for 
another humanity, and one—precisely because it is threatened—that 
deserves to be saved.  
Here, though, it might be worth questioning whether the 
Anthropocene is an event that really does demand that one either accept 
the general condemnation of man or blame a specific modality in man’s 
history (capitalism, corporations, males, the West). It seems that we have 
two options: either the Anthropocene is an effect of man in general, or it 
can be attributed to capitalism (or corporations, or colonialism, or patri-
archy), in which case man can emerge as an innocent animal—as a new 
humanity to come. But what if one were to refuse both these options 
by suggesting that man is neither the global culprit, nor the global vic-
tim, and that there are many living beings on this planet who live, dwell, 
struggle and survive with no sense of humanity in general? What would 
the present begin to look like if we refused both the claim for human-
ity as global agent and humanity as proper potentiality who may (and 
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ought) to inherit the earth? If we accept the Anthropocene premise that 
man in general is responsible, then we accept something like the human 
as such and ignore the subtleties of history, culture and difference; if one 
aspect of man is responsible—say, capitalism—then that allows for a 
space outside the guilty party. Either way, one generates the human, first 
by way of accusation—the Anthropocene, a single scar that calls us all in 
the moment of defeat—or by way of exculpation: no, not the human in 
general, but these humans—the capitalists (say), whose end will actually 
allow us to dream of a new beginning. Those who declare man to be guilty 
are the first true humanists, generating the “Anthropos” as agent, and 
promising another humanity—one who can be intimated after the crime 
of ecological destruction has been detected, diagnosed and managed.  
2. Theory Refuge 
If the Anthropocene has seemed to erase decades of “theory” that waged 
war on the very conception of the human, then at least—we might con-
sole ourselves—this gives the humanities a clear task at hand. What is 
presented as a scientific imperative where man is now discovered as 
both agent of destruction and as endangered species, requires some new 
industry of reading and critique that will not allow the future to fall into 
the hands of corporate opportunists or those whom Clive Hamilton has 
referred to as the Prometheans: 
The direction in which we thought we were going has now 
been denied to us. The historical force of this should not be 
missed, for it means that the utopian promise of all political 
and religious ideologies, both materialist and metaphysical, 
vanishes. So we have reached the point in history where we 
must face up to the tragic consequences of ‘the American way 
of life’, a way of life also lived in other affluent countries, albeit 
typically with less intensity and ideological conviction. The 
same qualities that made the United States a great nation—
relentless optimism, commitment to know-how, determina-
tion to expand—have become the enemies of its preserva-
tion and, collaterally, the preservation of the rest of humanity. 
A nation that has expansion running in its blood can barely 
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conceive of contraction, and so the question we will soon be 
forced to ask is how much of the rest of the world will be sac-
rificed to prolong the dream of affluence? We have seen that it 
is not true that Prometheans must favour climate engineering 
and Soterians must oppose it. Nor is it true that Soterians are 
against technology. It is not so simple. Yet among those who 
believe we should make preparations to engineer the climate 
there is a sharp division between Prometheans and Soterians. 
The former are inclined to see it as a way of defending the 
established order so that expansion can continue uninter-
rupted. The latter see it as a regrettable measure to protect 
those deeper values now threatened by the consequences of 
endless expansion—viable societies, vulnerable communi-
ties, ecological values and life itself (Hamilton 2013a, 208).  
Hamilton proposes that we abandon the social sciences (those who 
insisted that the human was a mere construction), and should temper 
technocracy with questions of politics. After years of theory that con-
tested every naturalization of what was ultimately historical and politi-
cal, “man” has returned. Feminism had tirelessly criticized not only the 
notion of a generic “man,” but had also increasingly questioned the cat-
egory of “woman.” If, as Catherine Belsey argued, “bourgeois liberal 
humanism,” was a blindness to the ways in which the subject or “man” 
had been composed from contingent, and therefore alterable, political 
relations, then theory was necessarily the demystification of anything 
so naively timeless as the individual: “The ideology of liberal human-
ism assumes a world of non-contradictory (and therefore fundamentally 
unalterable) individuals whose unfettered consciousness is the origin of 
meaning, knowledge and action” (Belsey 1980, 56). Terry Eagleton, also, 
defended theory as an awareness of the historical and social forces that 
had been (ideologically) masked as “natural”; theory is always political 
and to say it is not so is just another political maneuver:  
There is, in fact, no need to drag politics into literary theory: 
as with South African sport, it has been there from the begin-
ning. I mean by the political no more than the way we orga-
nize our social life together, and the power-relations which 
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this involves … Even in the act of fleeing modern ideologies, 
however, literary theory reveals its often unconscious com-
plicity with them, betraying its elitism, sexism or individu-
alism in the very ‘aesthetic’ or ‘unpolitical’ language it finds 
natural to use of the literary text. It assumes, in the main, that 
at the centre of the world is the contemplative individual self, 
bowed over its book, striving to gain touch with experience, 
truth, reality, history or tradition (Eagleton 1996, 170-71).  
Eagleton’s work is typical of theory as politicization, as an unmasking or 
de-naturalizing of “the human.” The putative bourgeois liberal subject 
who has no qualities other than the capacity to be open and tolerant of 
all others who (in turn) have no relevant qualities other than their own 
formal capacities for reason is nothing more than a mask for the capitalist 
consumer; the liberal public sphere, or the level playing field of free pub-
lic reason is just an alibi for the free circulation of capital. Differences of 
race, sex, class, gender, ethnicity, ability and even the personhood of non-
humans have been insisted upon against the undifferentiated and depo-
liticizing blandness of humanism. The supposedly universal “human” was 
always white, Western, modern, able-bodied and heterosexual man; the 
“subject” who is nothing other than a capacity for self-differentiation and 
self-constitution is the self of market capitalism. To return to “anthropos,” 
now, after all these years of difference seems to erase all the work in post-
colonialism that had declared enlightenment “man,” to be a fiction that 
allowed all the world to be “white like me,” and all the work in feminism 
that exposed the man and subject of reason as he who cannibalizes all 
others and remakes them in his image. The Anthropocene seems to over-
ride vast amounts of critical work in queer theory, trans-animalities, post-
humanism and disability theory that had destroyed the false essentialism 
of the human. The “human” of the late twentieth century had increasingly 
become a humanity of difference, defined less by being than an ongoing 
strategy or performance or becoming. But this humanity of becoming 
and self-differentiation was possible only by way of a negative universal-
ism, where the human was unified by having no essence other than that 
which it gave itself through existence. The politics of this humanity was 
a politics of increasingly recognized difference, achieved by analyzing 
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the dynamics that constitute the human in its specificity (rather than its 
being as species).  
If one accepts this notion of the political—that one should resist 
false naturalizations or universals—then to politicize the Anthropocene 
becomes a question of determining what scale or scales would generate 
the proper frame for narrating the genesis of “man.” Should one read a 
text in terms of social-economic narratives, or in terms of the founding 
event of sexual difference, or as an ongoing reinforcement of hetero-
normativity, or as a document of Western reason, imperialism or rac-
ism? Such questions are theoretical because they embed seemingly lit-
erary, personal or aesthetic texts within other contexts. Against a bland 
and undifferentiated humanism, political theorization strives to be more 
intensely and differentially human—seeing humans as emerging from 
complex political relations, where politics has to do with social forma-
tions and what is brought into being (historical/cultural) rather than 
what simply is.  
We might pause here to note that theory has two tendencies. The 
first would generate theory as theoria in its classical philosophical sense: 
theory steps back from, or disengages from, relations, and does not (yet) 
have a world in all its richness of affect and meaning. Theory would be, as 
de Man suggested, an attention to reading rather than assuming that the 
matters of a text simply offered themselves as meaningful. Materiality, in 
de Man’s sense, is very far from “historical materialism” (where matter is 
the matter of a history of human labour), and also very far from a whole 
series of “new materialisms” where matter is a “turn” towards bodies, 
affects and the vibrancy of matter. On the contrary, for de Man “material-
ity” suspended any turn back to whatever tropes had turned away from; 
to read was to attend to the matter of the text. In a different mode (but 
with similar force) Lacan would refer to the “agency of the letter”—the 
capacity for inscriptions, traces, marks or literally letters to operate with 
their own force. Perhaps this is why theory, at least in this mode, was 
deemed to be anti-political, guilty of abstraction and formalism. Many 
who objected to high theory objected to abstraction, textualism, depo-
liticization and a series of losses (of history, context, bodies). The second 
sense of theory reverses this conception of distance or disaffected looking 
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and insists upon politics; to be theoretical is to historicize, contextualize, 
and be mindful of multiple identities, investments and experience.  
When de Man wrote about the necessary resistance to theory—that 
reading would always lapse back into the affirmation of a meaning, there, 
in the text, to be unfolded—he appeared to be guilty of the most depo-
liticizing mode of theory, of assuming that texts were not truly grounded 
in real, material, violent, worldly and human matters. Our claim is not 
that de Man was, after all, properly political, but that his de-politicization 
did not go far enough. His attempt to free the matters of text from mean-
ing and security nevertheless deployed a language of tropes and rheto-
ric that (at first glance) spoke of materiality in human linguistic terms, 
almost as if one could think about language as having an intentionality, or 
as if language were anthropomorphic. In de Man, though, there is already 
the de-politicizing sense that the anthropomorphism of rhetoric does not 
refer to humans using language to render the world in their own terms, 
but that the figure of “the human” is an effect of a failure to read. In this 
respect, we might say that the problem with the Anthropocene is not that 
it depoliticizes, by placing all humans as guilty agents, but that it is overly 
political: still assuming something like “man” whose human-human rela-
tions form polities (rather than seeing whatever emerges as human as 
an effect of what Nigel Clark terms “inhuman nature” [Clark 2011] or 
Timothy Morton refers to as “ecology without nature” [Morton 2007]). 
There have been many death sentences, elegies, autopsies, mourn-
ings and celebrations of the death or end of theory. Far more forceful 
than those who mourn theory are those who maintain its afterlife by way 
of a redemption narrative. Robyn Wiegman has even provided a help-
ful account of the “reparative turn,” which she applies to queer theory, 
but which is pertinent well beyond queer and gender studies (Wiegman 
2014). Theory was once, supposedly, textualist and apolitical, but thank-
fully there were a series of realist, ethical, materialist, reparative and vital 
turns that restored theory to its properly political place. To theorize is 
to politicize, and to politicize is—ultimately—to situate whatever is 
inscribed within human agonistics. Theory—from Derrida’s “ethical 
turn” to new materialisms and the insistence on vitality, vibrancy and 
life—is no longer the theory that de Man claimed was necessarily subject 
to resistance (the theory that takes any political and human reality and 
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sees nothing more than inscription). After many post-theoretical mea 
culpas, reforms, and “turns,” theory has become politics, and politics has 
become hyper-human. To read politically is to focus on the composition 
of the human, with composition implying malleability and a future that 
might be otherwise.  
If theory has become an attention to construction and composition, 
the Anthropocene often appears as a reactionary insistence on the real 
and non-negotiable. Indeed, it often seems as though it is theory as such 
that seems to have fallen victim to the new scale of the Anthropocene. 
Or, “theory” has less to do with “theoria” or reading, and far more to do 
with trends in topics: from bodies and animals, to plants and now the 
Anthropocene. “Theory” has come to denote taking a stand, looking at 
the world from the standpoint of one’s lived experience, identity or alle-
giance. If late twentieth-century theory was—ultimately—a politiciza-
tion of all that appeared as self-evident and natural, and an overwhelming 
objection to anything as static as the human, then the Anthropocene (at 
least for some) corrects the notion that the human is a figure or construct 
within history. Against the “modern” diremption of humans from nature, 
Hamilton announces an end to social science and social constructivism 
(Hamilton 2013b). Humans are all too real, bound up as they are with 
the earth as a living system. 
…the effects of human-induced warming go far beyond 
changes in the weather; everything is now in play, and not only 
scientifically. So let us now make a leap from the land of sci-
ence to the grounds of the humanities, because the astound-
ing new facts uncovered by Earth system science force us to 
rethink our understanding of history. The idea that humanity 
makes its own history and does so against the backdrop of the 
Earth’s slow unconscious evolution is deeply implicated in 
modernity. We are accustomed to thinking of humans, having 
emerged from the primordial darkness, as independent enti-
ties living and acting on a separate physical world, a world we 
plough up, mine, build on and move over but which never-
theless has an independent existence and destiny. This under-
standing of the autonomy of humans from nature runs deep in 
modern thinking; we believe we are rational creatures, arisen 
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from nature, but independent of its great unfolding processes 
(Hamilton 2013a, 194-95).  
For Hamilton, the human is not a political, social or constructed force, 
but an aspect of an earth system that needs to be studied at a geological 
scale, which is—also—the properly political scale. Those who want to 
debate the starting point of the Anthropocene—say, with colonization 
in the seventeenth century are, Hamilton insists, stuck in environmental 
science and have not matured to earth system science, where the point is 
not relations among humans but the earth as a complex whole (Hamilton 
2015). Politics that operates at the traditional level of the polity (by way 
of relations among humans) needs to be opened beyond the “modern” 
enclosure within human history: “From hereon our history will increas-
ingly be dominated by ‘natural processes’, influenced by us but largely 
beyond our control. Our future has become entangled with that of the 
Earth’s geological evolution. …contrary to the modernist faith, it can no 
longer be maintained that humans make their own history, for the stage 
on which we make it has now entered into the play as a dynamic and 
capricious force” (Hamilton 2013a). 
On the other hand, and running directly against the shift to the scale 
of humans as a species operating as geological agents, various counter-
Anthropocenes have been declared. If we define this epoch of destruc-
tion as the Capitalocene or the Corporatocene (confined to a specific 
type or aspect of humanity, or a political grouping) then another world 
and another polity would possible, such as the “Sustainocene” (Manahan 
2014), or the Gynecene: 
We declare the imperative necessity for a new geological era 
to be commenced, before the Anthropocene is even offi-
cially admitted on that scale (it might be that by the time it 
gets fully acknowledged, it will be too late). Rather than con-
tinue to contemplate our annihilation, contributing to it or 
declaring hopelessness in front of it, we should at least try 
another approach—and this approach has to exclude patri-
archy in all its expressions and institutionalized forms of vio-
lence: domination, exploitation, slavery, colonialism, profit, 
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exclusion, monarchy, oligarchy, mafia, religious wars (Pirici 
and Voinea 2015). 
If the human is no longer accepted as a timeless political entity—
the atomic subject of liberal theory—this is because he is bound up 
with complex dynamics of multiple strata; to substitute terms such as 
“Anthrobscene” for “Anthropocene” is not to deny the existence of the 
human; quite the contrary, it is to see the human as effected and effective 
at different and multiple scales. This is what has led Jussi Parikka to tie 
the earth, media ecologies, and what appears as the Anthropocene into 
an “alternative account” that would not allow geology to co-opt the nar-
rative of our time: 
Temporalities such as deep time are understood in this alter-
native account as concretely linked to the nonhuman earth 
times of decay and renewal but also to the current anthro-
pocene of the obscenities of the ecocrisis. Or to put it in one 
word: the anthrobscene (Parikka 2015, 64). 
More explicitly concerned with theory’s failure to deal with the complex 
relation among humans, life, objects and labor, McKenzie Wark declares 
the need for competing narratives and a shift in scale, where politics 
would no longer concern relations among humans solely, but would 
include the earth and technology: 
It’s time for other stories. One thing, strangely, that the Soviet 
Union and its American Cold War nemesis had in common 
was a clear understanding that any narrative for a whole way 
of life has to scale. It had to work for millions, even billions. 
The challenge then is to take the desire for alternatives from 
the romantic anti-capitalists and wed it to the grand scale on 
which capitalist realism imagines itself now to be the only dis-
course (Wark 2015, 217-18).  
For Wark theory can be saved by climate science, where climate does not 
refer to weather patterns or even ecology in its usual sense, but all the 
bodies, technologies and systems that compose a complex whole:  
Climate science has no need for Marxist theory, but Marxist 
theory has need of climate science. Its project has to move 
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on, from the critique of political economy, to the critique of 
its Darwinian descendents in biology, to the critique of cli-
mate science, as a knowledge which shapes the most general 
worldview of the Anthropocene. It may sound like hubris 
to name an entire epoch the Anthropocene, as this seems at 
odds with the decentering and demoting of the human that 
was a significant achievement of ecological thought. But the 
Anthropocene draws attention to androgenic climate change 
as an unintended consequence of collective human labor. 
The Anthropocene calls attention not to the psychic 
unconscious or the political unconscious but to the infra-
structural unconscious. What labor builds is a disingres-
sion. Moreover, viewed via the Anthropocene, human action 
remains quite modest and minor, it’s just that in fluid systems 
a small action can have disproportionately large effects (Wark 
2015, 180).  
Wark’s aim is to broaden politics beyond the human, and to broaden 
the human beyond man as a political animal; man is a laborer and 
machine, bound up with non-human laborers and machines. In short, 
he is a cyborg, but no less real and worthy of concern for all that. Here 
Wark draws upon Donna Haraway who has also questioned the timing 
of the label of “anthropos”: after all the decades where it was unthink-
able to do “good work” while assuming the human as the basic unit of 
analysis, we might be better off thinking in terms of the Capitalocene, 
Plantationocene, or Chthulucene (Haraway 2015). For Haraway, such 
questions of naming are questions of scale: 
…the issues about naming relevant to the Anthropocene, 
Plantationocene, or Capitalocene have to do with scale, rate/
speed, synchronicity, and complexity. The constant ques-
tion when considering systemic phenomena has to be, when 
do changes in degree become changes in kind, and what are 
the effects of bioculturally, biotechnically, biopolitically, 
historically situated people (not Man) relative to, and com-
bined with, the effects of other species assemblages and other 
biotic/abiotic forces? No species, not even our own arrogant 
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one pretending to be good individuals in so-called modern 
Western scripts, acts alone; assemblages of organic species 
and of abiotic actors make history, the evolutionary kind and 
the other kinds too (Haraway 2015, 159).  
Such an objection to the Anthropocene—man returning as a unified spe-
cies—seems to commit the depoliticizing crime that Roland Barthes (so 
long ago) described as creating a static nature by way of freezing history:  
This myth of the human ‘condition’ rests on a very old mystifi-
cation, which always consists in placing Nature at the bottom 
of History. Any classic humanism postulates that in scratch-
ing the history of men a little, the relativity of their institu-
tions or the superficial diversity of their skins … one very 
quickly reaches the solid rock of a universal human nature. 
Progressive humanism, on the contrary, must always remem-
ber to reverse the terms of this very old imposture, constantly 
to scour nature, its ‘laws’ and its ‘limits’ in order to discover 
History there, and at last to establish Nature itself as historical 
(Barthes 1972, 101).  
Fredric Jameson sustained this demand in his imperative, “always histori-
cize” (1981, 9). The history, here, that would destroy the undifferentiated 
“anthropos” is a history of colonialism, labor, sexual contracts, slavery, 
capitalism and corporations. The history of deep time or geological scales 
would need to be nuanced by smaller scales that differentiate “man” and 
that open spaces of refuge that would demarcate capitalist man, and find 
a space for his less guilty others. “Man” is not reduced to what he actually 
is, nor what has occurred historically, nor as he is now defined by geology 
and earth system science. Political reading would distance itself from the 
given, the seemingly natural and universal. To read or think politically is 
to refuse the human, thereby enabling us to say that where we are now is 
an outcome of hegemonic interests (one group of humanity, one portion 
of the species) and that there might be another humanity, another given, 
another composition. This is how theorists as abstract as Alain Badiou 
have defined the political, as an event that breaks with what appears to 
exhaust the real: “politics can be defined therein as an assault against the 
State, whatever the mode of that assault might be, peaceful or violent. 
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It ‘suffices’ for such an assault to mobilize the singular multiples against 
the normal multiples by arguing that excrescence is intolerable” (Badiou 
2007, 110). Far less abstractly, and in direct response to the declaration 
of the Anthropocene, Bruno Latour has insisted on the composition of 
the world as it is at present, and therefore the possibility of its transfor-
mation, its capacity for being re-made:  
There is nothing native, aboriginal, eternal, natural, transcen-
dent in the habits that have been framed during the few centu-
ries “market organizations” have exercised their global reach. 
No feature of Homo oeconomicus is very old: its subjectivity, 
its calculative skills, its cognitive abilities, its sets of passions 
and interests are recent historical creations just as much as 
the “goods” they are supposed to buy, to sell and to enjoy, and 
just as much as the vast urban and industrial infrastructure 
in which they have learned to survive. What has been made 
so quickly can be unmade just as quickly. What has been 
designed may be redesigned. There is not fate in the vast land-
scape of inequalities we associate with the economy and their 
unequal distribution of “goods” and “bads”, only a slowly 
built set of irreversibilities. Now that historicity has shifted 
from the stage to the backstage of human action — namely, 
from second to first nature — activists should ally themselves 
with the globe against the global (Latour 2014a, 12).  
If the Anthropocene is really the “Capitalocene,” or the “Corporatocene,” 
and if it can be identified with high industrial appropriation, and colo-
nialism then there can be another humanity that would not be guilty. We 
might, as Naomi Klein, has done declare climate change to be the oppor-
tunity for us, the humanity who objects to capitalism, to find justice.  
3. What is the Political? 
When the Anthropocene emerged as a concept it seemed to offer, to me 
at least, so much promise: and by promise, I suppose, I mean something 
quite different from an almost automatic promissory response in human-
ities inquiry. When Jacques Derrida wrote on the exorbitant nature of 
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some of the humanities’ key concepts—such as justice, democracy and 
promising—he generated the possibility of a profound break with the 
temporality of concepts. To a great extent concepts became, by way of 
Derrida’s work, essentially promissory. If there were to be such a thing as 
justice, democracy, forgiveness, hospitality or promising then the very 
limited and impoverished nature of actuality was itself a guarantee of 
the infinite. Justice could not be reduced to any of its actual instances; 
if one uses a concept then one relies upon it being recognized because it 
exceeds any single context. Language is essentially in excess of any single 
instance of use. This means both that there can be no such thing as good 
conscience (for any ethical exercise of responsibility must exclude all the 
other potential fulfillments) and also that there can be no exhaustion of 
ethical concepts: justice, forgiveness, democracy and friendship have a 
power—as repeatable concepts—to extend, infinitely, into the future. 
Here, Derrida’s ethics operates by a structure that is akin to Kant’s cri-
tique of pure reason. Derrida’s ethics relies on what can be thought but 
not given, with thought being opened to the infinite by inscription: every 
concept “I” use has a power to be repeated beyond any use. One cannot 
contain or limit a concept on the basis of use or intention. Kant’s cri-
tique of reason accepts what, to use Derridean language, we might refer 
to as necessary impossibility: the world we know and experience is (by 
virtue of the fact that it is known) different from ourselves. We therefore 
know and experience in relation, and this relation to what we are not is 
only possible because we have a space in which we are located; to be in 
a relation to something or to know something, is to be different, distant, 
deferred. We experience a difference between ourselves and what we are 
not, and this necessary space that enables the experience of difference 
between knower and known also requires time. If we knew everything 
all at once, in a fully self-present and divine intuition without differ-
ence, delay, or deferral of a further revealed world, we might not call this 
knowledge at all but simply absolute self-presence outside all time and 
space. Time and space do not limit but enable knowledge, but if this is so 
then knowledge is essentially bound up with difference and deferral; it is 
never absolute. It follows for Kant that we should not lament the distance 
we have to the world that would supposedly prevent us from knowing: 
rather, this distance and difference is the condition for knowing. Because 
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we know things in relation, and in time, we keep seeking further experi-
ence and knowledge, and this leads us to imagine or strive for a knowl-
edge without distance—we cannot erase that tendency, but we cannot 
fulfill it either. Kant has his own ethical theory based on practical reason, 
where we imagine ourselves as if we were not bound by such finitude (as 
legislating universally, freed of all self-interest). Derrida’s ethics does not 
indulge in such a supra-human thought of a pure will that would think 
as if it were not bound up with the determination of the world. On the 
contrary, as I have suggested, Derrida follows an acceptance of the limits 
of our knowing and conceptualizing, and this itself yields an essentially 
promissory ethics:  
The necessary disjointure, the de-totalizing condition of jus-
tice, is indeed here that of the present—and by the same token 
the very condition of the present and of the presence of the 
present. This is where deconstruction would always begin to 
take shape as the thinking of the gift and of undeconstructible 
justice, the undeconstructible condition of any deconstruc-
tion, to be sure, but a condition that is itself in deconstruction 
and remains, and must remain (that is the injunction) in the 
disjointure of the Un-Fug. Otherwise it rests on the good con-
science of having done one’s duty, it loses the chance of the 
future, of the promise or the appeal, of the desire also (that is 
its “own” possibility), of this desert-like messianism (without 
content and without identifiable messiah), of this also abyssal 
desert (Derrida 2006, 33). 
No decision I make can determine what counts as justice, but far from 
falling into what Gilles Deleuze described as a highly bourgeois eth-
ics of compromise (“on the one hand.... on the other hand” [Deleuze 
1994, 225]), Derrida used the failure of determination to insist that our 
thoughts of what might count as justice, hospitality, democracy, friend-
ship or forgiveness would always be able to open to a future that was 
essentially impossible. For Derrida, then, it is the violence of the law (or 
its inscription that must emerge in a manner that is groundless and with-
out precedent) that also, necessarily opens to a future of justice that is 
unconditional. He writes of an “originary performativity”: 
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 … that does not conform to preexisting conventions, unlike 
all the performatives analyzed by the theoreticians of speech 
acts, whose force of rupture produces the institution or the 
constitution, the law itself, which is to say also the mean-
ing that appears to, that ought to, or that appears to have to 
guarantee it in return. Violence of the law before the law and 
before meaning, violence that interrupts time, disarticulates 
it, dislodges it, displaces it out of its natural lodging: “out of 
joint.” It is there that différance, if it remains irreducible, irre-
ducibly required by the spacing of any promise and by the 
future-to-come that comes to open it, does not mean only (as 
some people have too often believed and so naively) defer-
ral, lateness, delay, postponement. In the incoercible differ-
ance the here-now unfurls. Without lateness, without delay, 
but without presence, it is the precipitation of an absolute 
Singularity, Singular because differing, precisely [justement], 
and always other, binding itself necessarily to the form of the 
instant, in imminence and in urgency: even if it moves toward 
what remains to come, there is the pledge [gage] (promise, 
engagement, injunction and response to the injunction, and 
so forth). The pledge is given here and now, even before, per-
haps, a decision confirms it. It thus responds without delay to 
the demand of justice. The latter by definition is impatient, 
uncompromising, and unconditional (Derrida 2006, 37). 
Our inability to imagine complete or final justice should not yield res-
ignation, nor—as we start to think about climate change—should we 
accept a cost-benefit analysis of how much justice we can afford; no 
conception of justice and its possibilities can forestall what justice as a 
concept might become, might do, or might offer. Here, then, is the prom-
issory force of Derridean ethics: we live in a world of forces, relations, 
structures, inscriptions, and potentials not of our own making. We might 
claim with scientific certainty that justice is not possible; but if that cer-
tainty is truly scientific, it must accept the possibility of further experi-
ence and revision. The lack of absolute knowledge is neither paralyzing 
(because waiting until absolute knowledge arrived would be to forget the 
relational nature of knowing) nor compromising, precisely because every 
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decision made in the absence of knowing bets on a future that (for all we 
know) may indeed come into being. Nothing can be said, here and now, 
to be impossible or to be closed down or determined once and for all. 
The very existence of concepts such as justice, democracy and hospitality 
enables the promise of something beyond all conceived present possibili-
ties: the only impossibility is the determination in advance that certain 
events would be impossible.  
When the Anthropocene was first articulated there had already been 
some anticipatory criticism of the arrow of time in the Derridean future: 
it seemed to go only in one direction. Because we exist within differences 
and forces that have a power and potentiality beyond the present, and 
beyond the power to determine the present, nothing can be fully deter-
mined, and no sense of a concept—of what a concept might do—can 
be saturated. Even the past we carry with us (such as the archive of phi-
losophy, literature, science and inscription more broadly) has a capacity 
to “live on” in the absence of any of its original intentions or forces. This 
mal d’archive, far from prompting us to fall into despair and nihilism— 
that a text can mean just anything, and that there is no truth—generates 
quite the opposite: the text has a force that exceeds the limits we wish to 
place upon it, and its feverish, anarchic and untamed capacities have a 
generative power beyond any already formed instance. We might, follow-
ing Derrida, say that everything has promise, or operates as a promise: 
to speak, to experience, to act, to write and even to destroy anticipates a 
future that is not yet, or that is “to come.” Everyday experience of promis-
ing knows this to be true: from promises to pay back debts to promises to 
love or deliver justice there is always a gap between what we fully intend 
and give all our passion to achieving, and a life that can disturb, disrupt 
and erase the context that enabled the promise’s bind. Everyday experi-
ence knows also that the promissory arrow of time is sometimes not an 
arrow into the future, sent by the present, but comes from the future.  
Well before the Anthropocene was posed as a way of thinking about 
what would be readable in the future, climate scientists had been offer-
ing dire predictions. What makes a prediction differ from a promise? A 
promise—even if it cannot be commanded by intentionality or an antici-
pated future—makes some claim to retaining or realizing into the future. 
Phenomenology had argued that in order to experience something as 
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present, as real, or as having being, I retain the past (retention) and antic-
ipate future coherent experiences (protention); all experience is promis-
sory. Even if I assume that something is not real, or is illusory, it is because 
I anticipate that its image will disappear on further examination. Most 
of Derrida’s work on truth and ethics is of this anticipatory and promis-
sory register: in order to have a science of geometry I experience in the 
here and now what would be true for a presupposed humanity (Derrida 
1978a). That capacity to have an ongoing truth or ethics of the future —
such as justice to come—does retain an archival past that may or may not 
be retained, but the future is both necessarily anticipated, and necessarily 
irreducible to protention and anticipation.  
Predictions have a slightly, but importantly different, temporal struc-
ture from promises. They rely not on “us” retaining and anticipating; 
they happen to us, from elsewhere. To predict climate change or to say that 
changes that have already occurred are because of human actions that 
will continue to have effects beyond our intentions, is to do something 
quite different from promising. It is, in many ways, an exposure of a coun-
ter-intentionality of the promise: in addition to wanting to promise jus-
tice, love and prosperity (and doing all I can to bring these about) there is 
an ethical dimension of calculating the chances of fulfilling my promise. 
Promising is beautiful, and creative—it opens up to a future that is not 
yet. Dire predictions are ugly, and they are ugly because they make prom-
ising less easy. Dire predictions make the essentially ethical—the impos-
sibility of foreclosing justice—something that we can still imagine and 
even strive for, but something whose striving and promising is bound up 
with what is promised not by us but to us. It is as though the future— 
even though it too lacks full authority and determining power—is mak-
ing a promise to us. This future may not come about, just as promises may 
not be fulfilled, but the positive futurity of promissory time, is necessar-
ily intertwined with a future that is—in predictions—promising us with 
a dimension beyond our potentiality and its imagination of impossibility. 
What the Anthropocene adds to climate change prediction is both a 
difference in degree, and a difference in kind. By posing that humans will 
be readable as a geological force the Anthropocene seems to be destroy-
ing once and for all the future arrow of promissory time. By suggesting 
geological impact, and not just change within the human milieu, human 
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time—the time of justice and the polity that had been increasingly dis-
turbed by climate change—is now displaced. Other temporalities and 
scales come into play. We are perhaps today far less likely to be just to 
future humans and future life. Or, put more accurately, it is far less likely 
that there will be a time in which we will have been just. From a strictly 
Derridean point of view, far from us therefore abandoning all promise 
to the future, the stakes of justice would be raised: because we cannot 
definitively erase the possibility of future justice, because no event can 
discount the potentiality of justice (including the direst predictions), the 
future seems to provoke us not to close down possibility. By the same 
token, and still within the realm of Derridean possibility (though per-
haps not quite the spirit of Derrida’s thought), remaining within what 
the present enables us to promise should not foreclose reading what the 
future is promising us.  
What the future promises us, at least from one mode of the 
Anthropocene, is the impossibility of promise: this is not definitely the 
case, for it is not certain that promising will be impossible, but it is cer-
tainly one possibility. Put in concrete terms then, I want to suggest that the 
Anthropocene has two modalities and they are both perversely sublime 
or counter-sublime. I want to call the first Anthropocene sublime, fol-
lowing Paul de Man, the recuperative sublime, and then gesture towards 
a second, material sublime. It is possible to say that the Anthropocene 
offers, by way of geological inscription a time-frame beyond our pres-
ent, and that in doing so it opens human thinking to a future not given. 
What appears as a dire prediction—the earth as a living system marked 
with destruction—is also, by virtue of opening a time of thought beyond 
ourselves, the recuperation of the infinite. Some matters—geological 
inscription—open the thought, anticipation or promise of the “not yet.” 
In the very mark of our defeat and limit we are given a time to come; we 
are given a “we”, a “humanity to come.” As I have already suggested, this 
can occur in the banalities of pop culture’s cli-fi productions, where the 
presentation of humanity’s end generates a heroic humanity that finds 
itself triumphant precisely by hailing its nobility in having been defeated, 
but also in ostensibly more high-brow moments, such as Quentin 
Meillassoux’s insistence that God (as true redemption) must exist as a 
possibility precisely because of the injustice of the world at present. If the 
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only thing that we can posit as absolute is contingency, then God must 
at least be possible; whatever is might be otherwise: “From this point 
on, God must be thought as the contingent, but eternally possible, effect of a 
Chaos unsubordinated to any law” (2008, 274).  
By contrast de Man’s material, non-recuperative, tropological, sub-
lime would not allow some matters—such as geological inscription, or 
the thinkable contingency of anything at all—to promise or open any-
thing other register. Such a refusal of reference, a refusal to see “the” 
Anthropocene as the definitive figure of “the” human might be referred 
to as sublime precisely because the lapse back into reference, meaning 
and recuperation is impossible to avoid. Even so, to approach what has 
been offered as the Anthropocene in terms of sublime materiality, would 
be to read geological inscription as it is, and not as some promise or sign 
of what humanity must do, or what humanity must have been. If politics 
has become the promise and necessity of another world for us, I would 
suggest that what the Anthropocene promises is an impolitic erasure or 
deadening of those matters, inscriptions, figures and substitutions that 
seem to stand for a world to come. 
What does it mean to politicize a text? From one point of view—
albeit a highly parochial one—to politicize a text is to offer a theoretical 
reading: (finding the right scale, or semantics). That, at least, was how 
Terry Eagleton (1996) made a claim for theory as such. If you simply say 
that a text is about ‘x’ (whether that be the English civil war or evil) then 
you are not accounting for how that relation between text and referent 
has been generated. You have a theory, a politics or an ideology (but you 
say you don’t). Theory steps back from saying what a text means, and 
then asks how it means: to account for such relations, non-politically (by 
reference to what the author or text itself simply said) is the de-politiciz-
ing (and therefore political gesture) par excellence. Your scale is the indi-
vidual or, worse, the face; the cult of authorship that ties writing to senti-
ment, authenticity and psychology. This was why Lukács objected not to 
certain readings of modernism, but to modernism per se with its stream-
of-consciousness and presentation of the world as so much psychologi-
cal flux and affect (Lukács 1963). To talk of feeling or experience, spirit 
or inwardness—these were (once upon a time) the hallmark gestures of 
depoliticization. Such experiential or “humanist” readings were deemed 
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to be ideological because they took what was politically (i.e. historically 
and economically) constituted as natural or as personal. To say that the 
personal is political, or to say that what appears as “nature” is reified his-
tory, are gestures of shifting and expanding scale. To think of the individ-
ual or experience as the basic unit of analysis was, for theory of the late 
twentieth century, to occlude the socio-cultural formation of selves and 
ways of seeing and feeling. The problem of the affective fallacy increas-
ingly came to be a political problem: to be talking about psychological 
rather than political realities. Today things have shifted, and affect is now 
the political concept of the day: but this affective turn is still both a shift 
of scale—from the self or polity to its smaller components—and a way of 
thinking against the ideology of the human as a coherent, universal sub-
ject—for it is affect, now, rather than history that provides an “outside” to 
what appears as natural and unalterable (Protevi 2009).  
If ideology is not false consciousness (seeing what is as what it is 
not), and not simply error that might be corrected, then it is because it 
is constitutive and productive, or (to borrow from Fredric Jameson, bor-
rowing from Lacan): ideology is the imaginary way in which individuals 
live their relation to the real ( Jameson 1977). If we take this in one sense 
then we might see ideology as a rendering coherent, or tolerable, of mat-
ters that would otherwise be too traumatic to be lived. And this is how 
Jameson follows Adorno in thinking of ideology as the way in which the 
complex shudder of existence, contingency, and the violence of damaged 
life are rendered into some Manichean form of otherness: the nightmare 
of capital can be figured in forms of hero-villain narratives, or the sheer 
contingency of imposed systems can be figured by way of a wholes series 
of “natural” oppositions. For Jameson, to say that the Imaginary is the 
way individuals live the relation between the Real and the Symbolic, is 
to point to ideology as naturalizing and rendering into narrative form the 
cruel political oppositions of a history of class antagonism. 
The Lacanian inflection of this phrase changes things somewhat, and 
brings us closer to where I want to go with de Man’s notions of deface-
ment and disfigurement. If we think of the Imaginary as the way in which 
individuals live the relation between the Symbolic and the Real, then we 
are shifted well and truly away from false consciousness, and from ideol-
ogy as a symbolic rendering of political intolerability. For Lacan, it is the 
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notion of the Symbolic as having a relation to the real that is Imaginary, 
and that constitutes me as a subject. We might say that what calls itself 
human is just this illusion or trope: that some matters stand for, present 
or enable the true experience of others. This is what de Man referred to 
as phenomenalization. To correct someone for being ideological or apo-
litical—to say that we need a political reading—is usually to shift scale, 
and to insist that what we see as “x” is really “y”: what you take to be 
natural, I take to be political. The substitution of “political” for “natu-
ral”—no, this is not natural; this is the outcome of history, human agonistic 
history– keeps a certain figure of nature and politics in its place: nature 
is re-formed as that which is subject to human history, meaning, labor 
and transformation. Problems that appear as existential, abstract, univer-
sal, “natural” or personal are (depending on one’s theory) deemed to be 
an outcome of familial, colonial, class or economic dynamics. And, if we 
accept Jameson’s notion of ideology, all dynamics come down to histori-
cal dynamics—and human historical dynamics at that: what looks like 
racism or a loathing of the other is the way in which ultimately politi-
cal (economic) conflicts are rendered tolerable. One of the problems in 
accusing a reading or a text of being ideological, a-political or of requir-
ing political analysis is the way in which shifts of scale are often figured in 
terms of extensive space and size. You are ideological because you take a 
relation to be personal (the relation between two individuals) when you 
need to see it as a fragment of European history or patriarchy. It is for this 
reason that seemingly temporal shifts in scale tend to be mapped by way 
of a certain figuration of the globe (and not that of the planet). Jameson’s 
history, for example, is the history of capital, a history not only of a cer-
tain scale, but also of a certain space.  
Let us take a standard case of shifting from a depoliticized or meta-
physical reading to a political reading. I might read Joseph Conrad’s Heart 
of Darkness and claim that it is a novel about alterity, about the relation 
between human order and radical contingency, and then (in the narra-
tive framing of the tale) about the ways in which this fundamental and 
transcendental conflict, this encounter with “what resists symbolization” 
is figured in terms of light and dark, and is rendered into a narrative). 
Or, similarly, I might read Albert Camus’s L’Etranger as a text about the 
authenticity of a decision: faced with a world of constituted laws, norms 
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and social coherence, Mersault acts and then refuses to justify his act—
perhaps just as Kurtz in Heart of Darkness “cuts himself loose from the 
earth.” Now, against this notion that texts are about something as tran-
scendental or universal as evil, otherness or contingency we might want 
to say that such abstractions are there to make sense of specific political 
conflicts: what is really going on in Heart of Darkness is a localized, his-
torical, institutional and contextual event of power: the imperial exploi-
tation of Africa and its resources, a thoroughly political opposition that 
cannot be justifiably presented without some grand narrative of civili-
zation. The text, therefore gives symbolic form (light/dark, past/ pres-
ent, primitive/civilized) to what needs to be understood ultimately 
as an event of material conquest; by material we would mean not only 
the matter of this earth, but also a history of commodities, acquisitions, 
trade routes, enslavements and a racism (or horror of the other) that is 
required because the notion of power achieved by seizure rather than 
merit is not too pretty if you look too closely. We cannot read Heart of 
Darkness outside a more specific narrative of Belgian and British colonial-
ism, and we cannot read L’Etranger without a sense of twentieth-century 
France’s relation to Algeria and various others who are first rendered other 
by way of conquest and acquisition, and then metaphysically, mystically 
and ideologically rendered as other in some profound existential manner. 
The political, then, shifts from abstract opposition (some profound but 
unfathomable, and unmastered, and unsymbolizable relation (or non-
relation) and insists that what is presented as mystically contingent and 
ungraspable is the outcome of human historical forces, a world mapped 
according to conquered, acquired, expropriated and stolen forces. A read-
ing or “understanding” is ideological if it mystifies rather than narrates, 
if it presents as simply oppositional what is the outcome of history (by 
which we mean, who did what to whom).  
As a recent occasion I might cite a New York Times opinion piece 
(now expanded and published as a book) by a young philosopher who 
had completed a tour of duty in Iraq. Philosophy, he pointed out, is about 
learning how to die, about being able to shift our attachment and atten-
tions from pathological self-interest to a purview beyond our anthropo-
morphic narcissism (Scranton 2013). To this he was met with a stern 
correction from the left: the Anthropocene is not the Anthropocene but 
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the corporo-cene; it was rapacious capital (not the suffering humans of 
the Maldives) who wrought this destruction, and it is corporations who 
should be held to account (Rugh 2013). It is not resignation in all its exis-
tential and tragic pathos but resistance that we need to affirm. Philosophy 
should not be about learning how to die, but learning how to change a 
world in which it seems that all we can do is die.  
De Man (if one continues in this spirit) would be the ideologue or 
apologist of power par excellence. For de Man these stories of who did 
what to whom, and of an earth that can be mapped according to a tale of 
distribution, resources, acquisition and ultimately of justice and injustice 
are just that—stories—that allow us to make sense of inequality. Let us 
say that for de Man narratives of inequality or disproportionate distribu-
tions are ways of spatializing and temporalizing (or englobing) what can-
not be narrated because there is no common space or measure. True, as 
long as we remain at the scale of world history then one human’s encoun-
ter with another takes place within historical time (a time of nations, 
revolutions and corporations), and within global time: the time of this 
humanized earth that is lived as an environment in which natural time (a 
time of ecological bonding) is now being interrupted by capital time, a 
time of resource seizure and depletion that will end the world for us.  
Does this just require us to add another political scale, to add the 
dimension of the Anthropocene or earth system science to the list of 
theoretical contexts? We could say that Heart of Darkness is prescient of a 
certain expansion of the political to the environmental and the planetary, 
for what Marlowe encounters and ideologically witnesses as a horror that 
must somehow be saved by a narration of the higher civilizing good of 
empire is ecological rapacity, and the limits of the global imaginary. The 
Africans, the ivory, the Congo itself are all so much standing reserve for a 
journey of acquisition that is both covered over, but ultimately recognized 
by, the synecdoche of European learning that is Kurtz. The colored map, 
the moral projects, and the dreams of order are all humanizing masks for 
ecological destruction. Ultimately the culprit is empire, and ultimately 
what suffers and feels the wound is all the earth, which appears pale and 
at an end if one confronts the lie of European goodness too directly.  
What if there were another shift of scale, not towards the global, 
not towards accounting for self and other by way of the narrative of 
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the human earth (where existential conflicts are seen as fragments of a 
larger narrative of capital and acquisition), but where this narrative of the 
human earth—of capital, conquest and then the possibility of redemp-
tion by way of an outside of capital—were a way of symbolizing what is 
outside narrative and outside of a certain dialogic conception of justice? 
This is why I think de Man might be one of the few theorists capable of 
approaching what I would refer to as the hiatus of catastrophe. 
For the most part, history (including human history) has been one of 
utter contingency, violence and volatility, and thoroughly inhuman: the 
brief era of the publicly distributed book and the private sense-making-
imaginary of deep attention coincides with the era of high industrial-
ization, which is also the era that will precipitate the Anthropocene as 
a readable mark on the planet. That is, there is a brief period when we 
might believe in a nature that is lawful, benevolent, stable, not subject to 
change, and—as Kant suggested in reflective judgment—capable of being 
viewed as if it were in accord with a just and virtuous narrative. We might 
also think of history as readable, as having a face, direction, intentionality 
and sense, but only if we have tamed and stabilized the earth for a form of 
techno-science that relied on the theft of energy from another world that 
was not within the enlightenment or human purview. Only exceptional 
industrialization of agriculture could yield such a benevolent, cyclic and 
environmental nature. By exceptional I mean short-lived, and available to 
some humans only. This exceptional suspension of catastrophe generated 
something like the political scale as literary history has known it: we read 
a text within a history of capital, and that capital is semantic, traced back 
to persons and practices, and organized sensibilities.  
When Lacan talks about the Imaginary as the way individuals live the 
Symbolic’s relation to the Real, such that we imagine that we are thor-
oughly capable of grasping the full complexity and contingency of exis-
tence with our quaint anthropomorphic figures, we can say that there is 
no relation or correlation, no extension or continuity between the lin-
ear and human sense we make of what we take to be our world, and the 
multiple, volatile, and infinite forces that operate with blind disregard for 
human sense and intentionality; there are narratives about that disjunc-
tion, a narrative that will present an opposition between the dark chaos 
of contingency and the homely order of law, but there can be—as de Man 
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says - no theory of this narrative (de Man 1971, 271-72). It is that disjunc-
tion that we resist in all forms of theorization that would give an account 
of the temporal or spatial relation between that which resists all narrative 
order and some way of accounting for this order by way of notions of his-
tory, colonialism, capitalism and so on. Now one might want to set up a 
narrative about this type of theory, and it might go something like this: 
“theory” began with an initially radical emphasis on language and textu-
ality, but became far too confined to formalism and lost politics. With the 
turn away from deconstruction to theorists like Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari more attention could be paid to life, affect, bodies and politics.  
When the Anthropocene was proposed, this post-textual direc-
tion of theory (towards life or towards a new materialism) seemed to 
be confirmed and intensified. It is because the planet (for us) has been 
destroyed that there must be a we, and this “we” would be a new human-
ity united by emerging from what might otherwise appear to be defeat. It 
is supposedly materialism, the brute reality of ecological destruction and 
the imminence of our demise, that will save us, generating a humanity to 
come. The recuperation of the Anthropocene by way of the sublime has 
allowed the trace of human blindness and a radically impolitic event to 
reinvigorate politics. If, however, the Anthropocene were not recuperated 
by this mode of sublimity—this intimation of a greater humanity that 
emerges precisely in the moment of its vanquishing—one might begin 
to read. In this case, geological inscription and stratification would not be 
coopted by a narrative of vitality, and certainly not of a living system. The 
image of the earth as a living system is a restriction of scale to the narra-
tive that accounts for life, but this same earth might also be viewed from 
no scale at all, without the imminence of life operating as a frame. Before 
turning back to de Man and his claim for a mode of sublime that deprives 
matter of all face, life and homeliness, we might note that something of 
this conception of a pre-vital and pre-physical matter was articulated by 
the same Deleuze and Guattari who have been hailed as the great masters 
of vitalism. Speaking through the character of Professor Challenger (after 
Lovecraft) they write: 
He used the term matter for the plane of consistency or Body 
without Organs, in other words, the unformed, unorganized, 
nonstratified, or destratified body and all its flows: subatomic 
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and submolecular particles, pure intensities, prevital and 
prephysical free singularities. He used the term content for 
formed matters, which would now have to be considered 
from two points of view: substance, insofar as these matters 
are “chosen,” and form, insofar as they are chosen in a certain 
order {substance and form of content). He used the term expres-
sion for functional structures, which would also have to be 
considered from two points of view: the organization of their 
own specific form, and substances insofar as they form com-
pounds (form and content of expression). A stratum always has 
a dimension of the expressible or of expression serving as the 
basis for a relative invariance; for example, nucleic sequences 
are inseparable from a relatively invariant expression by 
means of which they determine the compounds, organs, and 
functions of the organism (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 43).  
It is hardly remarkable to talk about a pre-organic matter, nor a pre-vital 
matter but it is worth taking note of the notion of matter as pre-physical, 
as that which would be prior to the opening out of space and time. Such 
a materialism would be pre-political, and if the emergence of the polity 
were to be narrated it would be able to do so only by manufacturing a 
certain plane, which would necessarily leave out the radically material 
dimension prior to physicality. It is this sense of matter—inhuman, purely 
intense, devoid of homely sense and affect—that de Man describes when 
one regards matter (after Kant) “as the poets perceive it” (1996, 81). By 
contrast, to see into the life of things, or to intuit the vitality and vibrancy 
of matter is to give it a face or form; if such a vision is political (by locat-
ing what is seen into a narrative of human relations), it achieves this poli-
tics by way of privation or defacement. 
I think this is what Deleuze and Guattari referred to as minor litera-
ture: an inscription or matter that is so minimal, so cramped, so discon-
nected from all context, world and sense that is it neither human nor ani-
mal (though possibly capable of becoming-animal, indicating a potential 
outside constituted organisms). Here is de Man, first on language as a 
mode of silencing or rendering mute, and then on animation as a mode 
of defacement:  
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To the extent that language is figure (or metaphor, or proso-
popeia) it is indeed not the thing itself but the representa-
tion, the picture of the thing and, as such, it is silent, mute 
as pictures are mute. Language, as trope, is always privative. 
Wordsworth says of evil language, which is in fact all lan-
guage including his own language of restoration, that it works 
“unremittingly and noiselessly.” … As soon as we understand 
the rhetorical function of propopopeia as positing voice or 
face by means of language, we also understand that what we 
are deprived of is not life but the shape and sense of a world 
accessible only in the privative way of understanding (de Man 
1979b, 930). 
...the challenge to understanding that always again 
demands to be read. And to read is to understand, to question, 
to know, to forget, to erase, to deface, to repeat—that is to 
say, the endless prosopopoeia by which the dead are made to 
have a face and a voice which tells the allegory of their demise 
and allows us to apostrophize them in our turn. No degree of 
knowledge can ever stop this madness, for it is the madness 
of words. What would be naïve is to believe that this strategy, 
which is not our strategy as subjects, since we are its product 
rather than its agent, can be a source of value and has to be 
celebrated or denounced accordingly (de Man 1984, 122).  
This leaves us with what might appear to be the depoliticizing abandon-
ment par excellence: when you say empire, colonialism, patriarchy, and 
the blow corporate techno-science bears to the planet, I declare your 
reckoning of accounts to be human all too human, and then demand that 
we face up to the radical inhumanity of that which we tend to grasp (nar-
cissistically) as human. This is perhaps why the critical impact of notions 
of anthropogenic climate change and the Anthropocene has been enliv-
ening, rather than devastating; precisely when we ought to be confronted 
with “civilization” as a trajectory of wreckage, we become all too focused 
on surviving. Far from recognizing the ways in which desires, intentions 
and an epoch of humanism, enlightenment and globalism have destroyed 
their own conditions of emergence, the overwhelming response has 
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been an insistence on hope for the future (whether by way of politics or 
geo-engineering).  
In response to this recuperation, I want to conclude by focusing on 
a rigorous sense of aesthetic ideology, with an emphasis on aisthesis, or 
the transition from what is given—the sensible—to what that givenness 
presupposes or demands that “we” assume. To insist on the political, at 
any level, is to posit a putatively legitimate register that would be the 
appropriate milieu for taking an account of any event. Where the political 
tended, once, to be determined by way of socio-economic relations, it is 
perhaps—today—shifting to a different register of affect and corporeal-
ity, or how bodies are formed with the desires, interests and practices that 
then allow for individuals to form social wholes. But what if those prac-
tices of political theory were themselves dependent upon an epoch of 
suspension, in which the earth, the globe, nature, affect or corporeality— 
or even humanity—could appear as an object of stable knowledge only 
with certain practices and formations that would precipitate the destruc-
tion of the milieu on which they depend? There can only be the polity 
with certain forms of life, and from the very outset stable political wholes 
relied on violent forms of inscription and appropriation that erased and 
defaced in order to institute a plane of history. What if the (reflective and 
critical) reading and theorizing we direct to ourselves were the outcome 
of an era of technologies of the eye, hand and an industrialized relation to 
nature, with these technologies in turn always borrowing from the earth’s 
reserves in an ongoing debt that can never be discharged? What if what 
we know as politics—the practice of tracing what appears as contingent, 
universal or natural back to human forces—were possible only in a brief 
era of the taming of human history? There could only be “the polity” with 
the sense of nature not as a force in its own right, but as an environment, 
as nothing more than the passive background for praxis. Today’s climate 
change is an acute event in a long history of changing climates; what 
we take to be “our” earth is a brief and unsustainable period of human-
friendly ecosystems that have been manufactured violently and blindly, 
always at the expense of much life deemed to be non-human.  
What if today’s threatening conditions of volatility and disaster 
were to make anthropomorphism and the belief in nature increasingly 
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impossible? What sort of politics would we be left with in this disfigured 
world without face?  
I want to conclude, then, by thinking of politicizing what we have 
taken to be politics, or—perhaps—thinking about the epoch of the 
political. Before returning to de Man I would suggest that there is pre-
cedence for this in Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s Dialectic 
of Enlightenment (2002), where the period from Homer to the present 
is unified and depicted as an epoch of the critical subject, for whom the 
chaos and terror of the world is increasingly stabilized by technocracy, 
and for whom exercises in demystifying formal abstraction have a cer-
tain pacifying mythic (and delusional) quality. Similarly, though with key 
differences, Bernard Stiegler (2008) also regards the critical subject of 
reading and privacy as inextricably tied to textual, mnemonic technolo-
gies and, like Adorno and Horkheimer, sees that same critical subject as 
intertwined with (and blind to) the inscriptive and figurative systems that 
reduce the complexity of what comes to be known as nature to a manage-
able and manipulable substance.  
In conclusion, then, I would align de Man with a counter-political pol-
itics: any passage or transition to the political as the legitimate context for 
making sense of inscriptive systems must occlude the forces that generate 
the critical, politically astute subject-reader. Today we know those forces 
to be part of a destructive network of technologies that generate power 
(and power in a quite literal sense, including the depleting power of finite 
fuels, and the depleting power of the critical archive as individuals take 
on new modes of relating to texts and images). What de Man allows us to 
think about in this bracketing of the epoch of critical man is precisely that 
aspect of his work that has always appeared as so scandalously counter-
political: if there is nothing to legitimate the transition from inscription 
to sense, then politics is not so much about expansion—explain the text 
by way of its being an epiphenomenon of a grander or global whole—but 
about collapse.  
How might such an event of collapse help us with politics today? It 
would refuse the prima facie goodness of such a question: there would 
be no self-evidently justifiable “we,” no unquestioned right to sustain the 
polity, or the political. It would then be possible to look to the technolo-
gies—primarily inscriptive and aesthetic—that generate the beautiful 
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soul of critical reading, and the equally beautiful ecology and polity that 
is its natural other. What we then might have is a genealogy and geology 
of the event of aesthetic ideology. The reality that de Man scandalously 
claimed would remain unreadable, or readable only by way of allegori-
cal delusion—the natural world from which the text emerges and which 
could always be retrieved and re-read—would be the outcome of an 
epoch of affluence and climate stabilization that may now be coming to 
a close. If it is not coming to a close—if, say, we are about to continue 
this hiatus of disaster (for some by way of geo-engineering)—then per-
haps it would be more imperative than ever to think about the generation 
(in all senses of the word) of this human-nature. That is, we would need 
to think about the generation of power (all the resources of human and 
non-human energy that enabled the emergence of “humanity”), the gen-
eration that “we” are, in terms of the debt and destruction bequeathed 
to what might remain of a future, and the generation or genesis of the 
stratifications that allowed a figure of “nature” as our benevolent whole. 
This would also include questioning the generation of humans who are 
beginning to lament the loss of deep reading.  
4. The Geological Sublime 
Bruno Latour has argued that the problem of scale of the present crisis 
—which he defines as the ecological destruction that will be labeled as 
the Anthropocene—requires a reversal of the sublime: if the Romantic 
sublime followed from the magnitude of nature and its indication of an 
everlasting and eternal power, it is now the case that nature is puny, frag-
ile, destroyed and limited compared to the colossal force of man: “We 
realize that the sublime has evaporated as soon as we are no longer taken 
as those puny humans overpowered by ‘nature’ but, on the contrary, as a 
collective giant that, in terms of terawatts, has scaled up so much that it 
has become the main geological force shaping the Earth” (Latour 2011, 
3). For Latour, it is the materiality of the crisis –that nature appears as all 
too finite, limited and capable of a temporal end—that should preclude 
us from referring to the present crisis as sublime.  
Latour is interested in exactly what concerns me in raising the impor-
tance of the sublime: the destruction that presents itself to us cannot be 
118 Claire Colebrook 
presented. For Latour, though, this is an institutional problem, and one 
of discipline. The very disciplines that allow the earth to be viewed and 
studied, by virtue of being disciplines, limit the range and scale of what 
is studied: “There is no single institution able to cover, oversee, domi-
nate, manage, handle, or simply trace ecological issues of large shape 
and scope. We have problems, but we don’t have the publics that go with 
them” (Latour 2011, 1). The sublime concept of Nature—this ineffable 
“x” that lies as the ground from which the viewed world of relations and 
things emerge—must be abandoned. Abandoning that infinite and inef-
fable nature is the first stage of what Latour puts forward as a project of 
composition. We are waiting for Gaia: not nature as some absent sacred 
beyond, but nature as a composed, interconnected, and dynamic unity 
that is constituted from a series of modes of existence, including multiple 
human practices. We must start to think of ecology without nature.  
Why? For Timothy Morton (2007) the notion of nature as eternal 
and everlasting—a nature that would provide some ground for our nos-
talgia and yearning—never existed. What we thought of as nature was 
created or effected (ex post facto) from a series of forces and interactions, 
some of them human and some of them not. What Latour referred to 
as the modernist split between the world as it is and the world as it is 
known, needs to be displaced by one level of interacting forces—humans 
and non-humans, delimited things and a series of less thing-like entities 
(including odors, atoms, waves, particles and habits). For Latour, scien-
tifically, it is better to think of the world neither as a matter that is repre-
sented, nor as the effect of construction, but as a composition that fol-
lows on from “matters of concern.” Each discipline, practice or mode of 
existence is affected by the world (and this power to be affected follows 
from the fact that the world matters or possesses a degree of force), but 
the response to that affect is given differently in the range of habits and 
practices from which we too are composed.  
It follows then that there is no “we” as such, and that a compositionist 
response would require a coming into relation of various modes of exis-
tence. To think of nature as sublime, as an immensity that can be indi-
cated but never presented is not only defeatest—allowing perhaps for the 
fetishization of a pristine nature that never was and never can be—but 
also undisciplined: the only way we have a world at all is through the 
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concerns it prompts us to act upon, and it is that prompting that enables 
discipline in two sense. Disciplines are active, knowledge-composing, 
shared and adaptable practices that allow a common world to come into 
being, creating modes of existence that distribute distinct powers to be 
affected. Discipline is also what is required to confront the problem of 
scale; if we don’t compose some interdisciplinary Gaia then we will not 
have the power to be affected that Latour places at the heart of practice. 
Discipline (in the sense of knowledge practice) is at the heart of compos-
ing the world; and it would be from that composition that one might also 
then garner the discipline required to act upon the matters that would 
now concern us. What Latour refers to as sublimity is both no longer 
possible—for it is evident that nature does not overpower us and offer 
itself as eternal and everlasting—and certainly not efficacious. At pres-
ent the panorama of possible wreckage that confronts us may seem to 
be destructive of any possible public, but rather than express resignation 
and attribute sublimity to the spectacle that intimates a scale beyond our 
ken, we need to compose a unity that connects rather than disconnects 
our affects and actions.  
Taking Latour’s and Morton’s arguments into account, and recog-
nizing the value of composing (but not constructing ex nihilo) some 
interconnected whole that refuses any noumenal presence that would 
lie behind and explain the world of relations that we witness, what I am 
about to propose would present at least three problems. I am going to 
suggest that we pick up Paul de Man’s concept of the material sublime, 
and that we do not isolate the ecological crisis from a series of other cri-
ses, including the financial crisis, the war on terror, the new modes of 
terror (including bioterrorism) and the specter of mass viral pandemic. 
I would not be alone in gathering these catastrophic risks together; but 
apart from philosophical interest I would suggest that doing so has prac-
tical import. And it is the problem of practice that is tied to the sublime. 
On the one hand one must act as if there were a distinction between the 
material world of causes, and the decision of human freedom: praxis 
must at once be oriented to the world but not of the world. It is that idea 
of freedom that remains in Derrida’s “democracy to come,” and sustains 
Latour’s emphasis on the world being both composed from our concern, 
but also constrained by the matters that prompt concern. If the world 
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were fully knowable then there would be no room for human freedom; I 
certainly cannot theorize or give an account of freedom, for any descrip-
tion of freedom would necessarily require some narrative account, and 
would thereby fall back into causal logics. However, if we were to accept 
the force of the sublime—that there is indeed some “x” that is unrep-
resentable, untheorizable, and beyond any possible experience—then 
there would be something like a freedom effect. One might think of this 
in two ways. Derrida, insisting on the future insofar as it is futural, asks 
that that we open ourselves to the “to come.” Freedom would not be a 
theoretical object, but it would have practical effects: act as if the future 
were incalculable. Indeed, responsibility would only be responsibility if it 
were responsive without having calculated its range in advance.  
Alternatively, de Man’s “material sublime” would shift sublimity from 
the quickening of the subject’s powers, and would seem to de-activate or 
paralyze thinking. It would be a sublime without Idea. It would also be a 
sublime without Latour’s to-be-composed public, and without Derrida’s 
other. Such a sublime would be aesthetic in de Man’s sense not because it 
has to do with art and composition, but because it would propose a mode 
of seeing without sense or teleology.  
Why, outside of literary theory, would one want to exacerbate Latour’s 
problem of the absence of a public? Surely we want enabling notions, 
and ways of making our world manageable? Only a restriction into a nar-
row disciplinary frame of high theory (and de Man’s high theory at that) 
would warrant such a strategy, and it is precisely that disciplinary myopia 
that—it might seem –has done nothing to help the practical task of facing 
twenty-first-century crises. But I would argue quite the contrary: what 
is required is neither the connectedness of composition, nor the hyper-
ethical investment in the absolute singularity of every person’s world. It 
would only be with impersonality—when it is not the face, affective force 
or empathetic life of the other—that sublimity might be approached, and 
the approached may no longer be moral or ethical but pragmatic. What 
if we could look at all forces with the eye that is not detached from “the 
world” but is confronted with decomposition, fragmentation and detach-
ment tout court. There would be no other, no humanity, no “us” deemed 
immediately worthy of survival, but the question would then finally be 
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posed: what calls to be saved? Is saving, surviving, and living on a prima 
facie value?  
If the Anthropocene offers itself as too big a problem for the isolated 
disciplines and institutions we have, what on earth would we gain from 
throwing it in with anything and everything that might bring “us” to 
an end? I would suggest that thinking about the sublime, and thinking 
about the material sublime in de Man’s sense, requires and enables us to 
create a new conglomerate, a totality that is not a dynamic, creative and 
open whole of overlapping but distinct disciplines, but rather a force of 
destruction or dis-unification that is single only in its lack of quality or 
distinction. For all that has been said about deconstruction, difference 
and politics over the years—with deconstructive difference having been 
aligned with race, sex and other identity differentials—I would argue that 
de Man’s material sublime offers a more productive (because destruc-
tive) theory of indifference, and this is so even if it is de Man who seems to 
be the most guilty of reducing difference to textual difference.  
The Romantic sublime occurs when my ability to comprehend or rep-
resent is challenged by what appears to be an overwhelming or infinite 
nature. The self of sensation and material existence is vanquished, gener-
ating the feeling one has of oneself as immaterial. The relation between 
sublimity and ethics is human but impersonal: the thought of acting 
without regard for actual humanity, and being motivated only by pure 
duty then allows for the thought of elevation. Then and only then does 
one perceive a human action from duty as sublime. In Kant’s example: 
any notion of giving up one’s life for an end within this world, ranging 
from suicide to mere heroism, merely subjects my individual existence to 
a finite end; however, if I choose to die for a duty that exceeds all worldly 
ends, then I disclose to myself the degree to which I am a supersensible 
member of the kingdom of ends. Such a sublimity is Romantic because it 
operates with at once a striving for infinite apprehension, and then a feel-
ing that the very inability to experience the infinite generates a sense of 
that which lies beyond the given and finite. In Wordsworthian terms: this 
nature here, generates a sense of something far more deeply interfused, 
a ‘still, sad music of humanity’ that is quite different from the actual 
presented world of humans in existence. There is an intimation of the 
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infinite that is generated from the feeling of the finitude of any sensible 
or material life.  
De Man notes the apparent similarity between Kant and Wordsworth 
but then spells out an important distinction to do with a contrary rela-
tion to affect: whereas the Wordsworthian sublime is humanizing, with 
nature appearing as if harmoniously in accord with our higher nature, 
Kant’s version is architectonic. There is something depersonalizing and 
dehumanizing in the Kantian mode. To view nature as a vault, or as if 
built, is de-naturing or de-naturalizing, if by “nature” we think of some 
living, feeling, composed and affecting unity. To view nature architec-
tonically is, I would suggest—and this is de Man’s line of argument—to 
view the world as if humans were not present, and as if the world were 
not a living being so much as assembled, built and unreadable. De Man 
quotes Kant, and compares him to Derrida’s conception of the architec-
tonic nature of the sublime. For both Derrida and Kant, de Man notes, 
one needs to think of sublimity as erection, and this yields a specific mode 
of time and our relation to time; this is not a time of our own mastery, 
for the very symbol of virility—the pure erection without the “languid, 
yielding” affects of the beauty—is “anything but what one—or should I 
say men?—think(s) it to be”: 
What is it for Kant? We receive a hint in a passage which tells 
us how to look at the sublime, how to read judiciously, like the 
poets (“wie die Dichter es tun”): “If we call sublime the sight 
of a star-studded sky, we must not base this judgment on a 
notion of the stars as worlds inhabited by rational beings, in 
which the luminous points are their suns, moving purpose-
fully and for their benefit. We must instead consider the sky 
as we see it [wie man ihn sieht], as a wide vault that contains 
everything. This is the only way to conceive of the sublime as 
the source of pure aesthetic judgment”… 
Kant’s architectonic vision here appears in its purest form. 
But a misguided imagination, distorted by a conception of 
romantic imagery, runs the risk of setting the passage awry. It 
may appear to be about nature in its most all-encompassing 
magnitude but, in fact, it does not see nature as nature at all, 
but as a construction, as a house (de Man 1996, 126). 
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Already, then, within the Romantic sublime there are two tendencies 
that de Man outlines by way of the relation between the aesthetic and 
the political (and there is also a sexual register whereby the erectile image 
of self-inflation is ultimately a submission to a volatile force not of one’s 
own governance, and liable to dysfunction). The aesthetic is inscriptive, 
textual and sublime because the materiality it presents has not been human-
ized, nor rendered living, nor imagined as a wholeness or a connected-
ness. Commenting on Hegel, de Man writes:  
Monuments and statues made of stone and metal are only 
pre-aesthetic. They are sensory appearances, all right, but not, 
or not yet, appearances of the idea. The idea appears only as 
written inscription. Only the written word can be sublime, to 
the precise extent that the written word is neither representa-
tional, like a perception, nor imaginative, like a phantasm (de 
Man 1996, 110). 
In his essays on Kant’s and Hegel’s conception of the sublime de Man 
works tirelessly to orient the sublime towards a vanquishing of the imagi-
nation, or to arrive at something like an imagination without image that 
would—for that very reason—have to be a mode of disaffected calculus: 
“The faculty of imagination is itself beyond images” (122). This means 
that the sublime would be an appearance of a certain non-appearing, a 
viewing of something not as an image that stands in for and connects what 
is viewed with life and spirit, but “reestablishes contact with the classical 
philosopheme that Kant inherits from Leibniz, in which the homogene-
ity between space and number, between geometry and calculus, is to be 
reestablished by ways of infinitesimal motion” (122). One might make 
a connection here to the ways in which Deleuze and Guattari draw on 
the distinction in art between abstraction and empathy: the former mode 
is—as de Man describes the Kantian sublime—one in which the world 
or what is presented is given as pure form, quite distinct from life (pyra-
mids, straight lines, patterns); and this is opposed to empathy where one 
feels and perceives the life of what is presented. To quote Worsdworth: 
“we see into the life of things.” The difference between monuments and 
inscription is that monuments recall or stand for something, and to this 
extent one attends to what they present, whereas the word or inscription 
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as word institutes a separation, or de-natures us; we no longer perceive the 
world as ours, as representative. Mind must not be welded seamlessly to 
some enchanted world that is perceived as ours, as living or as meaning-
ful: rather, it is in not being the world, in being detached, separated—as 
if the world were mindless and inhuman—that sublimity emerges: we no 
longer live in a world populated by spirits. 
Rather than passing seamlessly from what is presented to the prolif-
eration of what it signifies, we perceive the presented and think critically 
about it not being that which it signifies, such that it is the distance and 
distinction of the word that renders it sublime. We would not perceive 
the oceans as a symbol for flourishing life, but just as though they were 
put together (not intelligently designed so much as placed). Is this not 
how we might imagine the human world and archive (after humans) in 
all its forms: not as something that we would read, or that would be read-
able? The geological sublime is therefore the challenge of looking at the 
entire archive of the earth—including human script—as one might look 
at the marks left on buildings by the forces of weathering. How would 
we read ourselves if we were not to assume some ultimate readability or 
spirit beneath the materiality of text? 
If one looks at the post-apocalyptic sublime the reverse takes place: 
we imagine the detritus of the world after humans as ultimately all that is 
left of a world that is nothing more than readability: it is as though monu-
ments, or the signs we give to ourselves as beings of freedom, constitute 
humanity and the only capacity humanity has to think beyond itself. We 
can think of two sublime-tragic instances: at the conclusion of Danny 
Boyle’s 28 Weeks Later (2007), after a seeming containment of the “rage” 
virus “we” witness hordes of infected post-human humans rushing upon 
the Eiffel Tower: “we” see the human world as if it were no longer popu-
lated by beings who would be able to recognize it as human. We see “our” 
world of freedom, sense and monument from the point of view of beings 
who can only look at the world as no world at all. To lose that readability 
would be to lose the world. And yet it is precisely that which (de Man’s) 
Kant seeks to find in the sublime, a gaze as if this world meant nothing, as 
if we could view nature not as monument but as vault. Consider the sub-
lime scene from the original The Planet of the Apes (1968) where Charlton 
Heston finds a fragment of The Statue of Liberty left on the beach as if it 
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were so much random junk. He now lives in a world in which the very sym-
bol of self-erecting freedom is no monument at all, merely contingent 
waste washed ashore. For de Man, Kant suggests that the look we might 
direct to the world as just something assembled, is sublime. Such a look 
would detach us from our world of feelings and meanings. But of course 
The Plant of the Apes does not view The Statue of Liberty in that manner; 
indeed, it is characteristic of the post-apocalyptic sublime to regard the 
loss of readability and (human) meaning as the loss of the world as such.  
Chapter Three 
Reading Paul de Man While Falling into Cyberspace
In the Twilight of the Anthropocene Idols 
J. Hillis Miller 
In Memory of Cat Kiki 
1. The Linguistics of Literariness and Ideology 
What we call ideology is precisely the confusion of linguistic 
with natural reality, of reference with phenomenalism. It 
follows that, more than any other mode of inquiry, including 
economics, the linguistics of literariness is a powerful 
and indispensable tool in the unmasking of ideological 
aberrations, as well as a determining factor in accounting 
for their occurrence. Those who reproach literary theory 
for being oblivious to social and historical (that is to say 
ideological) reality are merely stating their fear at having 
their own ideological mystifications exposed by the tool they 
are trying to discredit. They are, in short, very poor readers of 
Marx’s German Ideology.
Paul de Man 1986, 11 
This chapter is a long commentary or endnote to the passage from Paul 
de Man’s “The Resistance to Theory” cited above as my epigraph. The 
reader will see why and how as the chapter progresses.
My questions in this essay are the following: In these bad days, what 
good is studying literature or literary theory? What good can be served in 
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our present dire situation by appropriating Paul de Man’s procedures of 
“rhetorical reading” to help understand our present condition? By “these 
bad days” (a citation from Matthew Arnold’s “To a Friend” [Arnold 1965, 
105]), I mean the many ways things are not going at all well in the world, 
and in particular in the United States. Studying literature and literary the-
ory would be useful only if some form of language, including digital sign 
systems and visual images, is in one way or another involved in the ways 
we live now. De Man argues cogently that we must learn to “read” visual 
images, and I’ll return in the third section of this essay to that somewhat 
counter-intuitive claim. Tom Cohen’s brilliant essay for this volume has 
forcefully demonstrated that climate change and the other features of our 
life that I shall now identify are linguistic events. 
1) We are experiencing global climate change that may soon make the 
species Homo sapiens extinct, after putting our coasts and coastal cities 
under water (New York City, for example, not to speak of Florida and my 
coastal home on Deer Isle, Maine). California is already becoming a des-
ert or dust bowl. The Mid-West has had frequent violent storms with tor-
nadoes, alternating with droughts and heat waves. The winter of 2014-15 
was the worst on record, and violent storms are sweeping the Mid-West 
as I revise this in late April, 2015.  
Nevertheless, many people still fiercely deny “anthropogenic” cli-
mate change. (See Cohen’s essay for the deceptions buried in that word 
“anthropogenic.”) The facts about this are amazing, to me at least. They 
are strong evidence of the power of ideological lies to influence belief and 
behavior. An essay in HuffPost Politics for April 23, 2015, for example, 
reports that  
A Gallup poll released Wednesday [April 22, 2015] shows 
just how resistant some Republicans are to the science of cli-
mate change. In polling conducted over the past five years, 59 
percent of self-identified conservative Republicans said they 
don’t believe that climate change is happening now, and 70 
percent said they don’t believe humans are responsible for it. 
Gallup asked about 6,000 Americans of diverse political ide-
ologies whether the effects of global warming would be felt 
in their lifetimes, in future generations or not at all. Forty 
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percent of conservative Republicans deny that global warm-
ing will ever happen, while an additional 19 percent believe 
that it will only affect future generations. However, a May 
2014 governmental report found climate change is affecting 
all areas of the United States. Although there’s a wide scien-
tific consensus that climate change is caused by increased lev-
els of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, most conservative 
Republicans reject the idea that there is a link between pollu-
tion and rising temperatures. They are the only political group 
to have a majority not believe in the connection. (Sola 2015). 
When I worked on this essay in an earlier form in July and August, 
2012, the United States was experiencing the hottest year on record. Fires 
had raged in Colorado and elsewhere. A severe drought was destroying 
our corn and soybean crops. Food prices were already going up. Immense 
direchos, or thunderstorm fronts, had devastated parts of the Midwest and 
East, spawning tornadoes, downing trees, causing floods, and widespread 
power outages. A sudden melting of the entire Greenland ice-cap surface 
was reported in 2012, to the amazement of scientists, who keep saying: 
“Oh dear! All this is happening much faster than we thought!” Scientists 
also had just discovered, to their further amazement, that the huge thun-
derstorms are pushing warm air up into the stratosphere and posing a 
threat to the ozone layer over the United States (Fountain, 2012). New 
reports or events of this nature have occurred almost daily since then. 
Most of my new evidence in this introductory section comes from just a 
few days of reports in the digital media in late April of 2015. 
This long series of climate catastrophes has in fact accelerated in 
frequency and intensity since the summer of 2012, for example with 
Hurricane Sandy in late October 2012, which flooded large sections of 
New Jersey and Manhattan. Hurricane Katrina, that devastated the gulf 
coast, had already occurred in 2005. Hurricane Sandy confirmed that the 
prediction that climate change could cause flooding of the United States 
East Coast was not a science fiction fantasy or a wacky prediction of hys-
terical climate scientists.
The Antarctic ice is rapidly melting irreversibly. This will ultimately 
raise sea-levels worldwide about fifteen feet, as numerous recent on-site 
investigations have discovered.  
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Another (counter-intuitive) example is the recent extremely cold and 
snowy winters in the United States, the worst on record in many places 
all the way down to the Gulf Coast, where snow and ice-storms of an 
intensity such as have occurred are exceedingly unusual. These winters 
have been accompanied by so-called “polar vortexes,” a beautiful figure 
of speech. These ferocious winters would seem to support the claims of 
climate-change deniers. (“You see, the weather is just as cold or colder 
than ever! Who says the climate is getting warmer?”) Scientists, however, 
cogently relate these cold winters to the melting of Arctic ice caused by 
global warming that is registered in thermometer records (another form 
of language). An essay in Scientific American for May 2015 by Mark Harris 
persuasively and succinctly states the evidence for this connection: 
Accurate Arctic climate models are critical. [For most human 
beings, changes in the Arctic exist as “linguistic” “models.” 
Few of us have actually seen the open water in the Arctic. 
Television videos are after all another digital artifact, there-
fore mediated by a form of language.] Scientists at Pacific 
Northwest National Laboratory think that less sea ice in the 
Arctic means heat energy that is usually trapped underneath 
this ice can escape into the atmosphere. This rising heat can 
disrupt the jet stream, the swiftly moving high-altitude air 
current that makes it quicker to fly from west to east in the 
U.S. than the other direction. Some scientists believe that the 
jet stream acts as a barrier that prevents frigid Arctic air from 
moving south and that changes to it can cause extreme “polar 
vortex” weather events such as those that have frozen East 
Coast [and Mid-West I add. jhm] cities in the U.S. during the 
past two winters (Harris 2015, 66). 
Meanwhile such self-destructive activities as widespread use of tar sands 
and increased use of fracking for shale gas continue at an ever-accelerat-
ing rate. Drilling for new oil wells in Oklahoma has made that state the 
scene of constant earthquakes caused by the injection of water (produced 
by the oil well drilling and by fracking) deep into the earth. An essay by 
Clifford Krauss in The New York Times reports in a jubilatory mode that 
the United States is now the world’s largest producer of oil and gas. “Shale 
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drilling,” says the lead, “has not only transformed the United States from 
a dependent consumer into a robust producer of oil, it is also transform-
ing the price dynamics of the global market” (Krauss, 2015). Well, three 
cheers for that! Never mind that this is just contributing further to plan-
etary “ecocide” (Cohen’s word).  
We have, let’s “face” it, in any case already passed the tipping point of 
irreversible climate change. Language is deeply involved in this happen-
ing. It has been facilitated in part by climate change deniers, who believe 
the lies told by politicians and the media claiming that the evidence for 
“anthropogenic” climate change is a hoax perpetrated by “mad scien-
tists,” against the evidence. Another example is the ads by the Petroleum 
Institute of America still (April 2015) shown nightly on NBC Evening 
News. These ads are supported by appropriate graphics: cross sections of 
a schematic fracking site looking clean and neat, crowds of happy work-
ers, a superhighway full of speeding cars and trucks. In the foreground 
an attractive young woman claims that fracking is entirely safe. It will 
create millions of new jobs, and make the United States happily “energy 
independent.”  
If you have the strength and have never yet done so, just try watching 
one example of the NBC Evening News from 6:30 to 7:00. As a testi-
mony to the state of our culture, it is a dismaying mixture of 1) violent 
segments of so-called news calculated to keep viewers in a constant state 
of anxiety and terror: police murders of innocent unarmed “suspects,” 
volcanic eruptions, replays of the Boston Marathon Massacre or of the 
attempted assassination if President Reagan, or of the latest violence 
in the Middle East such as another town destroyed in Syria, Yemen, or 
Afghanistan. The same “shots” of violence are shown over and over; 2) a 
seemingly endless sequence of brief ads telemarketing patent nostrums 
for things like erectile dysfunction, or painful intercourse during meno-
pause, or insomnia, or arthritis pain, or Irritable Bowel Syndrome, or 
diabetes, or Alzheimer’s, all mixing videos of happy people taking the 
medicine in question with screen inscriptions and voiceovers touting 
the virtues of each, plus the intoning of side effects, as required by law 
(internal bleeding, heartburn, heart attacks, stroke, diarrhea, muscle pain 
and weakness etc.): “If you have an erection lasting more than four hours 
see your doctor right away.” “Ask your doctor if Crestor [a particularly 
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dangerous statin] is right for you.” Anyone who listens at all carefully 
to the side effects would be either truly desperate or an idiot to buy any 
of these drugs. A tremendous amount of poetic inventiveness goes into 
those ads, as in the one that shows a little dog searching for a safe place to 
hide a bone. It is an ad for an investment firm. 
A de Manian rhetorical reading of the segments in their sequence of a 
given half hour of the NBC Evening News would demonstrate the basic 
claim of this essay: that de Manian procedures would help us at least to 
understand the plight we are in as the victim of lies and baseless figura-
tive transfers. The ad for fracking takes its place in the series on a given 
night. Actually two different versions exist and are often both shown in 
the course of a given half hour. 
A lie, for example those in the ads I have just mentioned, or the claim 
made by many Republican politicians that climate change is a hoax, 
is a peculiar form of speech act. A lie’s referential value is nil, but if it is 
believed in and acted on it is an efficacious or “felicitous” speech act. 
Much of the linguistic involvement in our present unhappy situation is 
made up of such lying speech acts. 
2) The world is still recovering from a deep global recession. This was 
caused in large part by the subprime mortgage crisis, that is, by crimi-
nally fraudulent actions by our biggest banks and investment houses 
that would have been impossible without language in various forms. An 
example is the Ponzi Scheme computer programs creating by a regres-
sive series ultimately worthless “credit default swaps.” The banks are now 
again just doing fine and are up to their old tricks again. 
Though employment is way up, we still have relatively high unemploy-
ment in the United States, especially if those underemployed, part time, 
or self-withdrawn from job-seeking are included. Many of the new jobs 
are low-paying service positions, exacerbating the already huge discrep-
ancy between what the top 1% make and what an ordinary worker in, say, 
WalMart, makes per hour. In many European countries unemployment is 
even higher, and several countries (Greece, Spain, Ireland, Great Britain) 
have slipped back into deep recessions or into economic stagnation. 
Austerity measures, just the wrong strategy, have been adopted in many 
countries, such as the four I have mentioned, with disastrous results. The 
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argument for austerity rests in part on a false figurative transfer equating 
family finances with nation finances. Families should not spend beyond 
their means, so neither should countries. The two are not the same, partly 
because countries print their own money, which families do not. Nations 
can, within reason, safely run up large deficits.  
In the United States the disparity between the income of the top one 
percent and the remaining 99% has never been higher. The richer are 
getting richer, the rest of us poorer, partly as a result of self-destructive 
changes in our tax laws under President George W. Bush and other pre-
vious presidents. The United States is becoming more and more like a 
third-world country in its wealth distribution, with a concomitant grad-
ual disappearance of the once prosperous middle class.  
The global financial meltdown was brought about by the folly and 
greed of our politicians and financiers. Little has yet been done to re-reg-
ulate the banks and other financial institutions, for example by prohibit-
ing them from speculating wildly with investors’ deposits or by charging 
them a tiny fee for each transaction to discourage microsecond automatic 
computerized trading (another quasi-linguistic procedure). The Libor 
scandal of several years ago now over the rigging of the interbank lend-
ing rate is only one example of bank officials’ criminal fraud. That fraud 
has so far gone for the most part unpunished, though a number of settle-
ments in the billions with fraudulent big banks have at lest given them a 
vigorous slap on the wrist. Paying a good many billions in penalties is a 
piece of cake for them, however, part of the cost of doing business.  
Many experts confidently predict that eventually another financial 
meltdown worse than the first will occur, if nothing is done soon to regu-
late the banks and other financial institutions. This new regulation seems 
unlikely, since our present governments are in cahoots with the banks 
and still see them as “too big to fail.”  
3) In the United States rightwing lobbyists and media propagandists to a 
large extent control Congress and public opinion, particularly since the 
Republicans took control of both houses of Congress in the 2014 elec-
tions. Republicans are committed to stopping anything President Obama 
tries to do. They are funded by seemingly limitless contributions from 
super-wealthy extreme right-wing Americans like Sheldon Adelson or the 
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Koch Brothers, and by corporations. The latter are now absurdly labeled 
by the Supreme Court as “persons” with the same constitutional rights to 
secrecy about their political contributions that are guaranteed to persons. 
We have highly influential news media in the United States, such as Fox 
News and many radio talk shows, that are more or less lying propaganda 
arms of our right-wing parties. Nevertheless, they are believed by many 
citizens to be telling the truth. An example is the attacks over the years of 
the Affordable Healthcare Act, which has been a great success, increasing 
by around fifteen million American citizens those now getting affordable 
healthcare. It would be even more if so many Republican states had not 
perversely refused the expansion of Medicaid written into “Obamacare,” 
thereby condemning some people to die from lack of healthcare. The State 
of Maine, where I now live, with its Tea Party Governor, is one of those 
states. Our healthcare system until the Affordable Healthcare Act went 
into effect was one of the worst in the world (measured by such things 
as longevity, percentage of people covered, infant mortality, etc.), and 
without the conspicuous success of “Obamacare” would soon have cost 
25% of our annual GDP. This would have happened especially rapidly if 
the Republicans had won the Presidency and both houses of Congress 
in the elections of 2012. Happily, Barack Obama was re-elected, and the 
Democrats kept a majority in the Senate for the next two years, though 
the Republicans continued to control the House of Representatives. The 
latter have voted over and over again to repeal the Affordable Health 
Care Act. Their announced goal still remains to repeal it, to reduce Social 
Security or phase it out, to cut back or eliminate Federal contributions to 
Medicaid, and to turn Medicare into a voucher system. These acts would 
increase by about sixty million persons the number of Americans with-
out healthcare insurance, not to speak of raising catastrophically health-
care costs for individuals. Meanwhile, any fool can see that single payer 
universal health care, such as all other “first world” countries have, is the 
way to go both for reduced costs and for improved healthcare.  
I have spoken of “lying propaganda.” Perhaps it might be better to say 
that, as Guy Debord and Jean Baudrillard affirmed, in cyberspace the dis-
tinction between truth and lie has vanished in a triumph of “the society 
of spectacle” (Debord 1973) or of “simulacra” (Baudrillard 2013). I shall 
return in a later section of this essay to Debord and Baudrillard. One of 
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Mitt Romney’s top advisers in the presidential campaign of the Fall, 2012 
asserted that it did not matter whether or not what Romney proclaimed 
in his campaign speeches was true or not, so long as it was believed. 
Romney’s defeat was to some degree a triumph for the survival of a belief 
that the distinction between truth and lie is still relevant.  
4) We are still mired in all sorts of ways in the Middle East, in spite of the 
troop withdrawals that Obama promised and has more or less carried out, 
over the prostrate bodies of Republican hawks. If the Republicans win 
the Presidency and both houses of Congress in 2016 we are almost cer-
tain to be at war big time in the Middle East again in a matter of months. 
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan cost trillions of dollars, hundreds of 
thousands of lives, mostly natives of the countries we have invaded, but 
thousands of Americans too. Hundreds of thousands of our returned sol-
diers suffer from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.  
These wars have contributed to a new American xenophobia and 
to the serious erosion of our constitutional liberties here in the United 
States: suspension of habeas corpus, illegal surveillance, for example of 
email and cell-phones, including following GPS locators in cell-phones 
that cannot be turned off just by turning off the phone, murder by drone 
aircraft that are fantastic surveillance machines as well as carriers of 
deadly missiles. Just yesterday (April 23, 2015) came the announcement 
an “unfortunate” drone strike in Pakistan in January that killed two hos-
tages, an American and an Italian, held by Al Qaeda, along with several Al 
Qaeda members (Baker 2015).  
Big Brother is watching us in America these days with a vengeance. 
This police-state surveillance in the United States has come about since 
9/11 in the name of the so-called “War on Terror.” The media barrage 
associated with that “War” is calculated to keep citizens in a constant 
state of terror. That foreign-looking man or woman with a package next to 
us in the supermarket or at the airport may well be a terrorist. We move 
away from her or him in case a hidden suicide bomb goes off. 
5) New global telecommunication devices are putting people in touch 
with one another worldwide, thereby weakening local communities. 
Computer programs have played a big role in making possible the global 
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financial meltdown. Though the Internet makes a lot of useful truth avail-
able by a mouse-click, as I shall later specify, it is also the means of pro-
mulgating a lot of lies, for example in the deliberate use on a large scale of 
Facebook and Twitter to distribute false political propaganda.  
Both drone warfare and cyberwarfare would be impossible without 
the digital revolution. The Pentagon has a Cyber Command to oversee 
retaliation and protection against attacks by cyberweapons on our gov-
ernment computer systems, a well as to carry out preemptive strikes such 
as the one we used some years ago to disable Iran’s nuclear enrichment 
facilities (Sanger and Shanker, 2013). The United States uses cyberwar-
fare big time, for example to hack Chinese government computer servers 
or the private files of German Chancellor Merkel. 
The new digital devices—computers, iPhones, iPads, Facebook, 
Twitter, video games, and the like—are rapidly diminishing the role 
literature plays in most people’s lives. That is a big loss, but not the end 
of civilization, any more than was the shift from manuscript culture to 
print culture. There is no use, in any case, lamenting what is happening to 
the social role of literature. It will go on happening anyway. People these 
days play video games or watch films on Netflix or surf the net instead 
of reading Jane Austen, George Eliot, or Henry James in printed books 
or online, where huge amounts of print literature are now available. Our 
universities are, like glaciers worldwide, also in meltdown mode, espe-
cially the humanities.  
Though the Internet has been praised for all sorts of reasons, it may 
well be causing with amazing rapidity a disquieting mutation in what 
it means to be human. To be human these days more and more means 
being plugged into some digital device or another, as I am at this moment 
plugged into my computer in order to write or revise this essay. Who can 
doubt that cell phones, computers, and other digital devices facilitated 
the Arab Spring and other such insurrections around the world as well as 
being essential to the rise to power of ISIS, for example by the recruiting 
for ISIS of American young people, both male and female?  
The amazingly rapid development of MOOCs, “Massive Open 
Online Courses” is making “face to face” university and college teach-
ing more and more a thing of the past. A 2013 article in the New York 
Times reported that the co-founders of Coursera, two computer science 
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professors at Stanford, “watched with amazement as enrollment passed 
two million last month, with 70,000 new students a week signing up for 
over 200 courses, including Human-Computer Interaction, Songwriting 
and Gamification, taught by faculty members at the company’s partners, 
33 elite universities” (Lewin, 2013). Training in “Gamification” is just 
what we need.  
In 2013, as I was revising this essay yet once more by way of the mar-
velous resources of Word for Mac, another essay in praise of MOOCs 
appeared in the New York Times. This was an enthusiastic Op-Ed piece by 
Thomas Friedman, “Revolution Hits the Universities” (Friedman, 2013). 
Many similar essays have appeared since then. The 263 blogs respond-
ing to Friedman’s essay are interesting as indications of what people 
thought about MOOCs in 2013 and probably still do often think. Most, 
but by no means all, of the bloggers express more or less cogent opposi-
tion to MOOCs. The opposition is primarily by university and college 
professors and administrators. This is not surprising, since MOOCs not 
only appear possibly able to put colleges and universities out of busi-
ness (including for profit ones like Phoenix University), but also appear 
possibly able to make professors and even adjuncts obsolete. Why pay 
$30,000 to $50,000 a year to attend the University of California at Irvine, 
or Oberlin, or Harvard, when I can take the same courses more or less for 
no cost on my computer, taught before a video camera by distinguished 
professors at elite universities?  
According to a National Public Radio Interview by Ira Flatow in 2010 
of an associate professor of neurology, physiology, and psychiatry at the 
University of California, San Francisco, Adam Gazzaley, and of a profes-
sor of communication at Stanford, Clifford Nass, research has shown that 
the brains of those who spend a lot of time using iPhones, iPads, check-
ing and sending email, doing a lot of tweeting and texting, listening to 
MP3 music, all at the same time, are rewired for short attention spans 
and for multitasking, as opposed to the rather different wiring neces-
sary for the long-term single-minded concentration required, say, to read 
Middlemarch (Flatow; Gazzaley; Nass, 2010) A new kind of digital dex-
terity and hand-eye coordination, moreover, is needed to use an iPhone, 
or to play a video game, or to manipulate a mouse. Those changes are 
what I mean by a mutation in what it means to be human. Our brains and 
Reading Paul de Man While Falling into Cyberspace 137
bodies are becoming different as we are plugged in more and more of the 
time to the new digital “language systems.”  
The recent financial meltdown was facilitated by the computerizing 
of stock trading and other financial transactions. Digital machines, for 
example, automatically do the work of “high frequency trading,” buying 
and then selling stocks and bonds in a few microseconds for each trade, 
far faster than any human decision could be made. Attempts to restrain 
this by charging a minuscule fee for each trade have of course been met 
with fierce opposition. Ways to rig the market have evolved much faster 
than any effective regulation of computerized financial trading. On 
May 6, 2010, a “Flash Crash” dropped the Dow Jones industrial average 
1,000 points in a few hours. On August 1, 2012, a “rogue algorithm” in a 
stockbroker’s program for automatically buying and selling stocks sud-
denly made millions of trades when the market opened, “spreading tur-
moil across Wall Street.” A specialist on markets, Patrick Healy, said: “the 
machines have taken over, right?” (Popper, 2012). Of course computer 
nerds wrote those programs and algorithms, including the ones with 
inadvertent glitches. Nevertheless, once such programs are embedded 
in a powerful server they just go on working on their own, like Kafka’s 
robotic Odradek. Such programs still sometimes have a propensity to 
self-destruct hidden as “bugs” within them. These may freeze the system 
or cause other trouble when someone tries to use the program in a way 
not foreseen by the programmer.  
Just as I am making this revision, that is, five years after the “Flash 
Crash” event, a little-known British futures trader, Navinder Singh Sarao, 
whose “spoofing” (that is putting in orders to raise the price of a finan-
cial asset and then cancelling the order) authorities hold at least partly 
responsible for the Flash Crash, has been arrested (Popper and Anderson, 
2015). James Weatherall, in an essay in Nautilus for April 23, 2015, “Why 
the Flash Crash Really Matters,” argues, however, that “The Flash Crash 
reveals that we need a fundamentally different understanding of how 
modern financial markets work. We believe [he means “I believe”] that 
it shows us [Who is included in this “us”?] that markets are governed by 
the same principle as earthquakes and avalanches: self-organized criti-
cality” (Weatherall, 2015). “Criticality” means, as the essay shows, that 
the vast sign system making up financial markets is an example of what 
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de Man calls “the linguistics of literarity.” Another way to put this is to 
say that chaos theory or catastrophe theory or “criticality” (the butterfly 
wing flap in Guatamala brings about tornadoes in Kansas) operates in the 
huge digital sign system of the financial markets too.  
My goal in this first section has been not only to identify features of 
these “bad times,” but also to show that all these features, including cli-
mate change, have an inextricable involvement in language, most often 
with the power of ideological lies. I now turn to Paul de Man’s “The 
Resistance to Theory” to try to identify exactly what de Man says about 
ideology in that essay. 
2. If You Want to Lie, Digitize 
The frightening realities I have sketched out are well known to most 
Americans. How can we justify spending time, in such a dire situation, 
with something seemingly so marginal or even so trivial as literature or 
literary theory? My colleagues, Claire Colebrook and Tom Cohen, have, 
in their essays in the companion volume to this one (Cohen, Colebrook, 
Miller, 2012), brilliantly confronted this question. They did this with 
special attention to how useful or even indispensable it is to read Paul de 
Man carefully today, no easy task. Their essays for this volume continue 
that work. Colebrook has suggested that de Man may be the theorist for 
the twenty-first century. I agree. Just how might that be the case?  
You will note that the five catastrophes I have listed are all brought 
about by people’s propensity to believe lies. One scandal to cogni-
tion is the difficulty in understanding why this propensity is so deeply 
rooted. How in the world can so many people be brought, for example, 
to vote against their own self-interest, to shoot themselves in the foot, 
so to speak? That seems an unfathomable mystery. We have done noth-
ing to mitigate climate change because so many people have, against all 
the evidence, believed lies that claim it is a hoax. “How could ‘Mother 
Nature’ or a Good God allow such a thing to happen?” Governments in 
Europe and America have believed the lie that austerity measures and 
lowering taxes on the rich (the “trickle-down theory) will reduce the 
deficit and create many good jobs, whereas Economics 101 and recent 
Eurozone history show that this is false. Bank deregulation depended on 
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accepting the lie that the financial system could be trusted to regulate 
itself, whereas the banks and other financial institutions just used dereg-
ulation to commit the widespread fraud that led to the mortgage crisis 
and global recession. Resistance to adopting the obvious solution to the 
healthcare cost crisis, namely universal single payer healthcare, such as 
all other “first world” countries have in some form, has been fueled by 
endlessly reiterated lies in the media about how such healthcare would 
“pull the plug on grandma,” and so on. The catastrophic wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan were based on the lies that Saddam Hussein had weapons of 
mass destruction, that both countries were centers of Al Qaeda, and that 
both countries would welcome us with open arms as liberators bring-
ing them the Western-style democracy they supposedly covet. The latter 
was especially Dick Cheney’s iterated lie. Twitter, Facebook, and other 
new “social media” harnessed to the Internet by iPhones and other such 
gadgets have given enormous new scope to the ability to tell lies and get 
them widely believed. These devices have even eroded for many the dis-
tinction between truth and lie. 
3. What is Ideology for de Man? 
De Man’s name for lies that are believed is “ideology.” This returns me to 
my epigraph. Just what is de Man really saying about ideology? I want 
to identify that as exactly as possible both for my citation and for “The 
Resistance to Theory” as a whole—if it is a consistent whole, that is, 
which by no means goes without saying. Just before the passage cited as 
my epigraph, de Man has been talking about the aboriginal human error 
of taking language as referentially valid, as having “authority as a model 
for natural or phenomenal cognition” (de Man, 1986, 11). To put this 
another way, ideology means believing that lies are true, for example that 
just because some politician or talk show celebrity says Barack Obama 
was not born in the United States and is secretly a Moslem socialist, those 
false fictions (one might even call them “literature”) are true. “Literature,” 
says de Man, “is fiction not because it somehow refuses to acknowledge 
‘reality,’ but because it is not a priori certain that literature is a reliable 
source of information about anything but its own language” (de Man, 
1986, 11).  
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De Man goes on in the next paragraph to say that “it would be unfor-
tunate, for example, to confuse the materiality of the signifier with the 
materiality of what it signifies” (de Man, 1986, 11). Hardly anyone will be 
likely to do that with words about material phenomena, but with fictional 
narratives about history, politics, or life stories we are much more likely 
to be taken in: “No one in his [sic!] right mind will try to grow grapes by 
the luminosity of the word ‘day,’ but it is very difficult not to conceive the 
pattern of one’s past and future existence as in accordance with tempo-
ral and spatial schemes that belong to fictional narratives and not to the 
world” (de Man, 1986, 11). We in imagination make our lives confirm 
to fictional conventions, particularly those of “romance”: “poor little boy 
with no opportunities makes good through hard work and luck”; “pretty 
but naïve teenage girl meets Prince Charming in disguise, ultimately mar-
ries him and lives happily ever after.”  
“This does not mean,” de Man goes on to say, “that fictional narratives 
are not part of the world and of reality; their impact upon the world may 
well be all too strong for comfort” (de Man, 1986, 11). Fictional narra-
tives make things happen if we believe them and act on that belief. They 
have become felicitous speech acts, a way of doing things with words. A 
lot of Americans, happily not quite enough, voted for Mitt Romney in the 
2012 US presidential election. Obama’s plurality was not all that great. 
Romney might well have been elected. A Republican may well be elected 
President in 2016, a terrifying thought, since all the likely candidates are 
in one way or another Tea Party zombies who have already been bought 
by corporations and the Koch brothers or Adelson. Further examples 
from our recent history would include the invasion of Iraq on the basis 
of that lie about Saddam Hussein having weapons of mass destruction, or 
the delay until it is too late to do anything about CO2 emissions because 
so many people have been persuaded to believe climate change predic-
tions are a conspiracy perpetrated by power-mad conspiratorial scien-
tists, or the belief that the Affordable Healthcare Act is a “government 
take-over” that will make our healthcare worse and more costly, whereas 
just the reverse has happily turned out to be the case. That does not keep 
the Republicans from going on doing their best to repeal Obamacare. 
HMO’s and pharmaceutical companies have bought them through big 
covert contributions. 
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The passage from “The Resistance to Theory” I cited as an epigraph 
follows just after the passages I have quoted and discussed above. Let me 
look at my epigraph a little more closely. What does it really say? It is the 
most eloquent assertion by de Man of the specifically political and social 
value of literary theory. Literary theory is study of “the linguistics of lit-
erariness,” by which de Man means, as the rest of his essay and his work 
generally confirm, study of the role of rhetoric (meaning tropes) as dis-
ruptive of grammatical and logical meaning in texts generally. Grammar, 
logic, and rhetoric are the elements of the medieval trivium, the basic 
divisions of language study. De Man consistently discriminates among 
these three elements of language. That de Man means by “the linguis-
tics of literariness” something that goes beyond printed literature in the 
sense of poems, plays, and novels to include features of texts in general 
is confirmed by a passage later in the essay: “The resistance to theory is 
a resistance to the rhetorical or tropological dimension of language, a 
dimension which is perhaps more explicitly in the foreground in litera-
ture (broadly conceived) than in other verbal manifestations or—to be 
somewhat less vague—which can be revealed in any verbal event when 
it is read textually” (de Man 1986, 17). Elsewhere in “The Resistance to 
Theory” de Man includes graphic images along with strictly verbal events 
(words on the page) as requiring “textual” reading, as I shall show later 
on in this essay. 
Tropological displacements are, de Man makes clear, the basic instru-
ments of ideological fictions or, to put it more bluntly, the means of tell-
ing lies that people are led to believe are true and on the basis of which 
they then act disastrously. “What we call ideology is precisely the confu-
sion of linguistic with natural reality, of reference with phenomenalism.” 
Note that de Man says it is a matter of “calling” it ideology, of arbitrarily 
assigning it a name, not a matter of using the proper name of some ideal 
essence. Calling it ideology is a speech act, not a constative truth. This is 
partly because calling it ideology brings in the history of a loaded word, 
from the late eighteenth-century French “ideologues” on to Marx and 
Nietzsche and then to present-day ideology-critique in Lyotard, Deleuze 
and Guattari, or Derrida.  
“Phenomenalism” is a word de Man chooses carefully to indicate that 
he is not talking about “reality” as it is in itself, but as it appears to our 
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limited senses. Ideology is a confusion of linguistic with natural reality 
as the latter appears to our eyes, ears, taste, and touch. In my terms here, 
ideology means taking a lie, a fictional construction, as true in reality 
so-defined. Just because a plausible story, complete with aerial photo-
graphs and maps, is told about Saddam Hussein having weapons of mass 
destruction, we believe that he really does have them. We then invade 
Iraq on the basis of that false assertion. We vote to elect a congressman or 
congresswoman who will do everything possible to repeal the Affordable 
Healthcare Act because we believe the lying propaganda against that Act. 
We support deregulation of banks and the financial system because we 
have been persuaded to believe the lie that the financial system can be 
safely trusted to regulate itself honestly. A lie, as I have said, becomes a 
felicitous speech act if it is believed and acted upon. We vote for Mitt 
Romney because we have been persuaded to believe the lie that lowering 
taxes on the rich and on big corporations, while firing teachers, halting 
infrastructure projects, gutting Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security, 
will magically produce millions of new jobs. All these cases are examples 
of trying to grow grapes by the luminosity of the word “day.” 
4. Why Study Literary Theory? 
Well, how does studying literary theory or carefully reading Paul de Man 
help us in this self-destructive situation? Derrida compared our situa-
tion, notoriously, to having an autoimmune disease that turns the body’s 
defensive antibodies against its own tissues and organs. De Man’s next 
sentence in my epigraph (I cite it again) gives a bold, defiant, cheeky, 
and even counter-intuitive answer to the question of the utility of liter-
ary study: “It follows [from de Man’s definition of ideology] that, more 
than any other mode of inquiry, including economics, the linguistics 
of literariness is a powerful and indispensable tool in the unmasking of 
ideological aberrations, as well as a determining factor in accounting for 
their occurrence. Those who reproach literary theory for being oblivious 
to social and historical (that is to say ideological) reality are merely stat-
ing their fear of having their own ideological mystifications exposed by 
the tool they are trying to discredit.” Please note that de Man here rather 
casually makes the truly shocking assertion that “social and historical 
Reading Paul de Man While Falling into Cyberspace 143
reality” are ideological through and through, that is, a matter of false lan-
guage believed in as true. 
The reference to Marx follows immediately. Just what does de 
Man mean by being good readers, as opposed to very poor readers, of 
Marx’s German Ideology? What justifies bringing in Marx at this point? 
Answering those questions at all adequately would take another long 
essay or perhaps even a book. I have made a beginning with this in “The 
Working of Material Spirit” (Miller, 2013). Guessing what the reference 
to Marx means would involve, for example, deciding whether Derrida, 
in Specters of Marx, would have seemed to de Man a good reader of 
The German Ideology. Would de Man and Derrida have read what Marx 
says about the essence of ideology in the same way? In Specters of Marx 
Derrida, following Marx, traces all ideological aberrations back to the 
notion of the Man-God, the material Incarnation of spirit: “Is not the 
Christic moment, and within it the Eucharistic instant, the hyperbole of 
acharnement [“opinionated ardor,” from charnière, hinge, point of junc-
tion] itself? If every specter, as we have amply seen, is distinguished from 
spirit by an incorporation, by the phenomenal form of a quasi-incarna-
tion, then Christ is the most spectral of specters” (Derrida 1994, 144; 
Derrida 1993, 229). I suspect de Man and Derrida would read Marx in 
almost the same way. I say “almost” because Derrida was tempted much 
more than was de Man by the lure of some “wholly other” and by what 
he called “a messianic without messianism” (Derrida 1994, 59; Derrida 
1993, 102). This formulation attempts to avoid any belief in an actual 
Messiah to come, any belief in the Incarnation. It is still, nevertheless, 
tempted by the messianic. De Man would not, I imagine, have altogether 
agreed with Derrida’s formulations. Nevertheless, a reading of Marx by 
de Man, I suspect, if he had done one, would have stressed, as Derrida 
does explicitly in Specters of Marx, that for Marx the source of all ideo-
logical delusions is the spectral and baseless mystification of religious 
belief. More specifically, all ideological aberrations are modeled on belief 
in the Incarnation, that is, belief that in Christ the Word spirit and matter 
were conjoined. Jesus’s body incarnated God. Commodity festishism, for 
example, as analyzed by Marx in Capital, falsely believes, in way analo-
gous to belief in the Incarnation, that a given commodity embodies value. 
This is like trying to grow grapes by the luminosity of the word “day.” It 
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is, that is, belief that the word “day” incarnates a performative power over 
nature. A later section of this essay will analyze one example of commod-
ity fetishism in a recent ad from Wired Magazine. 
De Man is advocating using the linguistics of literariness, or what 
he also calls “rhetorical reading” (the sort of readings de Man made of 
Nietzsche, Rousseau, Benjamin, Baudelaire, and many others), to read 
the ideological lies that I began by identifying and that have got us by 
way of sleepwalks into our present catastrophic situation. Rhetorical 
readings of talk shows and news as promulgated by various media, of 
television ads, of films, of politicians’ statements, of political advertising, 
or of Supreme Court decisions will work better than any other form of 
analysis, de Man in effect promises, to “unmask ideological aberrations,” 
to tear off their masks and show the sinister face or impersonal lack of 
face that lies beneath. The linguistics of literariness, moreover, promises 
to “account for their occurrence,” that is, to explain how these disastrous 
self-destructive aberrations come about in the first place. That explana-
tion would go by way of readings of the role of tropological displace-
ments in making falsehoods seem plausible. 
It would seem to follow from this redoubtable power of “unmask-
ing” linguistic aberrations that once we understand them we will be 
cured, enlightened. We will also act henceforth on that enlightenment. 
In a seemingly analogous way, Freud promulgated the “talking cure” that 
would through language about language and other signs, such as dream 
images, cure psychosomatic maladies. These arise, Freud believed, if we 
are male, from unconsciously wanting to have sex with our mothers and 
therefore wanting to kill our fathers, or, if we are female, from hysteria 
that arises from a tropological similarity between a childhood sexual 
abuse by the father not understood as such at the time and some much 
later similar event that may not in itself be traumatic.  
The reader will no doubt have already observed that de Man’s key 
word in his essay, “resistance,” is borrowed, surprisingly, from psycho-
analysis. Freud used the term “resistance” (to oversimplify the issue a bit) 
to refer to patients’ blocking memories from conscious memory, just as 
those under the spell of an ideological aberration resist being cured of 
their mistake. I say “surprisingly” because de Man was generally hostile to 
psychoanalysis. “Resistance,” for de Man in “The Resistance to Theory,” 
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however, is a linguistic phenomenon rather than a feature of conscious-
ness in its relation to memories suppressed in the unconscious. De Man 
has tropologically appropriated the term for his own uses.  
Powerful resonances with the psychoanalytical usage are neverthe-
less still present. If we practice de Man’s talking cure, de Man seemingly 
implies, we will no longer be ideologically mystified. We will then vote 
correctly, support universal single-payer healthcare, endorse strong regu-
lation of banks, abandon our imperialistic wars, mitigate climate change, 
deal with the deficit by taxing the rich, and so on. We will, in short, sup-
port all those changes Barack Obama endorsed in his second inaugural 
address. De Man’s essays can, it would appear, be seen as exemplifica-
tions of the way rhetorical readings work as salutary enlightenment. After 
such readings we know “what Benjamin really says,” or what Kant, Hegel, 
Rousseau, or Nietzsche really say. That turns out usually to be as differ-
ent from the traditional interpretations of those authors as believing that 
Hussein had weapons of mass destruction is from the fact that he did not. 
5. What Does “The Resistance to Theory” Really Say? 
Whether this would really happen and whether de Man is really prom-
ising that rhetorical readings or wisdom about the linguistics of literari-
ness will make us all vote right is a big question. It does not go without 
saying that de Man is making that utopian promise. I shall eventually 
return to this issue, but need to work carefully toward it. Just after the 
passage about the superiority of the linguistics of literariness over every 
other mode of ideology critique, de Man explains “what it is about liter-
ary theory that is so threatening that it provokes such strong resistances 
and attacks”: “It upsets rooted ideologies by revealing the mechanics 
of their workings; it goes against a powerful philosophical tradition of 
which aesthetics is a prominent part; it upsets the established canon of 
literary works and blurs the borderlines between literary and non-literary 
discourse. By implication, it may also reveal the links between ideologies 
and philosophy” (de Man 1986, 11). De Man’s prime target in his late 
work, you will remember, was what he called “Aesthetic Ideology.” That 
helps account for the word “aesthetics” in this passage. 
146 J. Hillis Miller 
The statement just cited certainly goes far to explain the resistance 
to theory. That resistance is analogous to our resistance to what scien-
tists say about so-called “anthropogenic” climate change. (See Cohen’s 
essay in this book for an identification of the big problems with the 
word “anthropogenic,” as with “anthropomorphic,” and “Anthropocene.” 
A big part of the problem is the prefix “anthropo-” in all three words. 
“Anthropo-“ begs important questions by buying into the Greek defini-
tion of “man” as male, reasonable, and Greek, that is, the prefix is intrin-
sically exclusionary, as the Greeks excluded women and all non-Greek 
others, the “barbarians,” from the category of “man.”) We want to remain 
safe within the warm cocoon of our ideological aberrations, whereas lit-
erary theory shows they are mistakes. It unmasks them. The reception of 
de Man’s own work is a spectacular example of this resistance to being 
woken up from our illusions. His work always had an amazing ability to 
send readers or listeners up the wall, as for example those who heard de 
Man at Yale and Cornell present his lecture on Walter Benjamin’s “The 
Task of the Translator.” 
 “The Resistance to Theory” itself is another notable example. The 
essay was commissioned by the Modern Language Association of 
America as part of a book entitled Introduction to Scholarship in Modern 
Languages and Literatures. De Man was asked to write the essay on lit-
erary theory. The committee in charge of this book had an opportunity 
to publish one of the most brilliant and challenging essays in twentieth-
century literary theory. They blew it big time by rejecting the essay. That 
was surely a mistake. It was a revealing error, however, since it was per-
haps based, whether the committee members consciously knew it or not, 
on a feeling that their ideological convictions were deeply threatened by 
the essay. De Man’s account, near the beginning of the essay as it was ulti-
mately published in Yale French Studies in 1982, is devastating in its gentle 
irony: “I found it difficult to live up, in minimal good faith, to the require-
ments of this program [as indicated in the title of the MLA book cited 
above] and could only try to explain, as concisely as possible, why the 
main theoretical interest of literary theory consists in the impossibility 
of its definition. The Committee rightly judged that this was an inauspi-
cious way to achieve the pedagogical objectives of the volume and com-
missioned another article. I thought their decision altogether justified, 
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as well as interesting in its implications for the teaching of literature” (de 
Man 1986, 3). The Yale French Studies issue that finally published the 
essay was about teaching literature. De Man’s “interesting in its implica-
tions for the teaching of literature” suggests that if literary theory cannot 
be defined that may mean that it is also impossible to “teach literature” 
without remaining imperturbably within those aberrational “rooted ide-
ologies” of which literary theory reveals the hidden mechanics. I shall 
return later in this essay to what is implied by asserting that ideologies 
work “mechanically.”  
So far so good. It would appear that literary theory is good because it 
demystifies dangerous ideological mistakes. Who could be against that, 
once you come to understand what is at stake? Matters are not so simple 
for de Man, however, as the rest of his essay shows, as does that ominous 
formulation just cited about the impossibility of defining literary theory. 
Surely we ought to be able to figure out what theory is and define it! The 
rest of the essay explains why that is not the case.  
De Man begins anew, after the formulations near the beginning I have 
been analyzing, by saying, quite surprisingly, that the resistance to theory 
when seen as an attempt to protect rooted ideologies from exposure is 
relatively uninteresting. It is of merely local and historical importance. It 
is something belonging to our own parochial time and place, such as the 
room at the MLA headquarters where that committee met to reject de 
Man’s essay.  
What interests de Man more, he says, is something universal, some-
thing that is true of the resistance to theory at any time or place. The 
reader of de Man’s essay must follow its intricacies for herself or him-
self. I shall continue now, however, by investigating the implications of a 
series of sentences that take the form “A is B.” These copulative sentences 
form the backbone of the argumentation developed in “The Resistance 
to Theory.” Such copulas punctuate the essay at intervals like a recurrent 
modulated motif. They could be run together in a string that would say “A 
is B is C is D,” and so on. Are these sentences logical, definitional, posi-
tional, or axiomatic? Are they examples of that seventeenth-century more 
geometrico de Man discusses in this essay, as in the definition of a triangle: 
“A triangle is …” Or could the sentences be (false) tropological equiva-
lences, since, like a metaphor, they assert the identity of two entities 
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that must be different, one would think, since they have different names. 
Aristotle’s maritime example in the Poetics of a metaphor, “The ship 
ploughs the waves,” can be re-phrased as “A ship is a plough.” Anybody 
can see that a ship is not a plough. Interesting that so often examples of 
metaphor given by theorists involve ships, that is, a means of transport. 
That is after all what “metaphor” etymologically means, “carry over.” A 
metaphor gets you from here to there. 
It makes a lot of difference which way de Man’s “is” sentences are 
taken. I do not think this can be decided. This uncertainty indicates 
that even a thoroughly enlightened theorist of tropes like de Man can-
not avoid repeating a version of the deplorable uncertainty he exposes 
in others. An example is his analysis in this essay (discussed below) of 
the undecidability of the words “of ” and “fall” in Keats’s title, The Fall 
of Hyperion. It seems as if just knowing does not prevent you, by a fatal-
ity inherent in language, from erring, from repeating the undecidability 
you unmask. Knowing, pace Freud, does not cure resistance to theory 
because theory is itself the resistance to theory. I shall return to this dis-
quieting formulation later on.  
One thing is clear, nevertheless. De Man’s “is” sentences, whether 
we decide they are tropes or propositions, are conspicuously scandal-
ous and counterintuitive. I believe de Man deliberately makes them that 
way, perhaps because such bald statements are more likely to penetrate 
our ideological prejudices or at least arouse our conscious resistance. De 
Man’s “is” sentences are increasingly illogical, as the sequence proceeds. 
It appears that what de Man wants to say can only be said illogically, by 
way of paradoxical equivalences asserted between entities that are mani-
festly different. Here are the sentences in question, in their sequence in 
the essay, with “is” italicized in each case: 
What we call ideology is precisely the confusion of linguis-
tic with natural reality, of reference with phenomenalism (de 
Man 1986, 11). 
The resistance to theory is a resistance to the use of lan-
guage about language. It is therefore a resistance to language 
itself or to the possibility that language contains factors 
or functions that cannot be reduced to intuition (de Man 
1986, 12-13). 
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It turns out that the resistance to theory is in fact a resis-
tance to reading …. (de Man 1986, 15). 
The resistance to theory is a resistance to the rhetorical or 
tropological dimension of language …. (de Man 1986, 17). 
The resistance to theory which, as we saw, is a resistance to 
reading …. (de Man 1986, 17-18). 
Nothing can overcome the resistance to theory since the-
ory is [in this case de Man himself italicizes the “is”] itself this 
resistance (de Man, 1986, 19).
What does this sequence mean? What is “reading” doing in the sequence? 
Just what is reading for de Man? What in the world can de Man mean by 
saying that the resistance to theory does not come from outside, from 
those whose rooted ideologies are threatened by theory, but is intrinsic 
to theory itself? Theory is the resistance to theory! That is a scandalous 
“is” sentence if there ever were one. What implications does that have for 
the apparent claim near the beginning of the essay that theory would lib-
erate us from ideological mistakes by showing us how they work? How 
could theory do that if we cannot even define it and if the resistance 
to theory is intrinsic to theory itself? That would seem to make theory 
pretty feeble and useless, a broken reed, as opposed to being, as de Man 
claims, “a powerful and indispensable tool in the unmasking of ideologi-
cal aberrations.” 
I cannot pretend, much as I would like to do so, in a few sentences to 
give clear literal answers, more geometrico, to these questions, much less to 
follow in detail the intricate argumentation of de Man’s essay, along with 
the “logic” of his casual putdowns along the way of all the then-influential 
theoretical schools: new criticism, structuralism, semiotics, phenomeno-
logical criticism, criticism of consciousness, reader response criticism, 
and criticism using speech act theory. All are mystified, de Man argues, 
because they resist rhetorical reading and resist study of the linguistics of 
literariness. A beginning of a reading of “The Resistance to Theory” can 
be made, however, in relation to my fundamental question: Why do so 
many people believe lies these days and remain mystified by aberrational 
ideologies? My sketch of a reading will lead to somewhat dismaying ten-
tative results.  
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6. Two-Handedness as Sleight of Hand 
It looks to me as if de Man takes away with one hand what he gives with 
the other. On the one hand, he unreservedly praises the theory of rhe-
torical reading, that is, the linguistics of literariness, for being a power-
ful tool, more powerful even than economics, for “unmasking” rooted 
ideologies. On the other hand, when he turns to the intrinsic study of 
theory, he finds that the most important resistance to it does not come 
from outside theory, that is, as embodied in some people’s “fear at having 
their own ideological mystifications exposed by the tool they’re trying to 
discredit” (de Man 1986, 11). The true resistance to theory comes from 
inside theory itself. The assertion that the resistance to theory is intrin-
sic to theory is the amazing climax of the “‘is’ sentences” I have listed: 
“Nothing can overcome the resistance to theory since theory is itself this 
resistance.”  
How in the world can that be? Theory would appear to give a clear 
model for salutary rhetorical reading of any text whatsoever, including 
political speech and television or magazine advertising, etc. The answer 
lies in what happens when the program of rhetorical reading is carried out 
in a given case. What rhetorical reading is we know or think we know. It 
is attention to the way the tropological dimension of any discourse inter-
feres with its statement of a clear logical meaning. “Poetics” (die Art des 
Meinens, the way meanings are expressed) interferes with “hermeneutics” 
(das Gemeinte, what is meant). Here is what de Man says about this inter-
ference in “Conclusions: Walter Benjamin’s ‘The Task of the Translator’”: 
When you do hermeneutics, you are concerned with the 
meaning of the work; when you do poetics, you are con-
cerned with the stylistics or with the description of the way 
in which a work means. The question is whether these two are 
complementary, whether you can cover the full work by doing 
hermeneutics and poetics at the same time. The experience of 
trying to do this shows that it is not the case. When one tries 
to achieve this complementarity, the poetics always drops out, 
and what one always does is hermeneutics. One is so attracted 
by problems of meaning that it is impossible to do hermeneu-
tics and poetics at the same time. From the moment you start 
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to get involved with problems of meaning, as I unfortunately 
tend to do, forget about the poetics. The two are not com-
plementary, the two may be mutually exclusive in a certain 
way, and that is part of the problem which Benjamin states, a 
purely linguistic problem (de Man 1986, 87). 
The play of pronouns here (“one,” “you,” “I”) implies that I cannot avoid 
repeating, for example in this essay, the betrayal de Man names and with 
rueful irony confesses to performing. I do hermeneutics at the expense 
of poetics, as when I ask, “What does de Man really say in this essay?” 
That question implies that what he says can be clearly identified and para-
phrased, that it is not interfered with by the way de Man says it. 
Theory is resistance to reading, as de Man implies, though he does 
not say so in so many words. This formulation would add one more 
“is” sentence to those de Man enunciates. Theory is resistance to read-
ing apparently because theory pretends to foresee clearly the results of 
reading (demystification of aberrational acts of taking metaphors liter-
ally), whereas reading itself, rhetorical reading, is unpredictable. You 
never know beforehand just what you are going to find in a given text. 
Each genuine reading is, consequently, sui generis. It is not reducible 
to the application of a formula that knows what it is going to find. De 
Man’s teaching was a conspicuous example of this. Even when I thought 
I knew intimately already the text he was going to read in a given seminar 
and even when I thought I could guess what he was going to say on the 
basis of what I already knew of his work and of the work he was going to 
discuss, I was always surprised. He always presented a new way of read-
ing that particular text, a way I had not foreseen. One result of theory’s 
resistance to reading is that clear theory (after all “theory” etymologi-
cally means “clear seeing,” as in “theatrical”), when it becomes a model 
or tool for reading, leads to readings that become more and more opaque. 
Ultimately it culminates in (I am sorry, but I must use this word) “unde-
cidability.” Reading and theory are no more compatible than are herme-
neutics and poetics. Reading leads to the disqualification or severe modi-
fication of theory. De Man elsewhere calls this event an encounter with 
“the impossibility of reading,” which “should not be taken too lightly” (de 
Man 1979, 245). An example is the impossibility of deciding whether de 
Man’s uses of “is” are logical or tropological. We urgently need to know, 
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but we cannot know for sure. My own serene assumption at the begin-
ning that I can know a lie when I see one is beginning, by the way, to look 
increasingly problematic. 
The big (and only detailed) example in “The Resistance to Theory” 
of this dismaying outcome of following out the injunction to use rhetori-
cal theory as a tool for unmasking ideologies is the paragraph about the 
meaning of Keats’s titles for his two unfinished poems or versions of the 
same poem, Hyperion and The Fall of Hyperion. Only de Man could have 
written this paragraph. It is vintage de Man. He is inimitable. Don’t try 
this at home. You must do rhetorical reading, if you want to do it, in your 
own unique way.  
Beginning with the impossibility of deciding whether the “of ” in The 
Fall of Hyperion is a subjective or objective genitive (“Hyperion’s Fall” or 
“Hyperion Falling”), de Man makes a rapid series of moves. “Both read-
ings,” he says, “are grammatically correct, but it is impossible to decide 
from the context (the ensuing narrative) which version is the right one. 
The narrative context suits neither and both at the same time, and one is 
tempted to suggest that that the fact that Keats was unable to complete 
either version manifests the impossibility, for him as for us, of reading 
his own title” (de Man 1986, 16). This leads, by way of an expansion of 
the proper name “Hyperion” to potentially name Apollo, Keats, and, ulti-
mately, the reader, to a clear statement of the alternatives between which 
we cannot decide. This happens, in part, through two uses of a charac-
teristic de Manian locution for saying yes and no simultaneously: “mani-
festly, yes, but not quite.” This is a deliberate breaking of the logical law of 
the excluded middle. A variant, “This is indeed the case, to some extent; 
but not quite,” appears on the next page (de Man 1986, 17). “But,” asks 
de Man, “are we then telling the story of the failure of the first text as the 
success of the second, the Fall of Hyperion as the Triumph of The Fall of 
Hyperion? Manifestly, yes, but not quite, since the second text also fails 
to be concluded. Or are we telling the story of why all texts, as texts, can 
always be said to be falling? Manifestly yes, but not quite either, since the 
story of the fall of the first version, as told in the second, applies to the 
first version only and could not legitimately be read as meaning also the 
fall of The Fall of Hyperion” (de Man 1986, 16).  
Reading Paul de Man While Falling into Cyberspace 153
The paragraph concludes by drawing some dismaying conclusions 
about this miniature exercise in rhetorical reading. Crucial to what de 
Man says in these sentences is the assumption that reading literature is 
not innocent. It has consequences. Reading does something to us. “The 
difference between the two readings,” says de Man, “is itself structured 
like a trope. And it matters a great deal how we read the title, as an exer-
cise not only in semantics, but in what the text actually does to us. Faced 
with the ineluctable necessity to come to a decision, no grammatical or 
logical analysis can help us out. Just as Keats had to break off his narra-
tive, the reader has to break off his understanding at the very moment 
when he is most directly engaged and summoned by the text” (de Man 
1986, 16-17). 
On the one hand, you must obey the injunction to read rhetorically, 
that is, to follow out the interference of the rhetoric of tropes in the work-
ing of grammar and logic, of poetics as interfering with hermeneutics. It 
is an ineluctable summons. Your life, the future of your country, of the 
planet, and of the human race depend on doing such readings. On the 
other hand, it turns out that when you pursue this program in all good 
faith you find you cannot read in the specific sense of achieving clear and 
unequivocal knowledge of what a given text means. Rhetorical reading 
always leads you step by step to some undecidability, to some non-under-
standing. That is what de Man means by saying reading is impossible and 
why he says, at the conclusion of “Allegory of Reading (Profession de foi),” 
that “the impossibility of reading should not be taken too lightly” (de 
Man 1979, 245). 
“The Resistance to Theory” ends with a dense paragraph that draws 
conclusions and generalizations from what de Man has said so far. He 
begins the paragraph by saying that we ought to do rhetorical readings 
because each is a salutary “methodological undoing of the grammatical 
construct and, in its systematic disarticulation of the trivium, will be the-
oretically sound as well as effective [effective presumably as the unmask-
ing of ideological mystifications]. Technically correct rhetorical readings 
may be boring, monotonous, predictable and unpleasant, but they are 
irrefutable” (de Man 1986, 19). Charges of being boring, etc. were often 
made against such readings in those far-off days when they were still being 
done. De Man’s phrasing is characteristically ironic. His readings of “fall” 
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and “of ” in Keats are anything but boring and predictable, though they 
may be exceedingly annoying and threatening to what we thought we 
could take for granted as achieved knowledge about Keats’s poems. If the 
MLA refused to publish “The Resistance to Theory,” Oxford University 
Press rejected Allegories of Reading, arguably de Man’s most important 
work, though Oxford had published Blindness and Insight (1971). British 
Rousseau scholars that Oxford felt obliged to consult turned thumbs 
down on Allegories of Reading. 
Deeply disquieting formulations such as commonly end de Man’s 
essays begin to appear in “The Resistance to Theory” just after the ironic 
sentences about how technically correct rhetorical readings are boring 
and predictable but irrefutable. Such irrefutable readings, de Man says, 
are “totalitarian” (an ominous term), a form of non-knowledge, “unreli-
able, and “defective models of language’s impossibility to be a model 
language.” Here is the quite difficult sentence containing these elements: 
“They [irrefutable rhetorical readings] are also totalizing (and poten-
tially totalitarian [meaning, I suppose, claiming complete sovereignty 
without any basis in some legitimate authority]) for since the structures 
and functions they expose do not lead to knowledge of an entity (such 
as language) but are an unreliable process of knowledge production that 
prevents all entities, including linguistic entities, from coming into dis-
course as such, they are indeed universals, consistently defective models 
of language’s impossibility to be a model language” (de Man 1986, 19). I 
risk saying that de Man means here that those rhetorical readings, moti-
vated by an impeccable theory, always led to some blank non-knowledge 
of just what we most need to know, an undecidability such as is mani-
fested in de Man’s reading of Keats’s “fall” and “of.” This non-knowledge 
means that theory always leads to some form of the unspeakable, to an 
experience of the impossibility of bringing some entity or other, includ-
ing even language, “into discourse as such.” They demonstrate that no 
such thing as a model theoretical language exists. Such defective models 
for reading are, nevertheless, though “always in theory,” not in practice, 
“the most elastic theoretical model to end all models.” They are this by 
containing “within their own defective selves all the other defective mod-
els of reading avoidance, referential, semiological, grammatical, perfor-
mative, logical, or whatever. They are theory and not theory at the same 
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time, the universal theory of the impossibility of theory” (de Man 1986, 
19). Whew! One can see why that MLA committee was dismayed. The 
clear-seeing demanded by theory is impossible because the theory that 
contains all theories leads to non-knowledge whereas theory is supposed 
to be the opposite of non-knowledge, that is, a successful overcoming of 
ignorance. What would be needed is a clear theory of non-knowledge, 
and that is impossible.  
The result is that though doing those boring but irrefutable rhetorical 
readings is eminently teachable, what is being taught is the resistance to 
reading and the resistance to theory that is built into theory itself, not 
something that comes to it from those idiots outside theory who instinc-
tively hate theory as threatening to their ideological aberrations: “To the 
extent that they are theory, that is to say, teachable, generalizable and 
highly responsive to systematization, rhetorical readings, like the other 
kinds, still avoid and resist the reading they advocate. Nothing can over-
come the resistance to theory since theory is itself this resistance” (de 
Man 1986, 19). Just because correct rhetorical readings are teachable 
does not necessarily mean it is a good thing to teach them. The reader may 
at this point remember a passage near the beginning of “The Resistance 
to Theory” where de Man, commenting on those who “denounce the-
ory as an obstacle to scholarship and, consequently, to teaching,” asserts 
that “it is better to fail in teaching what [according to such theory-haters] 
should not be taught than to succeed in teaching what is not true” (de 
Man 1986, 4). You will always fail in teaching the theory of the impossi-
bility of theory, but what you can successfully teach should not be taught 
because it is a lie. 
Oh dear, say I to myself at this moment in my investigation, there 
goes my hope to use, with de Man’s approval, rhetorical readings as a tool 
in the fight against those five categories of lies I began by identifying as 
characterizing the twilight of the Anthropocene idols. Undecidability 
just does not seem a good tool for such demystification. De Man drives a 
final ironic nail into the coffin of my political hopes in the last three sen-
tences of his essay. They end with a final example of his characteristically 
obscure and paradoxical formulations. The essay culminates in an explicit 
undecidability. Literary theory will go on flourishing because it thrives on 
its impossibility, its resistance to itself. Whether that is theory’s triumph 
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or its fall cannot be decided: “The loftier the aims and the better the 
methods of literary theory, the less possible it becomes. Yet literary the-
ory is not in any danger of going under; it cannot help but flourish, and 
the more it is resisted, the more it flourishes, since the language it speaks 
is the language of self-resistance. What remains impossible to decide is 
whether this flourishing is a triumph or a fall” (de Man 1986, 20).  
One can see why that MLA committee rejected de Man’s essay. They 
were apparently smart enough to see that it threatens the entire enter-
prise of their book. That book was intended to help pedagogy by mak-
ing available the most up-to-date information about the current state of 
scholarship in language and literature, including literary theory. De Man’s 
essay does no such thing. It also puts in question the MLA’s work gen-
erally of supporting scholarship and teaching in modern languages and 
literatures. Why should we go on trying to do something that is either 
“impossible” or wrong to do even when it is possible? As usual, de Man is 
unwilling to let his readers off the hook with some unequivocally positive 
or even just barely decidable conclusion. 
In my naiveté, however, I still do not quite see how rhetorical read-
ings of those five categories of lies I began by identifying might not make 
things better by unmasking them as the lies they are, even if those read-
ings lead to aporias such as de Man identifies in Keats. The question is 
why politicians, media pundits, and voters persist in their ideological 
aberrations even when those delusions have been “unmasked” and clearly 
shown to be deeply mistaken and self-destructive.  
De Man’s essay gives the answer. The passage I began this essay by cit-
ing by no means says that doing readings in the light of the linguistics 
of literariness will cure you of making ideological mistakes. It just says 
that doing such readings will unmask such aberrations and account for 
their occurrence. Unmasking them and accounting for why they occur is 
not at all the same thing as curing people of their ideological aberrations. 
De Man’s position is profoundly anti-Freudian. No “talking cure” for him. 
The argumentation of “The Resistance to Theory” as a whole, as I have 
tried to show, not to speak of de Man’s work generally, claims, rather, just 
the opposite. It asserts not only that correct deconstructive readings do 
not lead to clear seeing but rather to undecidable aporias, for example 
the problems with “fall” in Keats. It also claims that such readings do 
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not prevent the repetition of the mistakes they unmask and account for. 
Language itself programs the repetition of the aberration. You ought to 
do poetics and may even be strongly committed to doing so, but you 
always end up doing hermeneutics.  
What is most distressing about de Man’s analyses is that he shows that 
the effort of unmasking ideologies and of accounting for their occurrence 
in itself leads to a repetition of the linguistic aberrations that brought 
about the ideological mystifications in the first place. This is perhaps 
said most clearly near the end of “Allegory of Reading,” de Man’s essay in 
Allegories of Reading about Rousseau’s Profession de foi: “Deconstructive 
readings can point out the unwarranted identifications achieved by sub-
stitution, but they are powerless to prevent their recurrence even in their 
own discourse, and to uncross, so to speak, the aberrant exchanges that 
have taken place. Their gesture merely reiterates the rhetorical defigura-
tion that caused the error in the first place” (de Man 1979, 242). This 
citation comes three pages from the end of the essay on The Profession de 
foi. Its last sentence has already been quoted, but I come back to it now 
from another angle and in a different context: “One sees from this that 
the impossibility of reading should not be taken too lightly” (de Man 
1979, 245). I take these two passages as confirmation that for de Man 
unmasking of ideological aberrations and accounting for their occur-
rences by way of tropological errors does not free even the wisest theorist 
of the linguistics of literariness from ideology. 
I end this section with yet another question: Is Paul de Man’s “The 
Resistance to Theory” itself a work of theory? The answer would seem to 
be “indubitably yes.” If that is the case, however, then is “The Resistance 
to Theory,” as de Man says all theory is, both a resistance to reading and 
a resistance to theory? I do not see how de Man can escape the ineluc-
table laws he lays down. What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gan-
der. When his seminar students asked de Man whether he escaped those 
laws, as I remember happening, he just smiled inscrutably. He did not say 
yes and he did not say no. What about my own essay, the one you are at 
this moment reading? I too must be caught in the same trap, but I leave it 
to my readers to spot where this happens in my discourse. 
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7. Reading Pictures in the Twilight of the Anthropocene Idols 
Literature involves voiding, rather than the affirmation, 
of aesthetic categories. One of the consequences of this is 
that, whereas we have traditionally been accustomed to 
reading literature by analogy with the plastic arts and with 
music, we now have to recognize the necessity of a non-
perceptual, linguistic moment in painting and music, and 
learn to read pictures rather than to imagine meaning. (de 
Man’s emphases)
Paul de Man 1986, 10
When Paul de Man died in 1983, the Internet was just a futuristic dream. 
The digital revolution was just getting underway. Consequently, he had 
little or nothing to say about what would in just three decades after his 
death change almost everyone’s life worldwide. Though de Man speaks 
eloquently in my epigraph for this section about reading pictures, he did 
not ever do that, either in seminars, as well as I can remember, or in his 
published work, whereas Derrida read a lot of pictures, for example in 
The Truth in Painting. De Man manages to talk brilliantly about Walter 
Benjamin’s “Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers” (“The Task of the Translator”) 
without mentioning Benjamin’s interest in graphics, from Ursprung des 
deutschen Trauerspiels (The Origin of German Tragic Drama), through 
his use in the “Geschichtsphilosophische Thesen” (“Theses on the 
Philosophy of History”) of Paul Klee’s Angelus Novus as an emblem for 
the way we go forward into the future with our backs to it, facing the 
past as an ever-increasing pile of debris, and then on to his concern with 
graphics in the incomplete “Arcades” project. De Man’s almost exclusive 
interest was in words on printed pages, though we know from a notorious 
reference in his Yale inaugural lecture that he much enjoyed the televi-
sion show, Archie Bunker. He makes a vile pun and calls a deconstruction-
ist an “archie debunker.” His Yale audience groaned disapprovingly, as I 
well remember. They perhaps thought such frivolity was not becoming 
on such an august occasion. Many people feel threatened by wordplay, 
particularly ironic wordplay. 
Reading Paul de Man While Falling into Cyberspace 159
8. Is the Digital Revolution the Radix Malorum? 
Whether de Man would have had things to say about the role of pictures 
in our digital age we shall never know, nor can I claim to fill that gap in 
this essay. His work was, as I have said, always surprising and unpredict-
able. Nevertheless, I turn now to the evident fact that all five of the fea-
tures I mentioned initially as characterizing our present dire situation 
would have been impossible without the digital revolution, which I men-
tion as the fifth characteristic of “these bad days.”  
Global climate change is not being caused by the digital revolution, 
but primarily by human-caused CO2 emissions, though these emissions 
are, as Tom Cohen persuasively argues, inextricably entwined with lan-
guage systems that were necessary to the “anthropogenic” activity that 
brought about the CO2 emissions. This includes ideologically motivated 
refusal to recognize until it was too late that there might be anything 
dangerous about them. The evidence for climate change given by scien-
tists depends on things you can do only on a computer or other digital 
devices, for example, measurement of CO2 levels, assembly of data about 
climates worldwide, statistical modeling of various scenarios for the 
future on the basis of that massive data, and so on. That data is too com-
plex and too multitudinous to be manipulated with a slide-rule. If we still 
had only slide-rules we might be dumbly wondering why our storms are 
so much more frequent and severe, why fires have raged in Australia and 
in the United States south and west, why we have more and more violent 
tornadoes in the Mid West, and so on. Computer calculations give expla-
nations and plausible predictions.  
All the information about levels of unemployment and attempts to 
scare citizens about the deficit and to persuade them to give up Social 
Security and Medicare is based on manipulation of computerized sta-
tistics. We are deluged on all sides with figures that are the result of 
digitalization. 
The global recession would have been impossible without the cre-
ation of subprime mortgages through computerized banking and invest-
ment transactions that then allowed the creation of “derivatives” and 
“credit default swaps.” No more keeping track of transactions by local 
banks in handwritten ledgers. All transactions are digitized, for example 
those automatic computerized microsecond trades I mentioned in my 
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opening section. When “the computers go down” at your local bank, all 
activity pauses. 
Public opinion is now to a considerable degree manipulated by digital 
gadgets like television, Facebook, Twitter, and so on. I shall discuss below 
the way this breaks down the distinction between truth and lie by turning 
everything into a digitized spectacle. 
Our wars are now fought to an increasing degree by drones, 
unmanned aircraft that are a triumph of digitization. Someone at a com-
puter screen in Colorado controls the drone and aims it at the target, kill-
ing lots of people, including innocent women and children, as well as, in 
January 2015, Western hostages held by Al Qaeda in Pakistan. The digital 
revolution has transformed warfare. Our soldiers train as killers by play-
ing video games. 
Literary study is being rapidly revolutionized by digitization, as my 
use of online sources in this essay indicates. I rarely need a research 
library these days to do my work on the remote island in Maine where 
I now live most of the time. Many people who read literature at all these 
days read it in e-Texts on a computer or on a Kindle or on some other 
e-Reader. A printed book is part of the print epoch, the epoch of library 
collections and books on scholars’ shelves. Paul de Man still lived all his 
life in that epoch. An e-Text, on the contrary, is part of the vast virtual 
reality we call cyberspace. This is a quite different mode of existence from 
that of a printed book. 
Perpetually plugged in, dwelling in cyberspace: that is the way we live 
now. I am at this moment attached to my computer as a prosthetic device 
that makes it possible for me to write this essay and then to revise it more 
or less endlessly with the help of Word for Mac 2011, version 14.4.9. 
Terms that have been used to describe the results of living in a more 
or less completely digitized world include “spectacle” and “simulacrum.” 
An e-Text is a simulacrum of a printed book. A video war game is a simu-
lacrum of a real war, but so are those repeated videos on television that 
illustrate the latest news about Mid-East violence with a shot of soldiers 
crouching behind a wall and firing automatic weapons. The same videos 
are used over and over, week after week. They are not films of something 
that the verbal report describes as happening just today or yesterday. 
They are, in any case, from the beginning simulacra, digitized videos. We 
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are not witnessing a real war scene. Moreover, the film clips in question 
are shown repeatedly on NBC evening news interspersed with the ads I 
described in the first section of this essay. At least forty percent of NBC 
Evening News is made up of TV ads, most of them for a narrow range of 
drugs: Cialis, Restasis, Chantix, Crestor, Advil, Claritin, etc., each with 
its own barbarous name. These ads are shown over and over from night 
to night, in nightmarish repetitions. They show actors pretending to be 
doctors or happy users. The fictitiousness of the ads rubs off on the so-
called news that is shown in brief bits as interruption of the real business 
of the thirty minutes, which is to sell Cialis, etc. The soldiers firing auto-
matic weapons over a wall become by contamination one more depthless 
ad, in this case propaganda for the endless continuation of wars in the 
Middle East. 
This meretricious depthlessness of television’s virtual reality calls up 
from my mental databank three names: Guy Debord, Jean Baudrillard, 
and Maurice Blanchot. Debord of course for The Society of the Spectacle 
(1967, in French); Baudrillard for Simulacra and Simulation (1981 in 
French); Blanchot for his theory of the “image” in “Two Versions of the 
Imaginary” (“Les deux versions de l’imaginaire”) and “The Song of the 
Sirens” (“Le chant des Sirènes”). The ideas of these three writers can 
hardly be perfectly reconciled, but they are to some degree in resonance. 
All were in one way or another influenced by Marx.  
Both Debord and Baudrillard were in different ways sociologists who 
deplored what they saw as a bad new society dominated by advanced 
capitalism and by the images created through mass media, advertising, 
film, popular music, etc. Both Debord and Baudrillard were deeply influ-
enced by the semiotics of their time. Both were photographers, Debord 
as a more or less professional film maker. He made in 1973 a film of The 
Society of the Spectacle (Debord 1973). For Debord “spectacle” is “a social 
relation among people that is mediated by images consisting of mass 
media, advertising, and popular culture” (Debord 2013).  
For Baudrillard, present-day society today has reached his fourth 
stage in the development of simulacra. That stage is “pure simulation,” 
an interplay of simulacra without any relation to “material reality” what-
soever. Stage four is a complete transformation of society by television, 
film, print, and now the Internet into depthless spectacle (Baudrillard 
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2013). Today we would add Netflix, Facebook, Twitter, and video games 
to this list.  
Debord’s “society of spectacle” and Baudrillard’s society of pure 
simulation are strongly analogous, in spite of important differences in 
terminology and mode of argumentation that need to be kept in mind. 
Baudrillard was a professional philosopher, while Debord was a film-
maker influenced by surrealism.  
Blanchot’s idea of the “image” is quite different from Debord’s spec-
tacle or from Baudrillard’s simulacra. I adduce Blanchot partly to indicate 
that all twentieth-century theorists of the image were not singing the 
same tune. Blanchot presents a subtle theory of “the image” as the essence 
of the imaginary embodied in literary language. Speaking, for example, in 
a characteristic torrent of paradoxes, of Proust’s breakthrough when two 
sensations coincided in a time out of time that made it possible for him 
to become a writer at last, Blanchot says: “Yes, at this time, everything 
becomes image, and the essence of the image is to be entirely outside, 
without intimacy, and yet more inaccessible and more mysterious than 
the innermost thought; without signification, but summoning the pro-
fundity of every possible meaning; unrevealed and yet manifest, having 
that presence-absence that constitutes the attraction and the fascination 
of the Sirens” (Blanchot 2003, 14; Blanchot 1959, 22). This formulation, 
in spite of important distinctions, is not entirely different from Debord’s 
spectacle or Baudrillard’s simulacra. Blanchot’s imaginary is a dangerous 
vanishing point within which one might be swallowed up and disappear. 
This danger is figured in the threat to Ulysses, in Homer’s Odyssey, of the 
Sirens’ song. Blanchot tends to identify the imaginary with death or with 
an endless process of dying. The imaginary also exists as “the narrative” 
(le récit), as opposed to the evasions of the novel (le roman). Blanchot’s 
examples in the essays I have cited are Ulysses in his approach toward, 
or refusal to approach toward, the real song behind the Sirens’ infinitely 
luring song, Proust’s Marcel in his search for (recherche de) lost time, and 
Ahab’s pursuit of the white whale in Moby Dick. 
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9. Verbal as Against Visual?  
Recent critical thinking has sometimes made a stark contrast between 
verbal media and visual ones. The contrast has often been couched in his-
torical terms. What Debord and Baudrillard say is posited on a theory 
of history as a series of distinct epochs determined in a Marxist way by 
modes of production and distribution, and by the media dominant at a 
given time. This ideological presumption assumes that during the epoch 
when print literature dominated, that is, during the 18th, 19th, and part 
of the 20th centuries, the primary cultural media—books, magazines, 
etc.—were linguistic: printed words on paper pages. More and more as 
the 20th century progressed, however, this historicizing concept assumes, 
new primarily visual media gradually came into cultural dominance: 
photography, film, television, video, and now the Internet, with all its 
concomitants, such as video games. Even popular music online is often 
accompanied by videos, as though we can no longer listen without at the 
same time having something to look at. Before, we needed to be expert in 
reading printed words. Now we must be expert in deciphering the impli-
cations of visual images, such as those in films or video games. The need 
to be good readers of, say, printed literature has apparently lessened. 
Few people would hold to quite stark a contrast, but most of us have 
some idea, however vaguely held, that verbal and visual media are quite 
different and require different academic disciplines (“film studies,” say, as 
against “literary studies”), and quite different methodologies of interpre-
tation. These seem to be quite plausible assumptions until you begin to 
think a little about the actual history of the two media.  
Verbal and visual media have been from the beginning of Western cul-
ture mixed in various ways at various times. That is my primary presup-
position in this part of my essay. Whatever there may have been originally 
of the ideographic in Western alphabetic languages has long since mostly 
disappeared, as opposed to an ideographic language like Chinese. The 
Chinese character for “exit” still looks, to me at least, like an open mouth 
or a doorway, though Chinese readers may well not notice the ideogram 
any more than we Westerners see the letter “o” as an open mouth uttering 
“Oh!” Mastery of a distinctive calligraphic style used to be a requirement 
in China for officials from the Emperor down to the lowliest bureaucrat. 
Recent scholars have, however, studied the way the visual aspect of purely 
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verbal written or printed texts in Western languages changes to some 
degree the meaning we assign: type font and type size, roman as against 
italics or bold, capitals as against use of colored type, space between lines 
and in the margins, binding, marks of punctuation like dashes and excla-
mation points that are not voiced, and so on.  
This was not quite what de Man meant, by the way, by his formulation 
about “the materiality of the signifier” (de Man 1986, 11). He meant, at 
least in part, the sound or appearance in any instantiation of a word like 
“day,” the sheer fact that any word must have some form of material base. 
“Materiality” is a complex word in de Man’s work. In any case, I am argu-
ing for differences in meaning arising from the way words are material-
ized, that is, from the visual side of words on the page or on the computer 
screen. My computer has a long list of fonts that I can choose from in 
different point sizes. The creation of fonts is work for highly skilled visual 
artists. My composition of this essay on my computer involves a whole 
set of choices designed to make what I compose look to me right on the 
page. A newspaper headline is in large type so it looks as if it is shouting 
and is really important: ROMNEY CHOOSES RYAN AS RUNNING 
MATE. Nevertheless, even the most purely visual set of signs invites 
being read as if it were a kind of writing, as my citation from Paul de Man 
asserts: “… we now have to recognize the necessity of a non-perceptual, 
linguistic moment in painting and music, and learn to read pictures rather 
than to imagine meaning.”  
By imagining meaning, I imagine, de Man meant the transformation 
of the words on the page into mental visual images, as when we, in differ-
ent ways for each reader, vividly imagine the faces, bodies, and surround-
ing scenes of characters in novels on the basis of verbal clues the novel 
gives. Examples are the reader’s internal image of those waves crashing on 
the shore in the Interludes of Virginia Woolf ’s The Waves (Woolf 1963), 
or what Wallace Stevens’ jar in Tennessee looked like in “Anecdote of the 
Jar”: “And round it was, upon a hill…. [It was] tall and of a port in air” 
(Stevens 1990, 76). In spite of de Man’s denigration of imagining mean-
ing, I think what might be called a spontaneous internal cinema accom-
panies, for most people, the reading of a verbal text. But reading pictures 
also happens for those adept in purely visual sign systems. What de Man 
meant by reading, alert readers of de Man’s “The Resistance to Theory” 
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will know. He meant, as I have shown in the first part of this essay, atten-
tion to “the linguistics of literariness,” that is, to the aberrational implicit 
assertions of figurative language. (“A ship is a plow.”) A familiar example 
of using the linguistics of literariness to read pictures is the way we under-
stand montage in film, the sequential juxtaposition of separate scenes, 
according to tropological rhetoric, as a metaphor, metonymy, or synec-
doche. Eisenstein’s crowd scenes in Eisenstein’s Battleship Potemkin set 
side by side with a shot of swarming maggots is a famous case of this. 
Such readable tropes, however, are a staple of the purely visual side of 
films and other visual media, even when they are not accompanied by 
printed or spoken words.  
10. Two Contemporary Examples of Pictures That Invite Reading 
Here are two concrete examples of this readable visual imagery, one from 
a New Yorker cover, one from an advertisement in Wired (20.08). These 
pictures exemplify in obvious ways Guy Debord’s society of spectacle 
and Jean Baudrillard’s final stage of the world as interacting simulacra 
with no reality behind it or referred to by it. Both mix verbal and visual. 
The first picture, however, works as a critique of ideology, whereas the 
second uses our everyday ideological associations to sell a consumer 
product. Readable visual imagery can function both ways, as demasking 
aberrations and as reinforcing them for a particular purpose. 
The recent brilliant New Yorker cover I have in mind ( July 23, 2012) 
shows a nuclear family (father, mother, and two teen-age children, a 
boy and a girl) standing side by side in tropical clothes on a beach at 
the edge of the ocean, with a backdrop of palm trees. In the foreground 
is the shadow of someone taking a digital photograph of the group. He 
stands just where you are, dear viewer, which makes you the one taking 
the snapshot that forms the cover. All four of the family members are 
holding iPhones or some similar gadget. All are texting or tweeting or 
using Facebook. They are paying no attention whatsoever to the beautiful 
scene they have come to visit, nor to one another. So much for the salu-
tary togetherness of the nuclear family and for the salutary function of 
vacations in the tropics! The facial expressions of the four persons, espe-
cially those of the father and mother, are tense, even anguished. They are 
166 J. Hillis Miller 
grimacing or clenching their teeth with concentration. They are plugged 
in. They are mere attachments to their digital machines. That is the way 
we live now. Such people are perhaps what all human beings will be like 
in the twilight of the Anthropocene idols.  
The readable meaning of this cover is attained without the use of a 
single word, except of course the words that tell the viewer this is a New 
Yorker cover of a certain date, with all that implies, and the signature of 
the artist in the lower right hand corner (Ulriksen). Moreover, as every-
one knows, the smartphones the family holds are multimedia devices, 
holding verbal, visual, and audio files. “A picture is worth a thousand 
words.” In this case the meaning is generated by the ironic and discordant 
juxtaposition of the beautiful tropical scene and the family all isolated 
from one another and all wholly absorbed in their iPhones. The viewer 
is put in complicity by way of the shadow in the foreground that shows 
the viewer’s surrogate taking a photo with another smart phone. Ironic 
incongruous juxtaposition is a readable/unreadable trope. It is impos-
sible to read it unequivocally. Irony is always to some degree unreadable, 
as de Man persuasively argues in “The Concept of Irony” (de Man 1996, 
163-84). Such an ironic juxtaposition could also be expressed purely in 
words, or in a mixture of words and images. 
My second example is from Wired (2008, August, 2012, no page num-
ber). The transformation of Wired has been truly amazing. It began as a 
McLuhan-like interpretation of media, featuring authors like Nicholas 
Negroponte of the MIT Media Lab, one of Wired’s founders (see 2013d). 
Wired now describes itself as providing “in-depth coverage of current and 
future trends in technology, and how they are shaping business, enter-
tainment, communications, science” (Wired 2013, under “Subscribe,” 
no longer given on the Website in just these words). A subscription to 
Wired gives you free access to all of Wired digitized on an e-Reader app 
for an additional $5.00 a year. No more talk about Creative Commons, 
open source, and sidestepping copyright limitations. Wired has become 
a spectacle, a panorama of simulacra itself in need of demystification, a 
capitalist tool. That transformation corresponds to the rapid expansion 
and commodification of the Internet, as it has turned into a full-blown 
Debordian spectacle or collection of Baudrillardian simulacra.  
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In the Wired ad I have chosen to “read” the meaning is generated by 
metonymies that turn from side by sideness to the similarity of meta-
phor. The owners of the registered trademark for smartwater® (glacéau® 
smartwater®), with its weird accent over the “e,” have refused to let me 
reproduce the ad. They were perhaps right to do that, since my goal is to 
demystify the way the ad works, thereby to disempower it. Doing that is 
definitely not in their interest. I repeat the ® both to protect myself against 
failing to acknowledge that the trademark is registered, and as a mild 
irony. Smartwater® is, by the way, a division of Coca-Cola®.
Most people are so used to seeing and “reading” such ads, in maga-
zines, on television, and on the Internet that they take their interpretation 
for granted. We just let such ads work their magic “unconsciously,” which 
is what the ad-makers probably intend. As Marshall McLuhan long ago 
recognized in The Guttenberg Galaxy (McLuhan, 1962), Understanding 
Media: The Extensions of Man (McLuhan, 1964) and other books, how-
ever, “The medium is the Message” (or “mass age” or “mess age” or “mas-
sage,” according to his puns) (Anonymous, 2013b; Anonymous, 2013c). 
McLuhan had little to learn from Debord or Baudrilard about mixed 
verbal and visual imagery. He “got it” already, with brilliant complete-
ness, including the recognition that “spectacular” juxtapositions of visual 
images work like verbal tropes. In the case of my glacéau smartwater® ad, 
visual images and words combine to produce a complex meaning. The 
word “smartwater®” echoes the word “smartphone,” in another covert 
allusion. Both, the words imply, have a species of superhuman intelli-
gence or will make you smarter than you already are. 
In the Wired ad, a beautiful and provocatively dressed woman with 
parted lips sits in an expensive leather-upholstered convertible holding 
a big bottle of smartwater® erect in her left hand. The traditional associa-
tion in ads of sex with fast expensive cars is shamelessly exploited once 
more. The woman’s relaxed right hand calls attention to her open, unbut-
toned blouse, her almost exposed left breast, and to what is hidden by 
her clothes lower down, where her legs fork and where her dangling fin-
gers point. She is looking just over the viewer’s left shoulder, as if about 
to turn to look you straight in the eye. She has a tastefully elegant bracelet 
on her right wrist and a matching necklace. The model, Beth Rosenberg 
tells me, is the television and film star Jennifer Aniston (Anonymous, 
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2013a). The caption at the bottom reads, with tasteful alliterative terse-
ness, “good taste travels well.”  
The message is clear. You would be smart to drink smartwater® because 
it will give you good taste in two senses, the taste of the water (which 
has electrolytes, and does taste good) and the social good taste that will 
earn you a ride with the beautiful woman, also in two senses. A promise 
that drinking smartwater® will enhance your manliness may also be read 
in that proffered bottle. It must work sort of like Cialis. I speak from the 
perspective of a heterosexual male, as you will notice. I suppose a good 
percentage of Wired’s readers are in that category. Many names on the 
masthead are female, however. Stories about women software entrepre-
neurs and other such professions are included. Female readers, straight 
or lesbian, would no doubt respond in a way different from me to the 
ad’s allure. 
All these double meanings are achieved by means of visual or verbal 
puns, similes, metonymies that become metaphors: the taste of the water 
is like the promised taste of the attractive woman, sex is like a fast car, 
and so on. To carry this interpretation even a step further, you might read 
the snap-buttoned leather box (the enclosure for the convertible’s roof) 
in the foreground as an invitation to a further act of unbuttoning, or of 
entering an enclosure.  
In this ad everything is turned into image and becomes a siren song 
promising, in Blanchot’s words, “movement toward a point—one that is 
not only unknown, ignored, and foreign, but such that it seems, before 
and outside of this movement, to have no kind of reality” (Blanchot 
2003, 7, trans. slightly altered; Blanchot 1959, 13). I really know that 
drinking smartwater® will not lead to possession of the sexy woman in 
her expensive car, but the ad nevertheless generates a movement in me 
toward the unfulfillable promise these images make. I know I am just 
looking at the photograph of Jennifer Aniston, who probably survives on 
carrot-juice and who takes whatever pose the photographer requests. The 
whole thing is a sham, a simulacrum, a spectacle, a “model,” as in “fashion 
model,” “late model car,” model train,” and “model pupil” (that is, a para-
digm for others). My deconstructive knowledge, nevertheless, achieved 
by my knowledge of the linguistics of literariness, as de Man asserted and 
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as I too believe, does not by any means prevent me from responding to 
the ad’s fraudulent appeal.  
The ad is made more powerful and persuasive, by the way, by being 
placed side by side in Wired with a great many other such ads for high-
end commodities of all kinds. Their allure rubs off on one another, in 
another distributed metonymy. My smartwater® ad, for example, is fol-
lowed, after a second masthead page, by an ad for the asics® Gel-Lyte33™ 
running shoe, that by an ad for the Hyundai 333-hp GDI V6, that by 
an ad for Fidelty Investments, and so on throughout the issue, which is 
about half made up of advertisements. This spectacular transformation 
of digital media into ideological “performatives” that persuade you to 
act in some way or other, for example to buy lots of smartwater®, is espe-
cially evident in the use of television, Facebook, Twitter, etc. in politi-
cal campaigns, as in postings and television coverage already ubiquitous 
for the Presidential race of 2016. The terms “truth” and “lie,” as Debord 
and Baudrillard in different ways argued and demonstrated, have ceased 
to have relevance to this complex tissue of mixed media assertions. If 
you say often enough that Barack Obama is a Kenyan socialist Muslim 
bent on destroying capitalism, a lot of people will believe it, just as many 
people will associate Mitt Romney primarily with that vacation drive to 
Canada with his dog strapped to the roof of his car or with his spectacular 
media gaffes. The dog on roof event apparently did happen in material 
reality, but it becomes a mediatic simulacrum when used over and over in 
campaign rhetoric. 
11. Mixed Media Forever 
I return now to my claim that multimedia in different forms and mixes 
have characterized verbal texts from the beginning. That means it is a 
mistake, in my view, to think of a radical change in the twentieth century 
from print media to graphic media, from printed novels, say, to films, with 
each requiring different disciplines and methodologies of interpretation. 
What is needed rather is a flexible procedure of “reading” appropriate to 
each given mixture of media at a given historical epoch. Paul de Man, in 
the essay I cited at the beginning of this essay and have then read in detail, 
called this procedure, as we know, a use of “the linguistics of literariness,” 
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that is, the rhetoric of tropes, to read all sorts of cultural phenomena. If 
he is right about the need to learn to read pictures, this claim would apply 
to television ads sponsored by conservatives claiming that lowering taxes 
on the rich will create a lot of jobs: the long-discredited “trickle down” 
theory. Changes in media have been all along rather a matter of complex 
changes in balance through the centuries among forms of expression that 
always have been, and always will be, mixed.  
Most scholars will agree with this if they think a little about it, but the 
recent supposed shift from print to graphic has been a powerful ideologi-
cal presupposition. From the mixture of verbal and graphic in carvings 
on Greek and Roman tombstones and funerary monuments, to medi-
eval illustrated manuscripts, to the sumptuous graphic title pages and 
other illustrations in early printed books (modern title pages still com-
monly have graphic elements), to seventeenth-century emblem books, to 
Hogarth’s great eighteenth-century mixed media graphic works (so bril-
liantly interpreted by Ronald Paulson [Paulson, 1971]), to printed novels 
that from the beginning have often, though not always, had illustrations, 
for example the great illustrations for Dickens’s novels by Cruikshank and 
Phiz, to Dante Gabriel Rossetti’s mixed media compositions juxtapos-
ing poems and pictures, such as his Aspecta Medusa, to the sinister illus-
trations by Aubrey Beardsley for Pope’s The Rape of the Lock or Wilde’s 
Salomé, to the inclusion of photographs in some early 20th-century multi-
volume “sets” of English writers like Thomas Hardy and Henry James, to 
the multitudinous illustrations in the magnificent Cook and Wedderburn 
edition of Ruskin’s works in thirty-nine volumes in 1903-12, to the com-
binations of print novels and films of those novels or television versions 
that have characterized later twentieth-century forms of mixed media, 
to the wonderful efflorescence of comic strips such as Peanuts or Pogo, 
to graphic novels based on the conventions of comic books, such as Art 
Spiegelman’s Maus or the Japanese “manga” graphic novels, many “trans-
lated” into English, though that is hardly the word for changing a graphic 
Japanese word for “pow!” or “bang!” into its English equivalent, since the 
original depends so much on the way the Japanese characters look when 
inscribed on the graphic page. (I have decided it would be pedantic to 
list in my Works Cited all the items mentioned in this paragraph. You can 
reach any one of them through Google or Wikipedia.) 
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The most spectacular (in both the idiomatic and Debordian senses) 
recent example of mixed media is, of course, the Internet, or Cyberspace 
generally. Cyberspace mixes verbal, visual, and auditory materials in a 
hyperbolic way. Almost all the Websites I list in this essay mix verbal and 
graphic materials, and many have auditory components too. Adepts at 
navigating cyberspace (or falling into it) must have skills in “reading” this 
latest example of mixed media. 
If I want nowadays to teach or write about Imre Kertész’s Fatelessness 
(Kertész, 2004) or Ian McEwan’s Atonement (McEwan, 2001), or even 
novels by Austen, Dickens, Hardy, James, Conrad, and others, I more or 
less am obliged to consider the films and BBC television versions of all 
these. I say “obliged” and “ought” because in my experience more and 
more students and faculty around the world will have seen the film but 
will not have read the book. If you want their attention and understand-
ing in a lecture or essay you had better say something about the film.  
I think part of the reason for the sharp separation between verbal and 
graphic in some people’s minds still today derives from the way publish-
ers during a relatively brief period of high modernism tended to publish 
novels without pictures, for example the novels of Conrad in the Dent 
Edition, or the Hogarth Press edition of Virginia Woolf, or the paper-
back editions of novels by Faulkner (though those had lurid covers). 
Virginia Woolf ’s The Waves, for example, in the Hogarth Press edition, 
has no illustrations beyond the elegant cover designed by Vanessa Bell 
(Woolf, 1963). On the other hand, it is available for free in a searchable 
e-Text that turns it to some degree into a graphic presentation, a display 
on the computer screen (Woolf, 1931). Older novels, for example those 
by Dickens, Trollope, or Hardy were usually published during the high 
modernist period without their original illustrations. That led teachers 
and students (me for example) to forget or ignore the role those illustra-
tions originally played in the generation of meaning.  
In doing this I was forgetting the children’s books that did so much 
to inform my early sensibility, my pleasure in puns, wordplay in general, 
and my spontaneous ability to “read” pictures. Such books would include 
especially, for me, Lewis Carroll’s, Alice in Wonderland and Through the 
Looking-Glass (Carroll, 1865; Carroll, 1871), Kenneth Grahame’s The 
Wind in the Willows (Grahame, 1908, read by me as a child in a later 
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edition with the Ernest H. Shepard illustrations of 1931), A. A. Milne’s 
Pooh books, also with Shepard illustrations (Milne, 1926; Milne, 1928). 
I remember as much the glorious Shepard pictures of Humpty Dumpty, 
or of the tea party in which the dormouse is dipped in tea, in the Alice 
books, or Rat “messing about in boats,” or Toad tearing down the road in 
an open car calling for “Speed! More Speed!” in The Wind in the Willows, 
or Piglet, in one of the Pooh books, terrified by Pooh fallen in a pit with 
his head stuck in a honey jar who therefore looks to Piglet like a “horrible 
heffalump” or a “heffable horrilump.” But I must desist.  
Henry James, in A Small Boy and Others, puts his finger on the truth 
about these mixed media creations as read by young people. Speaking 
of the Cruikshank illustrations for Oliver Twist, James, with wonderful 
astuteness, asserts: “It perhaps even seemed to me more Cruikshank’s 
than Dickens’s; it was a thing of such vividly terrible images, and all 
marked with that peculiarity of Cruikshank that the offered flowers or 
goodnesses, the scenes and figures intended to comfort and cheer, pres-
ent themselves under his hand as but more subtly sinister or more sugges-
tively queer, than the frank badnesses and horrors” ( James 1913, 120). 
Cruikshank’s Sikes, James is saying, looks, paradoxically, wholesome and 
sane compared to his Mr. Brownlow or his Oliver. 
12. Just How Has the Internet Transformed Literary Studies? 
Today print culture is fast fading. It is being rapidly replaced by digital 
culture of all sorts. Most people in the United States do not any longer 
read Shakespeare or Dickens or Emily Dickinson unless forced to do so 
in school. They watch Fox News on cable television, or the PBS evening 
news, or BBC sitcoms, or, a few people, television adaptations of classic 
English novels. Today people play collective or single-player video games 
online. They spend hours every day using cell phones, iPods, iPhones, 
iPads, email, Facebook, Twitter, and wireless laptop computers. They use 
smileys or emojis and they text, or indulge in “txtng,” even while driving 
a car, to their great peril. They communicate by Skype with a simulacrum 
of a friend on the screen.  
Features of the so-called post-modernist sensibility, specialists in it 
like Fredric Jameson say, are subjective depthlessness, absence of unified 
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selfhood, lack of affect, and the loss of any historical sense. These are 
among the results of our society of spectacle. One must be careful, how-
ever, not to fall into some naïve version of irresistible technological deter-
minism. The new gadgets can be used in all sorts of ways. They limit but 
do not absolutely determine the use that is made of them. 
A concomitant of the digital revolution, which has taken only twenty 
years to happen, has been great confusion and uncertainty in the humani-
ties. What should we humanists study and teach? If we teach anything 
like the old curriculum, we are teaching things that have less and less 
relevance to the actual lives of our students. In Victorian England (my 
special field), middle-class ideology, beliefs about gender roles, courtship 
and marriage, class divisions, and so on, were both transmitted and to a 
considerable degree created by novels, by works written by Jane Austin, 
George Eliot, Charles Dickens, Elizabeth Gaskell, Anthony Trollope, and 
a host of other popular novelists. Now such beliefs are passed on and to 
some degree created by films and by radio and television, including talk 
shows on TV and radio. The latter have such increasing power in poli-
tics that some people have said that the actual heads of the Republican 
Party in the United States are people like the hosts on Fox News, that 
is, those who exploit the media. Cyberspace is full of the most amazing 
vitriolic lies.  
Most people these days have not read Jane Austen at all. They know 
her work, if at all, only through the latest BBC adaptation. An online ad 
from the University of Minnesota Press listing new books for 2010 in 
“Literary and Cultural Studies” did not have one single book on literature. 
Book publishers, including university presses, appear, on the good evi-
dence of dwindling sales, to have concluded that little or no market exists 
for old-fashioned literary studies, whereas a book on the cultural history 
of Botany Bay (one book on the Minnesota list in 2010) is assumed to 
have a market. Now (April 2015) the University of Minnesota Press no 
longer even has a catalogue for “Literary and Cultural Studies.” That cata-
logue has become just “Cultural Studies 2015.” 
One result of these amazingly rapid changes, which I call “prestidigi-
talization,” has been the overnight change in the humanities from literary 
study to cultural studies. My decision in this essay to use the linguistics 
of literariness to read two images from popular culture is an example of 
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this. Younger scholar-teachers, especially, want to study and teach what 
really matters to them and to their fellow citizens. This is all to the good. 
Cultural studies, however, has not yet quite become a well-organized 
discipline, as once was, for example, the study of British literature or 
of medieval European history or of German literature. Cultural studies 
straddle the humanities and the social sciences, as do sociology, anthro-
pology, and “media studies.” No widespread agreement exists about just 
what is the best training, the best curriculum, to prepare scholars to do 
“cultural studies.” By contrast, I once could have told you exactly what 
courses you need to take to prepare yourself for a career as a specialist in 
Renaissance literature or in Victorian literature. We knew, or we thought 
we knew, what you needed to know. 
Some amazingly good things, however, have been brought to liter-
ary studies by the digital revolution. The ease of writing and revising on 
a computer is one of them. This essay is an example of that. Moreover, it 
is no longer necessary to be at a major university with a big library to do 
serious research and criticism. This is a powerful form of democratiza-
tion. Much literature is available online, if you happen to want to read 
it that way, for example work by all of the writers I have mentioned in 
this essay, as well as large amounts of secondary literature about litera-
ture: all of the novels by Dickens, Henry James, Anthony Trollope, etc. 
etc. I worked not long ago on Franz Kafka and Imre Kertész. More or 
less all of Kafka’s work in German is available online in searchable form. 
When I wanted to check the equivalent Hungarian word for “naturally,” 
and its frequency in the original, as against its recurrence in the English 
translation of Kertész’s wonderful Holocaust novel, Fatelessness, I found 
a searchable version in a minute by Googling for it. That location has 
since mysteriously disappeared, by the way. That is probably because 
after Kertész received the Nobel Prize in 2002 the printed version in 
Hungarian became valuable again, too valuable to give away free on-line 
as an e-Text. I ordered the film version of Fatelessness from Amazon and 
had it in my computer’s DVD slot in a few days. Recently I could not, to 
my shame, remember the location in Shakespeare of a phrase I recalled, 
“the beast with two backs.” In two minutes I found it by way of an online 
concordance. It is Iago speaking in Othello, act one, scene 1, line 126.  
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The Internet, the World Wide Web, and Wikipedia are fantastic 
resources for even the most traditional forms of humanistic scholarship. 
I use Wikipedia a lot. As with any encyclopedia, one has to be skepti-
cal and check it against other sources, but I have found Wikipedia to be 
amazingly accurate when I have checked its entries against other sources. 
One “spectacular” result is that I rarely have to borrow a book from the 
quite comprehensive University of California library system. I can do the 
scholarly and critical work I want to do just about as well in Sedgwick, 
Maine, or on Deer Isle, Maine, as I could in Irvine, New Haven, or 
Baltimore. I have emphasized this by giving all the URLs for the many 
online sources I have consulted to write this essay.  
Emailing, though I spend an inordinate amount of time doing it, has 
changed my life. It has put me in more or less instant contact with schol-
ars and students all over the world. Through email I have created my own 
virtual communities. I stress “virtual.” Essays and book manuscripts are 
sent to me by email attachment, though I still have difficulty reading 
books and essays on a computer screen or on my Kindle for Mac. That 
difficulty is diminishing. 
I am certain that using email, the Internet, and the computer has 
changed my personality, as well as the way I write essays and books. I have 
not, however, found it all that easy to be precise in identifying just what 
the difference is between doing literary study exclusively with printed 
books and essays and doing it with the help of the Internet. I think 
Debord and Baudrillard may help understand that difference. If I read a 
printed book that act ties me to the print epoch. It puts me back into a 
time when, however problematically, verbal and graphic creations were 
assumed to be in one way or another representational. They were taken 
as linked to the real extra-verbal and extra-graphic world by some form 
of mimesis. When a given printed text, Woolf ’s The Waves for example, is 
made available online in an e-Text, it is subtly transformed into image. It 
is transmogrified willy-nilly into one simulacrum among the billions of 
simulacra floating around in cyberspace in our society of spectacle. That 
is a huge difference. Whether I can work with such materials and remain 
true to the McLuhanesque commitments I share with the founders and 
early editors of Wired, or whether I will inevitably become subdued to 
what I work in, like the dyer’s hand, as rapidly as were those in charge of 
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Wired as it became more and more commercialized, is another question. 
Attention to the linguistics of literariness may help me keep my head. 
In any case, working with digitized materials as opposed to print mate-
rials means submission to a quite different technological or spectacular 
regime, even though both print and the results of prestidigitalization are 
different forms of mixed media. 
13. Imagine Paul de Man Online in the 
Twilight of the Anthropocene Idols 
Whether Paul de Man, if he had lived another thirty years, would have 
turned to “reading” the Internet and other forms of digitization is an 
impossible question to answer. It is a fruitless speculation. He was pretty 
firmly committed to study of “the linguistics of literariness” as it is pres-
ent in printed texts. He belonged heart and soul to the print epoch. He 
was a printed-book man. Trying to think of de Man before the screen of 
an Apple laptop, with his fingers on the keyboard, as Derrida is shown 
in films we have of him—it is impossible. De Man would never have 
fallen for that new technology. That technology is neatly symbolized 
by the Apple logo: an apple with a bite taken out of it, as in the Fall of 
Adam and Eve. Charlie Gere has noticed the implications of this (Gere 
2013). De Man never even got as far using a typewriter, though I don’t 
remember him ever expressing the active hostility to it that Heidegger 
does in his Parmenides lecture (Heidegger 1942-43). Jacques Derrida 
has written eloquently about Heidegger’s preference for handwriting in 
“Le main de Heidegger” (“Heidegger’s Hand”) (Derrida 1987; Derrida 
2008). De Man wrote all his essays out “in long hand,” as almost all schol-
ars from Plato through Rousseau to Walter Benjamin and Heidegger 
did. Nietzsche, on the contrary, bought in 1882 and used at least briefly 
a typewriter, a Malling-Hansen Writing Ball. As confirmation that I am 
well and truly fallen into cyberspace, I googled “Nietzsche, typewriter” 
and “Heidegger, typewriter.” In each case I found in a few seconds a sub-
stantial list of online texts on the topic, as well as (surprise!) ads for type-
writers (Nietzsche, typewriter, 2013; Heidegger, typewriter, 2013).  
De Man had no experience with cyberspace. Nevertheless, his pro-
leptic insight into the nature of the ideological mystifications that now 
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surround us on all sides, mostly in digitized form and usually with a visual 
component, can give those who have outlived him and who have taken a 
bite out of that apple a path to follow. We can attempt to unmask today’s 
ideologies and account for their occurrence, as I have tried to do with the 
ad from Wired. As part of this unmasking project we need to learn how to 
read pictures, as de Man said.  
De Man does not, however, promise that this unmasking and account-
ing for will cure us of the ideological aberrations that are rapidly turn-
ing the twilight of the Anthropocene into total darkness. Far from it. An 
example of that failure to cure is the resistance to Paul Krugman’s Op-Ed 
pieces in the New York Times. These argue authoritatively, with empiri-
cal evidence from what has happened in Ireland, Great Britain, Spain, and 
Greece, that austerity measures implemented in the United States, as the 
Republicans are determined to do, would likely bring on another reces-
sion, raise unemployment, and cause widespread social misery. States 
like Kansas and Louisiana that have tried austerity have more or less 
gone bankrupt. A good percentage of the blogs in response to Krugman’s 
essays, however, just go on saying in different forms that slashing 
Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security, while lowering taxes on the rich 
and deregulating banks and investment firms will bring good jobs and 
prosperity to all. Another example is the large number of people who buy 
the National Rifle Association’s absurd solution to gun violence (such 
as the Newtown massacre of twenty children and six adults, and many 
other such events since Newtown): arm everybody, including especially 
elementary school teachers, with military style assault weapons equipped 
with large ammunition magazines. Denying that climate change is hap-
pening and denying that it is “anthropogenic” is only one more of these 
delusional mystifications, though perhaps the most catastrophic.  
Just unmasking these delusions will not end them. De Man does 
nevertheless offer ways of understanding what is happening to us, as 
year-round heat waves and violent winter storms increase, as the Arctic, 
Antarctic, and Greenland ice melts, and as the water rises up to our 
necks, as it did during Hurricane Sandy for those on the Jersey Shore and 
in Lower Manhattan.  
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14. Anachronistic Reading 
In this final section of my part of this book, I present a reading of a poem 
by Wallace Stevens (Miller 2010). Although I cannot hope to match 
the rigor and inventiveness of de Man’s work, I present it as exemplifi-
cation of my own way of doing readings of literature in the light of de 
Man’s work. Since this essay was first published,37 as my contribution to 
an issue of Derrida Today in my honor, a lot of water has gone over the 
dam, but the changes have been mostly for the worse. The Affordable 
Healthcare Act has given millions more Americans affordable healthcare, 
though the Republicans have done everything they can to repeal it. They 
will go on doing so, while universal single payer healthcare, such as all 
other first world countries have in some form, remains the proper and 
obvious course. Our two houses of Congress are more or less dysfunc-
tional, with constant threats of government shutdown made by the Tea 
Party crazies in the House of Representatives. An immense number of 
American citizens get their political opinions from conservative (and 
blithely lying) radio and television talk shows and television news. The 
gap in wealth between the top one percent and the rest of us continues 
to increase to unheard-of proportions. The Supreme Court has made a 
number of disastrous decisions, for example “Citizens United,” which 
allows the very rich to buy our politicians with unlimited secret contribu-
tions. The candidates vying for the Republican presidential nomination 
for the 2016 election are, every one of them, disasters. Any one of them, if 
elected, would do immense damage to American democracy, for example 
by abolishing or privatizing Social Security and Medicare if they could do 
it, by cutting taxes on the rich and on corporations, by deregulating banks 
and other financial institutions, and by doing nothing to mitigate climate 
change, which many of them continue, in defiance of all the evidence, to 
deny. Climate change, meanwhile, is happening with astonishing rapidity, 
with wild fires, floods, droughts, water shortages, and the like happening 
with increasing frequency and intensity in the United States, not to speak 
of the melting of the Arctic ice-cap and the Antarctic glaciers. The role 
of the humanities in higher education continues to diminish. President 
Obama has just announced (October 16, 2015) that we are not going to 
pull all of our troops out of Afghanistan after all. Altogether, we are in 
an increasingly parlous condition as a nation, on the way to becoming 
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an oligarchy dominated by a few very rich people and families, as well 
as engaged in perpetual wars. This final section is my small contribution, 
to quote what I said at the end of the previous section, to procedures 
using literary works as a means of “understanding what is happening to 
us, as year-round heat waves and violent winter storms increase, as the 
Arctic, Antarctic, and Greenland ice melts, and as the water rises up to 
our necks.” My focus is primarily on climate change, as is consonant with 
this book as a whole. 
Literary works program or encode their future readings, though in an 
unpredictable way. This exemplifies Michelet’s dictum that “Each epoch 
dreams the one to follow,” or Percy Bysshe Shelley’s claim in “A Defence 
of Poetry,” that poets are “the mirrors of the gigantic shadows which futu-
rity casts upon the present.” The poet, says Shelley, “not only beholds 
intensely the present as it is, and discovers those laws according to which 
present things ought to be ordered, but he beholds the future in the pres-
ent, and his thoughts are the germs of the flower and the fruit of the latest 
time.”38 A free reading would try to identify the way a poem or other liter-
ary work mirrors the future. Such a reading, it follows, is anachronistic. 
It takes possession of the old work for present uses and in a new context.  
A poem encrypts, though not predictably, the effects it may have 
when at some future moment, in another context, it happens to be read 
and inscribed in a new situation, in “an interpretation that transforms the 
very thing it interprets,” as Jacques Derrida puts it in Spectres de Marx. 
The effects of a transformative reading exceed any intentions or intended 
meanings that may have been in the poet’s mind when he put the words 
down on paper, or, in Wallace Stevens’s case, dictated the poem to his sec-
retary. A poem is only completed when it is freely read at some point in 
the future. It takes two to tango, the writer and the reader. Each reading, 
moreover, is unique, even if the same reader makes several readings of 
the same work at different times. The reading creates the meaning retro-
actively, by a species of metalepsis or what Freud called Nachträglichkeit, 
cause after effect, the cart before the horse. For Freud the initial traumatic 
event only becomes traumatic when its effect is triggered by a much later 
event that recalls, echoes, or repeats the first event. Another way to put 
this is to say that the poem, though not the poet, foretells, foreshadows, 
foresees, prefigures, or even brings about performatively the meaning and 
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force it comes to have. Franz Kafka feared his stories and novels might 
bring about the catastrophe of the Holocaust they obscurely foresee. 
Therefore he could not finish his novels and wanted all his manuscripts 
burned, in an attempt, vain as it turned out, to abolish their performa-
tive force.  
Just what would an anachronic, ahistorical, anachronistic, inaugu-
ral, proleptic, transormative reading, such as I am demanding, look 
like? I take Stevens’s “The Man on the Dump,” from Parts of a World 
(1942), as my example. The poem, John Irwin reminds me, may 
echo the film of 1936 starring William Powell and Carole Lombard. 
William Powell plays the man on the dump who is hired as butler by 
a rich socialite, played by Carole Lombard. Here is a link to the poem 
http://www.poetryfoundation.org/archive/poem.html?id=172209
Well, what can I say about this poem? What does the poem say?  
On the one hand, the poem tells a plausible realistic story. The speaker, 
whoever that is, let us call him the Hartford poet and insurance executive 
Wallace Stevens, “now, in the time of spring,” has gone to the dump at 
sundown and moonrise, perhaps the municipal dump of his home-town. 
He observes the everyday objects of American consumer life that have 
been discarded in the dump and carries on the endless meditation that 
was Stevens’s interior life and the concomitant of his poetry. That medita-
tion, as transferred to language or generated by it, alternates, as was usual 
with Stevens, between an ornate richness of metaphorical transfiguration 
and a minimalist shedding that attempts to discard or eject all images, to 
“wipe away moonlight like mud,” as he says in another poem. The speaker 
beats an old tin can, a lard pail, no doubt found on the dump, as a rhyth-
mical accompaniment to his meditations.  
On the other hand, no thoughtful reader can doubt that “The Man 
on the Dump” is more than the realistic report of a visit to the Hartford 
dump by Wallace Stevens in 1942. The verbalized meditation is the point 
or substance of the poem. The poem’s material base must never be forgot-
ten, nevertheless, since it provides the “material” that Stevens’s language 
transfigures. That transfiguration takes two chief forms in the poem.  
One is the characteristically gaudy tropological transformations. The 
moon is seen as a woman named Blanche who places the sun in the sky 
like a bouquet of flowers, or, more precisely, like a “corbeil,” name for “a 
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sculptured basket of flowers or fruits used as an architectural ornament” 
(American Heritage Dictionary). The poem uses a wild assortment of 
tropes, a big bouquet of them: metaphors, similes, metonymies, synec-
doches, prosopopoeias, comparisons of more and less, alliterations that 
call attention to the material base of language (“bubbling of bassoons”), 
synesthesias, prolepses, analepses, metalepses, puns. 
“The Man on the Dump,” moreover, turns back on itself to reflect 
on this process of verbal transmogrification and, ultimately, to reject 
it—almost. Of “the freshness of morning, the blowing of day,” the poet 
asserts, “one says/That it puffs as [a simile; my italics] Cornelius Nepos 
reads, it puffs/More than, less than or it puffs like this or that.” The word 
“puff ” apparently refers to the intermittent breezes of a spring morning, 
but that puffing can be said to be more or less or like all kinds of things, 
this or that, even like the way Cornelius Nepos reads. Nepos was a Roman 
biographer, who lived from ca. 100-24 B.C. His only surviving work is the 
Excellentium Imperatorum Vitae (Lives of the Eminent Commanders). That 
work is certainly “puffs” in the sense that we speak of outrageously hyper-
bolic praise of a newly-published book as a “puff.” If the fresh breezes of 
a spring morning can be said to be like Cornelius Nepos’s puffs of these 
murderous military men, then almost anything can be said to be like 
almost anything else.  
The other form of transfiguration is to see the junk in the dump as 
figures or what Stevens calls “images” and what Marx, and I, would call 
the residue of consumer fetishism’s ideologies. The waste items in the 
dump, so carefully itemized by Stevens, are not exactly symbols. They are 
synecdochic examples: newspapers used as wrappings for bouquets, the 
wrapper on the can of pears, the cat in the paper bag, the corset, the tea 
box from Esthonia, spring flowers that must be discarded when they wilt 
(azaleas, trilliums, myrtle, viburnums, daffodils, blue phlox), old auto-
mobile tires, lard pails, bottles, pots, shoes, and grass. This motley assort-
ment is archeological signs of the social life of those people who have 
used and have discarded them, just as is the case with Roman or Mayan 
dumps archeologists disinter and analyze.  
Stevens’s term for the way these things in the dump are ideological 
signs of commodity fetishism, and of the state of technology at that time, 
is, as I have said, “images”: “The dump is full/Of images.” The movement 
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of “The Man on the Dump” is a complex temporal to and fro or give and 
take that attempts to move toward a repudiation or annihilation of these 
images by the man on the dump. That rejection leaves him “The Latest 
Freed Man,” as the title of the second poem after this one in the Collected 
Poems puts it. 
In “The Man on the Dump” this movement of imaginative “decre-
ation,” that sees things not as images but as they are, takes place quite 
suddenly, just after the gorgeous description of the way men and women 
copy dew in their clothes and jewelry: “One grows to hate these things 
except on the dump.” The poem opposes two kinds of time, the perpetual 
rhythm of sunset, moonrise, and then sunrise, in an endlessly repetitive 
present (“The freshness of night has been fresh a long time. The freshness 
of morning …”), to the time of culture in which things are manufactured, 
festishized as social values, and then thrown away, to remain as archeo-
logical or historical testimony in the form of images on the dump. We 
come to hate these images, to find them disgusting, like so much garbage. 
Walter Benjamin’s Angel of History, in the “Theses on the Philosophy of 
History,” faces towards the ever-growing debris of history at his feet as 
he is propelled backwards into a future he cannot see. Stevens’s man on 
the dump has his back toward history and has repudiated its images in 
“disgust” in order to face toward a future that will, he hopes, be purified 
of ideological mystifications. He knows, however, that always more such 
images will come and will need in their turn to be repudiated and junked, 
put on the dump, time after time, in an endless task of purification.  
The result of rejecting the trash is that “everything is shed.” In that 
moment of minimalist decreation so important in Stevens’s poetry, one 
sees (or thinks one sees) things as they are, without trope or deviation, in 
a double purification of both seer and seen: “the moon comes up as the 
moon/(All its images are in the dump) and you see/As a man (not like 
the image of a man)./You see the moon rise in the empty sky.”  
Such seeing without ideological distortion is extremely difficult and 
precarious. The last stanza, the most difficult lines in the poem, attests to 
that. After the lines about beating an old tin can, lard pail, as a way of get-
ting at “that which one believes,” which is “what one wants to get near,” 
the poem ends with a strange series of questions. It also returns to the 
gaudiness and tropological extravagance of the opening lines. Are these 
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just rhetorical questions or are they real questions? It is not easy to tell, 
though the question is important.  
If the stanza returns to the extravagant language of the poem’s open-
ing, after the bareness of a disgusted rejection of all the trash, it returns 
with a difference. To get near to what one believes is to get near to the self. 
The poetic self is, for Stevens, the home of the imagination. That imagi-
nation creates what Stevens calls the new “supreme fictions” by which, 
according to him, we all ought to live. For Stevens, as for Percy Bysshe 
Shelley, poets are the legislators of all mankind, or at least the makers of 
new ideological images, as well as being those who put in question the 
old images.  
For Stevens these supreme fictions are, for United Statesians, specifi-
cally American fictions based on our own landscape, our own birds and 
beasts. Stevens celebrates, in “Sunday Morning,” his version of the ideol-
ogy of the American Adam making a home in the wilderness: “Deer walk 
upon our mountains, and the quail/Whistle about us their spontaneous 
cries:/Sweet berries ripen in the wilderness” (Stevens 2006, 70). Stevens 
knew as well as did Louis Althusser (if not Marx, who was beguiled by 
the hope of an end to ideology), that when one ideology or set of cultural 
images is rejected in disgust and sent to the dump, the resulting bareness 
lasts only a brief instant. It is then replaced by a new set of cultural images. 
Stevens wanted the poet, that is, Wallace Stevens himself, the man on the 
dump, to be the begetter of this new ideology.  
The final stanza of “The Man on the Dump” obscurely projects as a 
hypothetical event that performative action in its series of puzzling ques-
tions. I take it the ear is superior to a crow’s voice in the same way that 
the imaginative self is superior to anything it can sense. That is because 
the ear can transform, through words, those sounds, for example the 
ear’s hearing of the cawing of crows, into articulate speech. That speech 
says anything the imagination likes, in sovereign domination. The next 
question I take to be an allusion and repudiation of Keats’s nightingale. 
We have no nightingales in New England. That means all those mean-
ings Keats ascribes to the nightingale are alien to the New England mind, 
however much they inhabit it, as in the echoes of Keats in this poem. 
Since the nightingale was alien to us, it tortured the ear, packed the heart, 
and scratched the mind. These are strong images of violence done to 
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body, feelings, and mind by the foreign bird. Here and now, in Hartford 
in 1942, the ear solaces itself in the sounds made by peevish birds like 
the grackle. The grackle is our equivalent of what the nightingale was 
for Keats. The poet says one finds peace on the dump, in a philosopher’s 
honeymoon. This is perhaps because the epistemological quest so central 
to philosophizing is appeased at last. Peace comes when all the images 
are on the dump, in a general purification of the mind. Then you can see 
“as a man (not like the image of a man).” That brief moment is like a hon-
eymoon because a marriage of imagination and reality is possible in that 
instant. Such a marriage is Stevens’s perpetual goal. That goal is reached 
only at brief moments if at all.  
Stevens’s philosopher appears covertly later in the stanza. In the third 
stage in the cycle from infatuation with images to throwing all those 
images on the dump to the creation of a new mythology, the poet mur-
murs “aptest eve” as he sits among the mattresses of the dead and the 
other junk on the dump. An evening free of images is aptest for the new 
performative action of poetic language. The poet says “invisible priest” 
when hearing “the blatter of grackles” because the poetic imagination 
is an invisible ubiquitous priest. That priest takes on the role of transub-
stantiation once played by priests in the literal sense. An example is his 
transformation of the blatter of grackles into poetry. That transmutation 
is happening in the lines we are at that moment reading. Such efficacious 
priests as we have these days are the poets. In an appropriation of sacer-
dotal language, the poet is, like James Joyce’s Stephen Daedalus, a “priest 
of eternal imagination, transmuting the daily bread of experience into the 
radiant body of everliving life” ( Joyce 1964, 221). The phrase “invisible 
priest,” to my ear, is another echo of Keats, in this case the sonnet, “Bright 
Star”. That poem contains the marvelous figure of “nature’s patient sleep-
less eremite,/The moving waters at their priestlike task/Of pure ablution 
round earth’s human shores” (Keats n.p.). 
That leaves the puzzling phrase “stanza my stone.” Why does the poet 
cry these words when he has ejected all the false images, pulled the day to 
pieces in a rejection of “the truth,” to replace that false hope with visions 
of a world that is always in parts? I claim that the reference is to the phi-
lospher’s stone, sought throughout the middle ages and Renaissance. It 
was a magic stone, “as hard as stone and malleable as wax,” that would 
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turn base metals into gold. “It was also sometimes believed to be an elixir 
of life, useful for rejuvenation and possibly for achieving immortality.” 
In Latin, “philosopher’s stone” is lapis philosophorem, in Greek chryso-
poeia.39 “Chrysopoeia”! That means, literally, “making gold,” but “poeia” 
is of course the root of our words “poetry” and “poet.” Stevens’s cry, 
“stanza my stone,” is a triumphant claim, just before that last line reject-
ing “the the,” that the poet’s stanza, his words on the page, is the philoso-
pher’s stone that turns the base metal, for example the blatter of our New 
England grackles, into the gold of the supreme fiction embodied in the 
words on the page. This new fiction will, in a powerful speech act, replace 
all those outworn images on the dump. Poetry is the philosopher’s stone. 
We need no other. 
~
I have sketched out a reading, a commentary or exegesis, of “The Man on 
the Dump.” You could call it a hermeneutico-poetic reading. It is not yet, 
however, the free reading, that performative reading, reading as work, as 
oeuvre that does something with words, for which Jacques Derrida calls.  
How many people really care, nowadays, for the subtleties of a poem 
by Wallace Stevens written in Hartford, Connecticut, in 1942, and read-
able in the context of social and cultural history of that time and in the 
context of Stevens’s other work? I mean, really, how many people truly 
care about such antiquarian excavations, such digging in the dump of his-
tory? I want to know why I should read this poem today, now, in October 
2015, and what use I can make of the poem for decisive action now. 
I turn now, briefly, to a more “free” reading, a performative interpreta-
tion that sees the old text as somehow a proleptic foretelling of a present 
situation. For Paul de Man a poetic reading is always allegorical in the 
specific sense de Man gave to the word “allegory,” as opposed to “sym-
bol.” “Symbols” are hermeneutic in the sense that their meaning is their 
spatial reference to something non-verbal, as we might take Stevens’s 
poem to refer to the Hartford municipal dump in 1942. An allegorical 
sign, for de Man, however, in the famous formulation in “The Rhetoric of 
Temporality,” is part of a temporalized structure in which the sign refers 
to another earlier sign of which it is a repetition, “in the Kierkegaardian 
sense of the term.” In place of de Manian allegory I put a proleptic reading 
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that sees a text as prefiguring a future event that comes to seem what the 
text predicted, foresaw, or forecast. This future chiming would also be 
a sign to sign relation, an anticipatory allegory or, perhaps, a prophecy 
or, perhaps, a miniature apocalypse in the etymological sense of an enig-
matic unveiling of what has not yet happened. Poetics has no good term 
for this different form of sign to sign relation across a temporal gap in the 
future rather than the past. “Prefiguration” is perhaps the best word we 
have, with an echo of Biblical figura, the Old Testament prefiguring the 
New. Such a miniature apocalypse is an unveiling that hides as much as 
it reveals. Models for this kind of reading might be my commentary, in 
another essay, following other critics, on the last chapter of Kafka’s Der 
Verschollene, The Man Who Disappeared. That incomplete novel is com-
monly called, without Kafka’s authority, Amerika. I see that chapter as 
an ironic foreshadowing of the Judentransporte that took so many unwit-
ting millions to the death camps.40 Other examples would be seeing, as 
Russell Samolsky does, Conrad’s Heart of Darkness as a foreshadowing 
of genocide in Rwanda (with the crucial difference that the Rwanda 
massacres were not the direct consequence of colonial violence, as were 
the massacres in Heart of Darkness). Samolsky also sees Kafka’s “In the 
Penal Colony” and Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians as foretellings or 
premonitions not just of torture under apartheid in South Africa but of 
United States’s shameful, abominable torture of prisoners in Abu Graib 
and Guantánamo Bay. We should read each in terms of the other. One 
could not easily read Coetzee’s novel today without thinking of our use 
of waterboarding and other forms of torture. A final example of such 
prospective allegory is Derrida’s “interpretation that transforms the very 
thing it interprets” of Marx in Spectres de Marx. Derrida appropriates 
Marx for our present global situation. He dreams of a New International 
that would move toward the ever-receding horizon of “the democracy 
to come.” What Derrida says goes well beyond anything Marx said and 
even disagrees with it on a crucial point. He rejects Marx’s ontologiz-
ing of material means of production as irresistibly causing ideological 
mystifications. 
What in our present situation does “The Man on the Dump” presage 
or foretell? It is impossible to read Stevens’s poem thoughtfully today 
without seeing how Stevens’s dump with its single human presence 
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anticipates our present condition, all six and a half billion and counting 
of us. We are collectively living on a planet that is becoming one gigan-
tic garbage dump. Just as Kafka’s single protagonist, Karl Rossman, fore-
shadows the six million victims of the Holocaust, so we are all now, all 
the time, men and women on a universal dump. Stevens lived in that 
happy time before we became aware of climate change, global warming, 
widespread species extinction, including the possible self-extinction of 
homo sapiens, glacial melting, rising sea-levels that will before long flood 
my two acres of beautiful shore property on Deer Isle, Maine, not to 
speak of much of Florida and Manhattan, increasingly violent storms—
hurricanes, tornadoes, typhoons, floods, forest fires—all caused by our 
collective human dumping of waste. Bats and frogs are already becom-
ing extinct. Polar bears are endangered by the melting of the ice floes on 
which their survival depends. Scientists predict that by the end of our 
century over half the world’s species will have vanished in the sixth great 
extinction. This one will, however, be caused not by asteroid-impact, 
like the one that triggered the fifth great extinction at the end of the 
Cretaceous period, but by clever human beings, homo sapiens. Human 
beings, those wise creatures, as they have become more numerous and 
have colonized the earth, have brought devastation everywhere. This dev-
astation has come along with the benefits of civilization, such as frozen 
processed foods, full of toxic chemicals, and broadband Internet service 
(Kolbert 2009, 52-63).  
Stevens’s dump was relatively sequestered in one place. It was com-
posed of relatively benign and biodegradable materials: mattresses, cor-
sets, flowers, newspapers, bottles, shoes, grass, pots, tin cans. Our present 
world-wide dump is made not only of all the non-biodegradable plastic 
and mercury-filled computer junk in our local dumps proper, but of pes-
ticides and chemical fertilizers that poison our agricultural soil and make 
it incapable of absorbing carbon-dioxide, of all the carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere from automobiles, coal-fired electricity plants, and other 
sources that is a chief contributor to global warming, of all that methane 
from domestic cows and from landfills, of all the smoke from forest-clear-
ing, of all the nuclear waste that the clever scientists do not seem to have 
foreseen would be almost impossible to dispose of safely. Huge rafts of 
floating garbage, much of it plastic, litter our oceans and wash up on our 
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beaches. The oceans’ PH level has risen, killing fish, coral, and seaweed 
worldwide. We have already taken for food about half the edible marine 
creatures in the whole ocean. Melting permafrost and melting glaciers 
reduce the reflective surface of the earth and accelerate global warming. 
Hardly a week goes by without some new evidence that global warming 
is already real and already probably irreversible. Another big chunk of the 
Greenland icecap falls into the sea, or another evidence of rising temper-
atures is recorded. 
All this devastation is striking confirmation of Jacques Derrida’s law 
of auto-co-immunity. This law is his claim that human cultures have an 
unconquerable penchant for self-destruction through their effort to make 
themselves safe. This, says Derrida, is analogous to the way the human 
body, in auto-immune diseases, destroys its own tissues. The body does 
this by way of an immune system that is supposed to protect the body 
from alien invaders, viruses and the like. All we human inhabitants of the 
earth are busy big time destroying the earth as a viable habitat. Practically 
nothing is being done to stop climate change in any way at all commensu-
rate with its rapidity. This is so in spite of the development of windpower, 
solar power, geothermal power, electric automobiles, organic farm-
ing, and the like. The latest Clean Energy Bill before the United States 
Congress has been viscerated by the lobbyists for coal-fired electricity-
producing plants and their ilk. Legislators worldwide continue to dither 
and delay. Deniers of global warming still abound. Scientists, meanwhile, 
keep saying, in surprise, that climate change is happening even faster than 
they had predicted. 
Just as Stevens figured by way of the junk on the dump the way the 
mind of the man on the dump was contaminated by cultural “images,” 
so the mind of almost everyone today is infected by vignettes about 
global warming and about the way the world has become one huge gar-
bage dump. A recent pamphlet I found in my local doctor’s office is called 
“Stop Trashing the Climate.” It has a photograph on the cover of a bull-
dozer on an apparently limitless garbage dump. The text gives statistics 
about the damage to the environment and the increase in global warm-
ing caused by our habits of dumping garbage and the use, for example, 
of incinerators or methane collecting apparatuses rather than extensive 
composting.41 
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 I watched in the ‘80s and ‘90s from my house in Irvine, California, 
the building up of a gigantic landfill about a mile away in a ravine across 
a small valley. Lines of trucks came to dump there day after day more 
trash, much of it, apparently, vegetation debris, tree branches and the 
like, but other parts apparently loads of ordinary garbage. Eventually a 
methane collection system was installed on the top of the hill, across the 
freeway. A housing development has now been built on the dump site. I 
am glad I do not live there. The inhabitants are, literally, men and women 
on the dump.  
I think also about that old story of the garbage barge in the sea off 
New York and New Jersey that kept going from one place to another 
trying, unsuccessfully, to get some garbage dump to take it, like Kafka’s 
Hunter Gracchus on his wandering death barge.  
I think of the decades spent, so far unsuccessfully, to get agreement 
about how and whether to put nuclear waste deep in Yucca Mountain 
in Nevada, or of that serio-comic story of the shipping container full of 
plastic ducks for childrens’ bathtubs that fell off a ship into the Pacific 
Ocean. Plastic ducks kept coming ashore in distant places for years. 
Who knows how many are still floating around out there, like miniature 
Flying Dutchmen.  
I think of my own local dump on Deer Isle that is now divided into 
piles of mattresses, piles of metal and plastic junk, recycling containers, 
kitchen garbage containers, and piles of wood and cardboard that are 
periodically burned, putting yet more carbon dioxide and toxic chemicals 
into the atmosphere. It will not escape my readers that the photographs I 
have taken of these sights make me the man on the dump, with camera.42 
I think also of that poisonous lake in Tennessee whose dam burst 
recently, covering a large area with toxic chemicals and heavy metals.  
I think of that picture of a beach on one of the Hawaiian Islands, cov-
ered with junk from the open ocean. As Tom Cohen observes, “what 
may now be the largest man-made feature detectable from space” is 
“the vast floating island of plastic debris that spans a large part of the 
Pacific ocean.”43 
I think of those recent stories about the breaking off of a piece of the 
Wilkins Ice Shelf in Antarctica, a piece as big as the state of Connecticut 
in the United States. 
190 J. Hillis Miller 
I think of that recent Pixar/Disney animated film, Wall-E, in which the 
earth has become uninhabitable, a huge garbage dump. All the remaining 
human beings have fled earth seeking some new habitable planet, leav-
ing behind a solitary robot, Wall-E. Wall-E was programmed to pick up 
garbage and compact it into meter-sized cubes, which he goes on and on 
doing, mechanically. He builds great walls and buildings of cubes made 
of compacted garbage.  
That the trashed earth, in this animated film, is left only with a robot 
doing what it has been programmed to do might be taken as a compact 
emblem of the way climate change, though initiated by men and women, 
is a mechanical process. That process is now proceeding apace beyond 
our control, just as human auto-immunity is a non-human process. It is 
a result of something that has gone wrong with an immune system. That 
system works automatically, for our good or ill. Our consciousness does 
not have any control over it. The immune system just goes on working, 
blindly, as chemicals and genes program it to do. Another analogy is way 
computer nerds concocted the computer programs that were necessary to 
create complex derivatives and credit default swaps. Now, however, these 
programs operate, as bankers now probably truthfully say, beyond human 
comprehension or control, like robots gone wild. The banks and other 
financial institutions claim, perhaps truthfully, that they have no way of 
knowing how many billions or even trillions they are collectively in debt 
beyond their available assets. The parallel with climate change is betrayed 
in the way we speak of “toxic assets” and “global financial meltdown.”  
Many human beings live today not just on the global dump, but pros-
thetically connected to it much of the time, as when we watch TV, use 
an iPod or an iPhone, or a computer connected the Internet. While giv-
ing this paper in oral form, I used an Internet “connection” by way of the 
Wild Blue Satellite service to bring down from cyberspace the photo-
graphs that are signs we are trashing the climate. The global trash heap 
is us. We are not separate from it. It is an extension of our bodies and 
minds. Stevens’s protagonist is a single man meditating on a local dump. 
We are now six and a half billion men and women plugged into a world-
wide toxic garbage dump. Our future, perhaps, if Wall-E is right, is to 
vanish, leaving behind a single surviving garbage-compacting robot on a 
global trash heap. 
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Another version of our modern man on the dump is that New Yorker 
cover by Dan Clowes for the June 8 & 15, 2009 issue. It is entitled 
“Future Generations.” The picture shows a little green man from outer 
space. He has come to earth from his flying saucer overhead. The back-
ground shows an uninhabited Manhattan overrun with vegetation and 
green vines or green slime. This alien is sitting in a dump entirely made 
of smashed computer parts, CDs, and the like, and surrounded by broken 
walls. He is reading a book.  
The importance of the model of the machinal or mechanical as 
opposed to the organic or consciousness-organized is hinted at by 
the importance these days of the word “apparatus.” The word names a 
machinelike assemblage put together by human beings to do some kind 
of work or other. We speak of a “photographic apparatus,” or of a “dredg-
ing apparatus.” Wall-E is a robotic apparatus for compacting garbage. We 
also, however, speak of our “security apparatus” as a name for the inter-
locking agencies that led to torturing at Abu Graib and Guantánamo Bay. 
Michel Foucault used the word dispositif, translated into English as “appa-
ratus,” as a name for the machine-like working of the whole social-legal-
governmental-financial bureaucratic assemblage in a given society at a 
given time. A willing worker for such an apparatus is called, in Sovietese, 
an “apparatchik.” This apparatus, said Foucault, is “a thoroughly hetero-
geneous set consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, 
regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, 
philosophical, moral, and philanthropic propositions—in short, the said 
as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus.”44 Today 
Foucault might have added to this litany of the wielders of power the 
media, including the Internet. Althusser includes the media among ISAs, 
Ideological State Apparatuses, in his famous essay on ideology’s interpel-
lations. It is a feature of this all-embracing social apparatus that it operates 
on its own, robot-like. What it brings about is “Nobody’s Fault,” to cite the 
title Dickens first presciently intended for Little Dorrit, with its Kafka-like 
presentation of the Circumlocution Office. The latter is the model of an 
efficient bureaucracy that just goes on and on, like the Energizer bunny, 
doing its intended work of procrastination, in a way parallel to the legal 
system in Kafka’s Der Prozeß (The Trial). As Barack Obama is discover-
ing, it is extremely difficult to alter such an apparatus in any fundamental 
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way. It is a Herculean job, for example, to clean the Augean stables of our 
present catastrophic health-care apparatus and replace it with the only 
sensible form, single-payer universal health-care run by the government 
and paid for by taxes. Obama fell into the trap, during a press conference 
about health care, of answering a question about Henry Lewis Gates Jr.’s 
arrest. Obama’s response (saying the police acted “stupidly” by arresting 
a man in his own home who had committed no crime beyond protest-
ing to the police officer) gave the media a chance to create a great storm 
of controversy. This successfully turned attention away from the urgent 
necessity of health care reform if the United States is not to go bankrupt. 
Suicidal auto-immune responses like this can be seen every day in the 
media and in the behavior of our legislators. 
I think, finally, of that recent story in the Huffington Post about 
an expedition to the summit of Mount Everest confirming that the 
Himalaya glaciers are rapidly melting, that the glacial lakes there are get-
ting bigger and threatening to burst their ice dams and inundate the vil-
lages below. The melting ice and snow have exposed all the debris from 
previous expeditions. “Mountaineers in the past habitually left behind 
their climbing gear, tents, empty oxygen bottles and food wraps, leading 
to Everest being dubbed the ‘world’s highest garbage dump.’” The expedi-
tion brought down to base camp from near the summit 11,000 pounds of 
garbage.45  
The last thing in Stevens’s mind when he wrote “The Man on the 
Dump” in 1942 was the coming of catastrophic climate change as a result 
of the whole earth becoming a garbage dump. The poem itself, however, 
I claim, “dreamed the epoch to come,” or, rather, a free or performative 
interpretation today would see Stevens’s poem as foreshadowing our sit-
uation by that reverse allegory I have described. In such an allegory pres-
ent image metaleptically echoes beforehand future event, preposterously, 
in an act of foreseeing. Climate change in itself is invisible. It is only vis-
ible in the signs of it. Those signs, such as the verbal vignettes I have pre-
sented, and indeed the host of photographic images to which they may be 
linked, resonate allegorically, in a reverse allegorical sign to sign relation, 
with the verbal signs in Stevens’s poem. One way to define my reading 
would be to call it an allegorical interpretation not of Stevens’s poem, but 
Reading Paul de Man While Falling into Cyberspace 193
of all those present-day images of global climate change as interpreted 
prophetically by Stevens’s poem. 
What then of the move in the last stanza of Stevens’s poem to a claim 
that the poet is the supreme artificer who will create the supreme fic-
tions by which we can live better lives? The good poet constantly makes 
up new image clusters that will just as constantly find their way to the 
dump. I do not think that heroic concept of the poet’s role has much pur-
chase these days. A free or transformative reading of Stevens’s poem, such 
I have sketched out, would rather claim that a reading for today is either 
an instigation to urgent action to do what we can to “stop trashing the cli-
mate,” or a way of facing up to what is happening to us, as the water rises 
to inundate our coasts and as species after species goes extinct. You can 
take your pick. You can be either a watcher or a doer. I claim this essay is 
a form of doing things with words and other images, even if what it does 
is only to cry, “Get ready. The end of the world is coming.” It is, perhaps, 
distinctively human to bear witness, to use language to testify that cata-
strophic climate change is happening and is going to happen.

Notes
Preface 
1. Here, again, we would extend a point made by Latour. The correct response 
to climate-change denial is not to insist upon absolute certainty and the cold 
hard facts of science, for it is the notion of a truth that cannot be contested or 
narrated otherwise—the criteria of being beyond all doubt—that places an 
undue and impossible pressure on science. What we are contesting in today’s 
narrative of the Anthropocene is that genesis is anthropogenic; what has 
taken place, over centuries is a series of thefts, substitutions, justifications, 
reparations and triumphs. If today we accuse “humanity” or “anthropos” 
of scarring the planet, and then attribute this intention to an agent—
capitalism—such that “we” might then be otherwise, we are taking part in a 
history of inscription and rhetoric.  
2. Or, a snowstorm is a snowstorm: it does not mean that global warming is a lie, 
nor is it a sign that we must act now to survive. Snow storms, unemployment 
figures, stories about illegal immigrants stealing our jobs, statistics regarding 
the dependence of the US economy on illegal immigrant labor, the shooting of 
unarmed African Americans by law enforcement officers, the election of the 
first black US president, the IPCC report on rising sea levels, alongside more 
dire warnings—all confront us, and need to be read. These are neither signs of 
a conspiracy, nor of an absolute imperative for humanity to regroup; not one 
of these inscriptions is the cause, or ground, or truth of the other.  
3. What we contest is that one matter stands for or speaks the truth 
about another.  
Chapter One
4. Norman Myers and Andrew H. Knoll, writing in 2001, cast the question 
of mass extinctions in the context of a future biotic crisis—that the 
“anthropocene’s” drastic deletion of biodiversities reduces the combinant 
store of options for post-anthropoid “life,” and that even the wash and rinse 
period of five million years or so when mass extinctions begin sorting out 
new arcades of life forms would be crippled: “The biotic crisis overtaking our 
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planet is likely to precipitate a major extinction of species. That much is well 
known. Not so well known but probably more significant in the long term 
is that the crisis will surely disrupt and deplete certain basic processes of 
evolution, with consequences likely to persist for millions of years. Distinctive 
features of future evolution could include a homogenization of biotas, a 
proliferation of opportunistic species, a pest-and-weed ecology, an outburst 
of speciation among taxa that prosper in human-dominated ecosystems, 
a decline of biodisparity, an end to the speciation of large vertebrates, the 
depletion of “evolutionary powerhouses” in the tropics, and unpredictable 
emergent novelties. Despite this likelihood, we have only a rudimentary 
understanding of how we are altering the evolutionary future. As a result of 
our ignorance, conservation policies fail to reflect long-term evolutionary 
aspects of biodiversity loss. Human activities have brought the Earth to the 
brink of biotic crisis. Many biologists (e.g., refs. 1–5) consider that coming 
decades will see the loss of large numbers of species. Fewer scientists—
witness the lack of professional papers addressing the issue— appear to have 
recognized that, in the longer term, these extinctions will alter not only 
biological diversity but also the evolutionary processes by which diversity 
is generated. Thus, current and predicted environmental perturbations 
form a double-edged sword that will slice into both the legacy and future of 
evolution” (Meyers and Knoll 2001, 5389-5390).  
5. At issue is, of course, not just the flat, morose, aura-less words that have 
circulated in this zone, architected for failure, nor the mediacratic as 
well as psycho-telic streams of climate denialism—basic modes of affect 
manipulation, perpetual ambiguation, invitations to side with a crafted 
“we” and defer incomprehension, theological invocations, and the parade of 
American double-talk that have earned the leader of the “free world” such 
skepticism and cynical resentment abroad as the “one superpower.” Its lead 
Senator on committee an oil shill decrying perpetual “climate hoax,” its 
Florida governor forbidding the use of “climate change” for state employees, 
even a Yale program dedicated to climate communication settling for a poll 
on which is better “climate change” or “global warming” for the commoner 
(the latter, because it’s hot at least). But, then, we were addressing in parallel 
the academic, humanist, Leftist, and critical theory blinds that, broadly 
and with exception, maintained or do the same denialist posture due to 
investment and, of course, recoil. As Dipesh Chakrabarty remarks in closing 
out a “post-colonialist” modem before the logics of extinction and climate 
change (still, human on human, utopist, empathetic to its imagined “others”), 
these twentieth-century modes and historicist modes not only fuel the 
ecocidal acceleration but relapse before its thought (Chakrabarty 2009). Most 
interesting, since the recoil against so called linguistic pre-occupations and 
“deconstruction” specifically, Derrida’s choice to leave this unaddressed in his 
late and last writing, for reasons one might speculate as both structural and 
risky to his project as a legacy work, mimed unaware climate denialism—and, 
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inversely, damaged his currency by avoiding just this intersection. Is it not 
surprising, by now, that we have no rhetoric of “climate change” written yet?  
6. In choosing the proper name Anthropocene over, say, Sinocene, when the 
latter arguably has the longest running terrestrial civilization but is the 
most numerous and consequent to twenty-first century impasses, a subtle 
adjustment is made, a card held under the pack, beyond the obvious Western 
nominal land grab—though the Chinese might know not to take ownership. 
That adjustment is the assignation of this “epoch” to an alphabeticist 
writing trajectory, a telos-inflected grammar (sentence narration), a nihilist-
monotheist arc, a technological “era of the Book” and theologization of a 
priest-hermeneut class, and the abstractions of an “Enlightenment” premise 
never lived and posited for “them” (as Conrad’s Kurtz might explain). 
Ecocide would—misleadingly or not—not be assigned to the temporalities 
and techno-organizations of the pictographic cognitive script, with its re-
aligning dashes and disjunct vocals, absent psychotic mono-gods, overrun 
by “industrial revolutions” and the fertilities of intra-state competition and 
dueling commerical imperiums.  
7. “If…
 
collective individuation, like psychic individuation, is a process of 
adoption, and though this adoption is in part linked to what Freud called 
‘identification’, the question of the we is that of its consistence insofar as it does not 
exist (just as spirits do not exist, any more than phantoms or ghosts, which 
does not prevent them from being effective: this is what is referred to as 
symbolic efficacy)” (Stiegler 2014, 12). 
8. Someday, when the prospect of an angel doesn’t get readers hot and bothered 
to identify with it at any price, Benjamin’s chastened scrutinizers will realize 
they’d been had, and that the too-renowned Angel of History Benjamin gives 
a sentence or so to before literally annihilating it in his Theses was a front and 
bait for the very identificatory and recuperative takes on him he disowned 
in the first theses—that, say, of the Marxist dialectician (Adorno) and the 
theo-hebraic allegorist (Scholem). Benjamin had already identified Klee’s 
“new angel” with something more ferocious, without anthropomorphic 
accoutrement (no ruddy cheeks, nice wings, no fake sorrowful back glances 
at his own hypocrisy toward the dead readers looking to his face). In the essay 
on “Karl Kraus” it appears, succinctly, as the Unmensch, and it is particularly 
angled against Nietzsche’s Overman, whose rhetorical fireworks Benjamin 
regarded still as romantic hedging—human, all too human, Zarathustra’s 
animals notwithstanding: “This must be borne in mind if one is to understand 
the urgency with which he decried the dancing pose affected by Nietzsche—
not to mention the wrath with which the monster (Unmensch) was bound to 
great the Superman (Ubermensch)” [Benjamin 1986, 452]; “One must have 
followed Loos… , heard the stellar Esperanto of Scheerbart’s creations, or 
seen Klee’s New Angel (who preferred to free men by taking from them, 
rather than make them happy by giving to them) to understand a humanity 
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that proves itself by destruction” [456]; “Neither purity nor sacrifice mastered 
the demon; but where origin and destruction come together, his reign is 
over. Like a creature sprung from the child and the cannibal, his conqueror 
stands before him not a new man—a monster, a new angel…. Angelus—that 
is the messenger in the old engravings.” [457] In turn, in the rhetorically 
bifurcated Thesis IX, this Unmensch returns not as the duped and annihilated 
“Angel of History” (or, more in synch, historicism), but what displaced him 
and his face—what is called, in climactic jargon, the vortex of a “Storm” 
(Sturm replaces the grammatical subject in the successive sentence). At once 
destroying force without any possible anthropomorphism, tied to technic 
accelerations (“Progress”) and to inscriptions (“the old engravings”).  
9. I had been asked sometimes to clarify an argument put forth that Paul de Man 
is best read as a writer avant la lettre of the era of climate change—though I 
concede that I resent a bit being prodded to this question. I have changed my 
sense of this, as well. At least, I no longer recommend pursuing what I use de 
Man to index as a missing piece in the thinking of “climate change,” at least, 
not without goggles, a semio-biotic lens, and a sense of the comic void of any 
recuperative reflex. In a sense, I resign from this assignment, but I will try to 
indicate why. If I no longer recommend de Man as a hidden counter-stroke, 
it is not because the argument is not cogent. Rather, it is because of the way 
that it is cogent. To give this a little piquancy: can one posit something like 
a literary structure to “climate change,” one that even guarantees ecocide, due 
to a regime of hermeneutics instituted reactively to the hyposcripts out of 
which perceptual grids, referential conventions, and agreed upon memes form 
a discrete but totalizing closure—for which the critical probes of extending 
itself to new others remains a strategy of sustainability?  
10. However, part of the passive violence of the digital transcription of 
“everything” (archives, “data”) is the quiet retirement of the humanualist 
template (clearly run down by the time Derrida stalked its mechanisms), 
that is, of the hand in favor of fingers, digitalia. (This may supplant the 
humanualist with, in Jonty Tiplady’s phrase to me in an e-mail, the “who-
digitalian.”) One types, no longer handling a pen or stylus to scratch. Tone 
no longer holds (conceptually). This loss of the privilege of hands would echo 
a retirement of an economy of face. Fingers make contact point (typing), fan 
into spider dances, reduce the affective counters and expanse of the skin-sack 
to pixels and points—redesigned as the “mimetic” screen. See Tom Cohen, 
“Tactless—the Severed Hand of JD” [Cohen 2009].  
11. This does no more than “see” light as a technic (pyrotechnic) itself, as what 
precedes the trope of a fiat lux, and the binary division of a light defined by 
its binarization through darkness, blackness, an absence that confirms its 
presence: but the technics of “light” includes, nuclear fission aside, waves, 
frequencies, spectrums of invisibility, hence interval, absence, “blackness” in 
advance—for which, in turn, the tropologies of blackness are inadequate (and 
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privative). For discussions assuming, advancing, or interrogating this premise 
as that of digitalization, see Cubitt, Palmer and Tkacz (2015).  
12. “Corporations are, theologically speaking, institutions of death. They 
commodify everything—the natural world, human beings—that they exploit 
until exhaustion or collapse. They know no limits. There are no impediments 
now to corporations. None. And what they want is for us to give up. They want 
us to become passive. They want us to become tacitly complicit in our own 
destruction” (Hedges 2013). 
13. https://vidrebel.wordpress.com/2011/11/10/catherine-austin-fitts-the-black-
budget-and-the-leveraged-buyout-of-the-world-using-stolen-money/ 
14. The “epistemology of tropes”—as de Man characterizes it—is given textbook 
rendition in parts of Nietzsche’s fragment, and the premise for de Man’s 
use of the text (a fragment of a sentence) can be read as its displacement. 
For de Man, this critique is essential, unavoidable to arrest cognitive 
automatisms and highlight the essentially subjectless position of mnemonic 
epistemologies, but not an end in itself. Its trajectory leads beyond itself, 
as “tropes” are put in question collectively as substitutive chains that, in 
the end, merge, mime one another, find themselves totalized (in a vortex), 
or as neutered as the term ideology today (which these parallel as aesthetic 
confabulations). They are also diversions and evasions of “material” events 
or inscriptions that, outside of phenomenality, project and give rise to 
the then antithetical play of tropes (doxa, “perceptual” consciousness, 
ideology, cognitive automatism, hermeneutic relapse). That tropes guide 
or foreclose affect and cognitive effect is hardly news to tele-marketing 
whizzes (consumerist and political), whose science of designer metaphors 
and corn-brewed “affect” is trumped only by post-communist nations’ 
unrivalled psy-ops and propaganda science (it helps if one’s legacy is that 
there is only propaganda—that is, rhetorics of power—but, over time, 
doesn’t help if that’s reduced to crude slogans and mono-cultural fantasy). 
Enter de Man, who puts his foot in this door but feigns timidity over what 
lay on the other side, something which would not accommodate dialectic 
binaries, personification or perceptibility. While the most transparent title 
in this regard is “The Epistemology of Metaphor” [de Man 1979], this first 
premise—that substitutive tropes and their death-cycles program cognitive 
and affective processes—permeates Allegories of Reading [de Man, 1979]. The 
“epistemology of tropes” precedes so-called ideology critique, since like the 
former, “ideologies” replace one another as content for a similar platform 
or regime of reference, perceptual hallucination, narrative editing. One can 
criticize one from the position of another, seemingly, but not exit the vortex: 
which explains why both the utopic left and the utopic right (Banksters and 
their minions) fuel the ecocidal acceleration. Here is where the late de Man 
both extends and muddles what is no longer a dialectic puzzle or temporal 
construct when, in “Kant and Schiller,” he improvises (it is a transcribed 
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talk) that, despite the “irreversibility” of what appears a movement from 
an essential “critique of the epistemology of tropes,” one does not arrive at 
a “performative” alternative (that would simply occur regardless) nor, he 
insists, does one revert (“reversal”) into the tropological foreclusure—what 
facilitates, say, climate change denialism and invisibility. The hermeneutic 
fold back that is more or less reflexive or inescapable is only a “relapse,” not 
a reversion, something is clawed forward, and he will leave this movement 
hanging in the figure of the “passage” between an epistemology of tropes 
and the language of power, a “passage” that is in perpetual question except as 
passage. My guess is that the word “relapse” had a special resonance for the 
cancer-stricken de Man, whose green light prognosis at the time would very 
soon, and suddenly, convert to kill him. So there is the implied door-stop: 
this does not all disappear with the “relapse,” the hermeneutic recuperation 
(as occurs routinely in Derridean “deconstruction”): something happens; 
one, we, it, does not revert, it remains, a la Benjamin, a one-way street, and 
so on. Thus de Man in “Kant and Schiller”: “the passage from a conception 
of language as a [cognitive tropological] system... to another conception 
of language” [de Man, 1997, 132]. And: “There is a difference, a progress 
made, it cannot return despite this refold—the “relapse” harbors the seeds 
of a next fumigation: “[A]nd as such [it] is not a reversal, it’s a relapse. And a 
relapse … is not the same; it has to be distinguished in a way which I am only 
indicating here but which would require much more refined formulation—the 
recuperation, the relapse has to be distinguished from a reversal”[de Man, 
1997, 133]. And yet, in fact, it serves to extend the domain of the reversal, if 
you like, giving inverse birth, which is to say marking, to the irreversible. The 
improvization needs a supplement, certainly from the twenty-first century 
and following the pan-archival digital transcription and totalized “data” 
harvesting since accelerated, as if the latter had read de Man on “aesthetic 
ideology” for pointers, inversely, on the capture of “inscriptions” themselves, 
the control of the sensorium as of assigned debt. There never was nor needed 
to be “reversal,” the “relapse” is all there ever was and simulates reversion; 
in fact, the “irreversible” requires the step beyond that had from the earliest 
inhabited de Man’s artifice (his dissertation, “The Rhetoric of Temporality” 
and before). But if the “epistemological critique of tropes” is inescapable, 
it also expires as a sort of painted doorway. All tropes appear substitutive 
maneuvers with interchangeable ends, a perpetual system one can neither exit 
from nor exceed by outwitting. This parallels so-called “ideology critique”: 
one can “criticize” one ideology from the perspective of another, which would 
replace it, but both are modeled on, and substitute different “contents” for, the 
same aesthetic regime and programs of reference, identification, promissory 
time, and the same conversion of inscriptions into hallucinatory totalities and 
perceptual projections. Thus the premise of aesthetic ideology, which departs 
from a shared program of reference and perception out of which so-called 
ideologies occur (interchangeably, like tropes). This is why the progressive 
leftist and the petro-banker converge in fueling the ecocidal acceleration, 
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without exit. De Man, Claire Colebrook has opines, did not go far enough—
and he did not, in any case, attend a twenty-first century environment where 
pan-archival digital transcription and pre-emptive streaming would both 
enforce and disassociate closed circuits of “tropes” as a controlled perma-
environment, a mode of capture still refining itself and anticipating the leap 
to simple implants. It would not be that, say, heliotropism pervades and 
misinforms the figural chains of the West, as a revelation to consider, but that 
the illusion of a trope of “light” retro-posited by that regime yields, today, 
an entire template of “Enlightenment” stitchings detached, fully, from the 
mafiatized institutions that re-run those rhetorics as amoral gameboards—
moreso, as the flood of climate refugees, random “genocides,” the writing 
off of peripheral “states” and populations, and so on, proceeds into an era 
of managed extinction (for the disposable populations as the bottle neck 
approaches. De Man’s disinterest in psycho-analysis was the same as that 
in the ping-pong of “ideology critique,” each never left the epistemology of 
tropes 2.0. 
15. One can decide, as Bernard Stiegler does (2013a), that this coalesces in the 
arche-cinematic event of the cave paintings, a cinematized model subject 
to torch-waved shadows, the inception of a vision tracking movement (and 
identifying mimetic animemes with the hunt (and its hermeneutics), the 
inception of extinction events (the megafauna of the first screens would be 
the first to go, regurgitated, perhaps, in Spielberg’s dinosaur re-animation 
trope for cinema), duly codified in Plato’s allegory of the cave and resonant 
in the cavernous multiplexes of today, the cemetery parks of cinema—
finally dissolved into the direct neural engagement of interactive screens, 
digital implants, honed mediacratic trances and the industrial redesign 
(“proletarianization”) of the senses themselves. 
16. Any telepolis simulates and swarms with algorithms of identification and 
coded referents, traversed by the strictly formal calculus of “data”: everything 
is of the order of inscription so long as it appears anything but that, offered 
as the efficiency of rhymed anaesthetizing drug hits. Moreover, since this 
final avatar of the arche-cinematic cave is totalized, it not only censors the 
rushes and practices pre-emptive forensics, soon to be genetic, but both 
scripts and hacks memory regimes and “reality.” As we see today, telepoloi may 
be encompassing but arrive in competing variants, edited or warring with 
one another ostensibly (since that may always be for marketing purposes). 
The telepolis precedes nationalist “content” (cultural and linguistic), we 
see divergent warring regimes and models positioning for the resource 
wars gathering. China would re-cycle a sort of “cultural revolution” lite 
meme, eschewing textbooks with “western values” together with corporate 
presence—and as the “western” telepolis is de-centered or exposed as running 
on Potemkin “Enlightenment” fronts ignored the corporate imperatives and 
the cartels of a klepto-mediacratic elite, others re-center: as, with a hyperbolic 
and derisive edge, Putin’s “Russia” has, closing its media and, increasingly, 
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internet off to the despised “west,” generating a war economy for a return 
that returns to the tsars and Stalin, to World War II and the medieval princes 
(anything, that is, except the Mongol occupation). The phrase “media 
ecologies” had been used, perhaps too tamely, to suggest what have become 
small and large, differentiating and warring, closed media “economies” that 
are, simultaneously, in a permanent war setting. The telepolis unadventurously 
names the simulant place without place of the shaped and enclosed digital 
streams, the gaming of totalized tropes dissociated from inscriptions and a 
real that is fully hacked—then taken for the latter (Cohen 2014). 
17. “Autobiography as De-Facement” (de Man 1979b) is de Man’s titular or 
iconic treatment of de-facement, but its implied logics permeates unrelated 
formulations, such as, in “Genesis and Geneaology (Nietzsche)”: “The 
tradition is caught in a non-dialectical notion of a subject-object dichotomy, 
revealing a more or less deliberate avoidance of the moment of negation 
that coincides, for Hegel, with the emergence of the true Subject” (de 
Man 1979, 80). 
18. “[T]he time of hyperobjects is an age of hypocrisy, weakness, and lameness”; 
and: “Humans have entered an era of hypocrisy” (Morton 2013, 24). Morton’s 
para-ethical shift to grand style hyperbolism is, in fact, warranted by the 
semiosis claimed for the hyperobject—in effect, Morton’s friendly death 
hug to OOO by taking the “object” hyper (the subject-object rhetoric as 
perma-trap). The underlying import of the claimed disconnect between the 
current sensorium regimes and their referential skeins points, however, in 
the alternate direction from the viscously ensconcing hyperobjects beyond 
phenomenal access: that is, toward modes of hyposcript, such as inscriptions, 
that are sealed off from perceptual access—where Morton’s examplary 
hyperobject, oil, passes into the liquidation of carbon and imprints (ink), 
and the permeability of organisms and forms of animation in this perpetual 
projection loop. If the era of hypocrisy and weakness accords, say, with Wall 
St. insider casino plays, the end-running or gaming of all “laws,” or the “short-
circuiting” (Stiegler) of pure technics taking itself as target, we have returned 
to the pre-moment of initiation of the arche-cinematic, “light,” and the 
archival premises of “anthropos” in a modum of pure, faux Promethean theft.  
19. Bernard Stiegler’s reclamation of an arche-cinematics (as “older” than 
Derridean arche-writing), and its claim to span up to the “death” of cinema 
in its digital transcription in today’s multiplexes opens, decisively, a non 
“Western” technics that is only partly exploited as Stiegler invests in the 
socio-tropological imaginaries architected from Simondon’s (faintly yet 
in fact non-Nietzschean) weaves of “trans-individuation” (Stiegler 2010, 
2014). It may be that, with the “proletarianization of the senses” a fait 
accompli rather than a process to be reversed, he turns further toward the 
facticity of hypomnemata themselves (the order of material inscriptions). 
The arche-cinematic needs, he knows, to be other than metaphoric, a 
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modus of “consciousness” production as well as that of perceptual regimes: 
“‘Consciousness’ would then be this post-production center, this control room 
assembling the montage, the staging, the realization, and the direction, of the 
flow in primary, secondary, and tertiary retentions, of which the unconscious, 
full of protentional possibilities (including the speculative), would be the 
producer.” [Stiegler 2010: 28] What need be reversed in the culture of this 
metaphorics, which includes by negative default the closet mimeticisms 
of cinema studies, is the narrative that a “cut” is introduced by the editing 
process of material “pieces of film” (Hitchcock), as if disruptively, rather than 
that “cut” pre-inhabiting linguistic consciousness (Cohen 2016). 
20. The Western remainder of the anthropoid trajectory finds itself (justly) 
trolled from all sides in its geopolitical death by a thousand cuts and, 
inversely, superficial ubiquity. By Putin, clearly, but most notably in black-
faced ISIS, which presents itself as a reverse anthropomorphism and 
death cult, out-miming internet web-sites, curtailing French TV stations, 
subsuming video-game imaginaries and HBO aesthetics (Game of Thrones). 
The beheading videos of Western faces mocks and plays the Western 
addiction to face and mimeticism. ISIS defaces—not only the ancient 
temples and cultural treasures but the tele-streaming totalization that posits 
itself as hyper-industrial modernity, “the West,” yet whose teleological 
fantasies project escapist singularities. In this battle of the two nihilisms, the 
Western anthropos and his faceless, Ebola-like, decapitating, mass killing 
other—an “other” no Judith Butler could step in to empathize with—Žižek 
is disappointed in the fake “fundamentalism,” seeing it as envious of what it 
rejects—even if that is the comfort and security and sexual ease of last man 
culture: “It may appear that the split between the permissive First World 
and the fundamentalist reaction to it runs more and more along the lines 
of the opposition between leading a long satisfying life full of material and 
cultural wealth and dedicating one’s life to some transcendent cause. Is this 
antagonism not the one between what Nietzsche called “passive” and “active” 
nihilism? We in the West are the Nietzschean Last Men, immersed in stupid 
daily pleasures, while the Muslim radicals are ready to risk everything, 
engaged in the struggle up to their self-destruction” (Žižek, 2013). Gaining 
admiring analyses from cineastes, and having forced Obama to do the last 
thing he wanted to (open yet another Middle East war, particularly one 
the liquid and techno-evolutionary ISIS could, like Russia’s “hybrid” war, 
simply win). 
21. Let us leave aside whether “correlationism” is another name for a more 
subdued routine of the past (mimeticism, Heidegger’s Adequatio, de Man’s 
descriptivity, Benjamin’s “historicism,” et al.). Meillassoux stages this break 
with something of a dummy front, misleadingly familiar if hyperbolized as 
what it is not: the great error of 20th century confabulations was linguistic 
fetishism, like “deconstruction.” Yet in positing what it definitively dismisses 
in opting for, well, totem words (“the absolute,” “infinity,” “randomness”) 
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the power of the gesture as an assertion beyond the closing and closed order 
of inertial philosophemes and consumerist thought, he creates a hologram 
“unconscious” that leaks back—quite aside from miming the errata out of 
which something like deconstruction (arose around the materialities of 
semio-mnemonic “consciousness”). The closed orders of what lies outside 
the 21st philosophemic toolbox is not the absolute but climate change, 
bio-material mutations, the permeabilities of the inorganic, and the closing 
tele-imaginaries streamed incessantly that no magical “OOO” can claw 
down, even when moving productively to the peripheries (objects require 
subjects, even self-denying ones, and literary descriptives). Thus for 
Meillassoux, the return of the suppressed and denied is fairly immediate—
as when the exemplar will be a close reading of Mallarme’s Un Coup de des, 
or in the literalization of an arche-fossil that, purportedly, proves to the 
neo-philosophic saint (theology returns with a vengeance) that a world 
existed and exists and will exist outside of anthropos’ “consciousness” (now 
largely managed and streamed), since that needed proof by way of a trace. 
Meillassoux, in short, rediscovers de Manian randomness and Benjaminian 
“prehistory,” not to mention trace, while clothing his prose in swinging 
incense fumes. The desire to be free of fossils leads to a logic of future fossils 
(Barikin, 2004). It is not the “prison-house of language” that requires escaping 
(itself an ideologeme misreading Nietzsche for an imaginary left polemic) but 
the “prison-house” of generated referential, tele-political streams, mnemo-
technic regimes, “correlationist” habits and conventions—the undead order 
of “tropological systems” digitally totalized and grammaticized.  
22. “Face” is always double tapped. It must (it seems instantaneously) archive, 
recognize, then passively cite itself—rather like anything identified by 
“consciousness” as perception, experience, or even the “I.” And like any 
identifiable perception (“phenomenalization”), is a composed and redacted 
citation—as a photograph is, despite its plead to index. Like the cinematic cut, 
which used to be marketed as a radical effect but now is recognized to barely 
catch up with “consciousness’” own mnemonic jump-cut editing of hourly 
rushes, the effect of coalescing or crediting a face of the friend, a core survival 
imperative of groups, seems instantaneous. Apparently any Anthropocene era 
will only be possible to name once this fellow, anthropos, is fully composite 
and displayed as an embedded algorithm. The problem is, perhaps, that the 
moment “anthropomorphism” becomes readable as other than a trope, as 
an invasive alien software that hides among and then freezes their ability 
to generate substitutive chains or transport—when it becomes, as it were, 
totalized—then any retirement of a culture of face implicitly involves the 
retirement of an entire story arc and trajectory of the very figural systems 
that manage cognition and knowledge bases. There would be not just a 
sedimentation of dead metaphor, but an evacuation of aura or mourning from 
figures that no longer function, are even figural, or perform their services. 
The good news might be that once you double tap face, you implicitly double 
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tap everything, which would appear to create an opening to reset without 
relapsing into the image of the oikos that, essentially, had performed as the 
cave, butcher shop, or reserve imaginary cavity in which interiorities would 
be proprietized, defended in advance, rendered a counter-chronotopic 
anchor or enclave, or what Wallace Stevens’ calls “the jar.” But if an era of face 
were retired what Derrida identified as humanualism—the determination 
of “human” difference by the technicity of the hand, going back to the cave 
painting—would also be closed with our being aware particularly. The not 
inglorious hand, and its ally the eye, are affiliates of face and adhere to the 
latter’s mirage of a full spectrum senses management center (nose, tongue, ears, 
and so on), a head or Capo. Everything that then went by the name human, 
as an essential property, including humanualism in Derrida’s formulation, 
but certainly including affect, identification, mimetic regimes, referentials, 
and mourning appear, rather than as core and defining traits (the heart, say), 
as the product of an artifacted and whirring citational circuit. It is less a 
question of a ghost in the machine than a machine that is the ghost. Of course, 
what is discretely implied is also the sudden retirement of the humanualist 
network, since the hand is now replaced by pixels and digitalia. Unlike the 
hand, which iconizes technics, touch, holding (conceptualizing), and proffers 
broad contact with body surfaces, fingers are multiplex, channel strikes and 
numbers, and are associated with mnemonic gadgets, and tap keys. But not 
only has the body not itself been told of this change, but during that gap of 
composition between cinematic cuts and the completed montage, narrative 
resin is secreted, and pasted back as a recuperated. The digital double taps “the 
body” and instantly knows how to counterfeit continuity—face identification, 
mimetic kazoos, and all this, the better to stream, harvest, and control. This 
seems obvious in the present, from corporate streams of climate denialists 
to Hollywood’s “consciousness industry” (Stiegler). Hollywood, of course, 
has been quick to market climate disaster flicks in concert with corporate 
logics: Cli-Fi blockbusters and post-apocalyptic rants, mock-Biblical updates 
and earth-ending wormhole travel, and so on—each of which, oddly enough, 
allays anxiety in three ways: first, they all have survivors that regenerate a 
new future (it will be ok—well, someone will); second, they familiarize with 
all variety of catastrophe logics, so whatever arrives will remain familiar; 
and third, the public feel they’ve already seen the movie (even as they are 
subliminally instructed that “climate change” is to be ignored). With the 
politics of managed extinction well underway, with financial engineering at 
the forefront, “Hollywood” retains a privileged, entirely endemic, role.  
23. This phantasmagoric essay returns, otherwise, to a core negotiation: a 
sentence fragment from “On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense,” a text 
fragment that (along with Birth of Tragedy) would define de Man’s “Nietzsche” 
and, if you like, Nietzsche’s “de Man”—the stripping away of all rhetorics of 
existential pathos before the “aesthetic” technogenesis of mnemonic power, 
material referential and perceptual regimes, “consciousness,” and specifically 
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in rhetorical terms. What is overlooked is that this essay of Nietzsche’s begins 
not as a scan of the tropological nature of words and dead words in cognitive 
tapestries but a questioning of the very role of “intellect” in the hominid 
trajectory—a pointing to where the automations of disembodied logics persist 
in relation to “life” (and against the backdrop of said creatures’ momentary 
appearance on (and disappearance from) the planetary and cosmic stage. The 
preoccupation of the late de Man with defacement turns against a totalization 
of tropological systems—and the counter term that is left is shorn of any 
possible anthropomorphism itself, a “materiality of inscriptions”: “Truth is a 
trope; a trope generates a norm or value; this value (or ideology) is no longer 
true. It is true that tropes are the producers of ideologies that are no longer 
true.” There is something to be said today for a reading of world processes 
as complex “rhetorical” events caught within destructive vortices, reactive 
mimetologies, and pre-emptive maneuvers.  
24. De Man tracked the privative import of zombie tropes but was reticent to 
assume any of the faux pathos of that impact of biomorphic life. He identified 
aesthetic ideology as what accelerates ecocide; he marked the cultural 
investment in “description” and “historicism” similarly; he deboned from 
the flesh of tropes a “materiality of inscription” that would be immaterial 
perceptually, and which would implacably extend into animation and life 
forms (RNA). He tagged unreadability yet did not bother to unfold what that 
implied literally—which is that no text is readable if it is not read through 
its gathering disclosure of ecocide. He refused all the “recuperative” options 
that welded the figure of light and the eye to the promise of knowing, and 
identified affect as a virtual affectation, but eschewed any prophetic pose. 
The ultimate reference to his trope of a “resistance to theory” was not 
the inscriptions out of which perceptual phantoms, historical narrative, 
referential grids, mnemo-technic regimes, mimetic ideologies, and ecocidal 
acceleration derive. The “theory” resisted is paralled oddly by the resistance 
to “climate change” today, which is the resistance to thinking this backloop 
at which an immateriality “materiality of inscription” occurs, and disappears 
into animation and biomorphic “life.” These have now beached themselves in 
an “irreversibility” that penetrates reading.  
25. Until recently, “climate change” was the perpetually arriving bad future to 
be warded off—a fiction that has settled in. That is how the passing of tipping 
points typically looks in an ecocidal civilization. After tipping points pass, 
the acceleration obeys its own vortex of negative feedback loops and sudden 
adjustments. But with tipping points past the temporal glue that held in place 
the discourse currency of anthropos—the temporal span of the “promise,” 
about which credit, managed futures, and utopist lures spawn—snaps like 
the Fates’ thread. A civilization that cannot promise even a “future” has 
abandoned—like the contract of face or tropological regimes, humanualism 
itself—the pretense of the “promise.” Hence the shift today from a rhetoric of 
sustainability to one of “resilience.” 
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26. Say, some HBO script titled “2015,” in which a variety of oddities and events 
juggle for symptom status in a world in which biologemes and “reality” 
appear to have been hacked. In it, mega-droughts and destructive floodings 
accelerate, international “law” accords from the post-cold war parenthesis 
dissolve, democracies fall or falter systemically, and so on—genre stuff. But 
the twist either will sell or not: not only have tipping points quietly passed 
(and been discretely acknowledged by Western states), but as the fog of the 
2008 economic “crisis” parted, or could afford to, what emerged to view was 
quite impressive: the greatest wealth transference, accomplished digitally, 
since Genghis, and without a shot fired by those harvested. But even this 
concealed another event in the plot—and here I am a bit suspicious, unsure if 
it will go directly to late night by its absurdity. Since this remarkable wealth 
transference was engineered by the same corporate class that streamed 
climate denialism to the masses, and since this same hyper-elite turned 
down acting at every opportunity, particularly the U.S., and iconically in 
Copenhagen, one begins to assume an outlandish Hollywood narrative is 
lurking, a narrative that is even disguised by public analysis, chitchat, and 
hand-wringing about “inequality”—another weasel term fallen from the 
Terracotta warrior army of tropes, like those of climate discourse, engineered 
for statuesque opacity. It certainly seems odd if the premise of Enlightenment 
rationalists, free market priests, and science itself assumed that with the 
proper evidence, or coming to light, of awareness of these horrific facts and 
these extinction friendly consequences, a coming together would occur 
to defend, well, self-interest, survival, and so on, which has turned out to 
be largely, if not emphatically, not the case. Rather, we found that after 
Copenhagen, they accelerated emissions. Now, of course, the same interests 
streaming climate change denialism (redundant cognitive paralysis, as 
practiced on Fox News to great effect), know and access more “deep state” and 
collapsing ecosystem reports than any “public”—so, first of all, they know. 
And the transference of hard assets to a new hyper-elite, and the “breakaway 
civilization” (and economy) enacted, is not an issue of “inequality” gone 
hyper again, an imbalance again in the capitalists’ cycle to be wished to be 
returned to its norm (er, “equality”?), but the meme even in Piketty’s hands 
(2014) serves its anaesthetizing purpose. But one of the pleasures of being 
past tipping points, which is to say irreversibly accelerant, is that one can 
set aside all cordial or considerate attempts to rally those addicted to its 
tinctures—ecologically-minded folk, honorable Cassandras, weak messianists 
(yes, still on auto-pilot), those seeking and proposing new “we’s,” or extended 
ones to accommodate some rupture of otherness or some yet unaccounted 
for thing or animeme outside of the pale, late, but now fully digitalized 
“anthropomorphic” apparatuses. And this makes me wonder if the script 
will fly: with this transference of terrestrial wealth and resources undertaken 
not just out of compulsive corruption and mega-acquisitiveness, as per Wall 
Street gaming itself, but with an eye to the predictions of agricultural collapse 
and population culling, such as made already in a 2003 climate change 
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report by the U.S. Department of Defense and C.I.A. (Townsend and Harris 
2014). One had just witnessed, as no one notes, what will be understood 
in retrospect as a species split, and a delineation of disposable castes and 
territories going forward, and a hyper-elite at the cusp of exponential leaps 
in nanotechnologies, genetic engineering, robotics, bio-technics, hyper-
militarized data security, and so on, willing to make the ultimate sacrifice 
of, in this imaginary, being the survivor caste of the species, those who 
would be genetically enhanced in several generations, and in control of 
remaining resources and so on, and look back on the messy residue of earlier 
“Anthropocene 3.0” types as a mop-up operation of those endangering species 
survival. You can round this out yourselves—but I count this screenplay as a 
robust sampling of climate comedy today. What an absurd, kitsch, and cynical 
script. But one does not always get to change channels. The issue with any 
totalization of cognitive systems is the tropological totalitarianism it lends 
itself to. So then, what does this “army of tropes” and its enforcers have to do 
with, well, passing tipping points today—and continuing to dissociate itself 
cognitively from the event? Any metaphorics of light and the angelic metaphor 
of the “human” and its interpretive recuperations appear, like Enlightenment 
templates, tools of a different order, the levers of hypo-scripts operating from 
where light and its others have not been metaphorized, blackness not invented 
nor “light” naturalized as solar god for the eye and life.  
27. It would be an error to think of de Man as launching a mode of rhetorical 
reading ruled by the combinatoire of substitutive chains (anacoluthon, 
prosopopeia, metonomy, and so on, an enumeration Nietzsche’s sentence he is 
rehearsing when interrupted). Rather, “tropes” would tend in late de Man to 
aggregate, appear finally all the same among themselves—the place of doxa, of 
“phenomenalization,” of referential regimes. They are be displaced en masse 
by what, nonetheless, would have no access to perceptibility itself, an order of 
inscriptions.  
28. It would seem, across this parenthesis related to the promise, one witnesses 
the cinematic migrations of the Greek Autos in advance of its successors and 
acquisitions—which includes the corporatization of the non-existent “we”—
until, like the alien bursting from the host human’s belly, it assembles itself 
autonomously, automatically, acquiring compensated elite humans as puppets 
and agents (lawmakers, lobbyists, the sociopathic hero CEO), on behalf of 
logics of exponential acceleration and extractivisms for which social or human 
realities are entirely irrelevant: this specter of an autonomous A.I. haunts the 
post-tipping point imaginary almost like a salvation—the inverse singularity 
concealed in the optimist versions. The trajectory anthropos would have 
cycled through from initiation to the corporatization of the person, in 
some regards “his” full exteriorization, might be cast as Grand Theft Autos 
(by itself). 
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29. For the rural folk of the U.S. state of Georgia who share a dwindling border 
river with their Tennessee neighbors, the latter are sub-humans (and vice 
versa)—as a segment of The Daily Show once documented hilariously. The 
video-game “Tribal War” simply turns on the annihilation of the enemy 
“tribe” (whichever), a variety of soccer hooliganism as ISIS. It is not accidental 
that the geo-political rift artifacted today between a “West” and an “East” 
that marks the de-legitimation of the former’s universalist models, market 
hypocrisies, and “Enlightenment” legal facades levered by financial mafias 
rests not on the rift between post-communist societies and “the West” 
but a different history of writing systems and temporal and mnemonic 
settings, between nihilist monotheist alphabetacisms with teleological 
grammars and alternative hierarchies and definitions of human life (and 
economies of death). 
30. For one of the many genealogies of the “future” offered today with the Janus-
faced god of A.I. in view—the usual, salvation or annihilation, immortality 
or disposability—see Peter Holley 2015: “Apple co-founder on artificial 
intelligence: ‘The future is scary and very bad for people’.” 
31. It would have been manifest in a constitutive resistance to reading itself, to 
reading “Plato” say, rather than transmuting and tagging that event as what 
produced memes the text explicitly disowns—for instance, the eidos, which in 
fact “Parmenides” flays on its conjecture from “young Socrates.” 
32. Perhaps a better prism for reading Nietzsche’s “Rome” would be Michel 
Serres’s interrogation of Rome’s difference and self-erasing origin “legend”—
producing the imperial techno-anthropoid void of philosophic originality, 
a remarkable reading of Rome’s emergence from and as a “black box,” a cave 
legend unlike Plato’s and without sun (Serres 2015, 9-33). 
33. Every time a Hitchcock (among others) marks the cinematic machine as the 
subject and predatory eye itself, pushing out or killing off mimetic human 
“stars” (from The Lodger on, yet most on display in Psycho’s “mother” or the 
birds themselves), it is marked overtly. 
34. When we survey, from the twenty-first century, how “the Greeks” would be 
edited, canonized, reduced to fingers pointing up and down, as by Raphael, 
it echoes what de Man finds occurs to Kant when passed through Schiller’s 
ameliorative pop transcriptions—that nothing changed in centuries of 
interpretation once that would be installed. Or for “Plato,” millennia. 
If the eidos never was posited in Plato’s script as such, the artifice of the 
“Good” involved little more than an inverse transposition of an indigestible 
materiality of the mark itself, transposed across his oeuvre through the 
evolving figurations of “Socrates” (Plato’s Semiotik, says Nietzsche), as 
hypogram, as arete, and so on. The helio-swathed “light” or sun was left for the 
hypocrite lecteurs Plato had so much trust for that he would exile, for them (no 
doubt chuckling), hearing or reading poets.  
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35. “On the one hand, a growing shadow of mass depoliticization is cast by such 
scientific studies of the Anthropocene as various networks of scientific and 
technical experts once again position themselves to administer from above 
and afar any collective efforts to mitigate or adapt to rapid anthropogenic 
climate change” (Luke 2015, 141).  
36. https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/03/
anthropocene-capitalism-climate-change/
Chapter Three 
37. See Miller 2010. I am grateful to Derrida Today (Edinburgh University Press) 
and to Nicole Anderson and Nick Mansfield for permission to reuse this essay 
in slightly changed form. See Permissions at the end of the book.
38. Jules Michelet, “Avenir! Avenir!”; cited from Walter Benjamin, The Arcades 
Project, 4. Percy Bysshe Shelley, “A Defence of Poetry,” etc. I take these 
citations from Samolsky’s admirable Apocalyptic Futures (Samolsky 2011).  
39. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosopher’s_stone, accessed 
May 31, 2009. 
40. I perform this reading in The Conflagration of Community: Fiction Before and 
After Auschwitz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011) on the basis of 
hints in Kafka’s own statements and in remarks by previous critics, as well 
as on the uncanny similarity between Kafka’s narrative and later first-hand 
accounts of the Jews’ transportation to Auschwitz, for example in Primo 
Levi’s Survival in Auschwitz, Elie Wiesel’s Night, or Imre Kertész’s fictionalized 
account of his teenage experiences in the camps in Fatelessness. 
41. See www.stoptrashingtheclimate.org. Accessed November 18, 2015. 
42. The reader should note that the oral version of this paper included an 
accompanying PowerPoint presentation showing an array of dumps, garbage, 
and signs of melting worldwide, from the local dump on Deer Isle to the 
Antarctic ice-melt, a beach in Hawaii, and the top of Mt. Everest, where 
melting is exposing the debris of many climbing expeditions. The presentation 
also included some stills from the Pixar/Disney movie WALL-E, showing the 
whole world made uninhabitable by garbage everywhere. A large secondary 
literature on garbage exists. New evidence of global warming appears nearly 
every day in the media. An example is a recent short piece in Science News 
titled: “Oceans yield huge haul of plastic: ‘Garbage patches’ more common 
and deeper than thought.” What is sometimes called “the Great Pacific 
Garbage Patch” is now, the article notes, measured as about twice the size of 
Alaska. “Some of these areas are like a black hole,” Nikolai Maximenko, an 
oceanopgrapher at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, is quoted as having 
said. “Once things are trapped there, they never escape.” Most of this garbage 
is tiny bits of non-biodegradable plastic. (Science News [March 27, 2010], 8). 
Here are a few high points from the literature on garbage. I thank Dragan 
Kujundzic for identifying these for me. Jacques Derrida’s “Biodegradables: 
Seven Diary Fragments” (Critical Inquiry, 15, 4 [Summer 1989], 812-73) is 
an aggressive answer to the six “responses” the editors of Critical Inquiry had 
recruited as comments on Derrida’s “Paul de Man’s War.” It is also, however, 
an admirable exploration of the resonances echoing in those strange words 
“biodegradable” and “non-biodegradable.” Derrida’s essay is particularly 
forceful as a reflection on what is at stake when you ask whether a text can 
be the one or the other. Here are six books on garbage, waste, rubbish: 
Zygmunt Bauman, Wasted Lives: Modernity and Its Outcasts (Oxford: Polity, 
2004); Gay Hawkins, The Ethics of Waste: How We Relate to Rubbish (Lanham, 
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006); Susan Strasser, Waste and Want: A 
Social History of Trash (New York: Henry Holt, 1999); Heather Rogers, Gone 
Tomorrow: The Hidden Life of Garbage (New York: The New Press, 2005); 
William Rathje and Cullen Murphy, Rubbish!: The Archaeology of Garbage 
(New York: HarperCollins, 1992); Elizabeth Royte, Garbage Land: On the 
Secret Trail of Trash (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2005). A series 
of brilliant articles and conference presentations by Natalka Freeland have 
explored “disposable culture” and “rubbish” in “the Victorian imagination,” 
for example the dust heaps in Dickens’s Our Mutual Friend. 
43. In “Delegation: ‘Deconstruction’ Contretemps, Family Plots, and Climate 
Change,” MS, 15. 
44. Cited by from Foucault’s Power/Knowledge by Giorgio Agamben in an essay 
on Foucault, “What Is an Apparatus,” What Is an Apparatus? And Other Essays, 
trans David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 2009), 2.  
45. See Binaj Gurubacharya’s essay at http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2009/05/25/appa-sherpa-warns-mount-e_n_207398.htm, accessed 
June 1, 2009. 
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